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i 
ABSTRACT 
Using a comprehensive firm-level dataset from the National Bureau Statistics (NBS) 
of China over the period 2000-2007, this thesis studies political connections, 
intended as the lishu relationship between Chinese manufacturing firms and central, 
provincial or local governments. Although extensive studies have investigated firms’ 
political connections, the lishu relationship has not been explored. Besides, the 
literature has generally overlooked an important question: what are the determinants 
of political connections? To fill this gap, we firstly investigate the determinants of 
the lishu relationship. We find that firms’ characteristics, ownerships, financial 
variables, profitability, and sales growth significantly affect the probability of having 
a lishu relationship. We then examine the link between the lishu relationship and 
firms’ exporting propensity and intensity. By examining the unobserved firm 
heterogeneity and the initial conditions problem, we find that the lishu relationship 
has a negative impact on firms’ exporting. Furthermore, firm size, productivity, 
financial health and age are the significant determinants of firms’ exporting. Finally, 
we explore the links between the lishu relationship and financial constraints, 
demonstrating that firms’ financial constraints can be alleviated through a lishu 
relationship. This effect is pronounced for firms affiliated with high level of 
government, foreign firms and firms in financially constrained regions.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This Chapter provides an overview of this research. Section 1.1 introduces the general 
background and the motivations of this research. The research questions and outlines 
of this thesis are proposed Section 1.2.  
 
1.1 Research background 
 
Thanks to its reforming and opening-up policy since the 1970s, China has achieved 
remarkable economic success over the last several decades. The growth rate of its 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has increased dramatically during our sample period, 
from 8.43% in 2000 to 14.19% in 2007. Such a growth has exceeded the GDP growth 
rate of the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), and the global average rate 
(see Figure 1.1). During 2008 and 2009, the world GDP growth experienced a 
significant decline due to the global financial crisis. Both the US and the UK have 
confronted negative growth, while China conserved a considerable growth above 9.00% 
in both years. In 2014, China’s GDP grew approximately 3 times faster than the US 
and the UK (The World Bank) (see Figure 1.1).  
 
In addition to its GDP growth, China’s international trade witnessed a remarkable 
increase. Figure 1.2 plots the value of merchandise exports and imports of China and 
the US from 2000 to 2014. We observe that the US merchandise trade maintained a 
deficit over the period, while China showed a surplus. Specifically, China became the 
largest merchandise exporting country in 2009 with a total value of around 1.20 
2 
trillion US dollars, compared with 1.05 trillion US dollars in the US (the World Trade 
Organization; the World Bank) (see Figure 1.2). Figure 1.2 also shows that both China 
and the US suffered from a shrink in merchandise exports in 2009 because of the 
economic crisis, but the growth recovered faster and rebounded more sharply in China 
than that in the US after the crisis. Moreover, total merchandise trade value accounted 
for 43.63% of the total GDP in China, while the figure was 18.46% in the US in 2009 
(the World Trade Organization; the World Bank) (see Figure 1.3). Figure 1.3 
demonstrates that the contribution of total value of merchandise exports to the GDP 
remained above 38% in China over the period 2000-2014. The ratio reached 64.49% 
in 2006, indicating that exporting in China has contributed to its economic 
development significantly.  
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Figure 1.1 The GDP growth rate from 2000 to 2014 (annual %) 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank.  
Notes: “Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum 
of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated 
without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.” (The World Bank, available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator)
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Figure 1.2 Merchandise exports and imports of China and the United States 
from 2000 to 2014 (trillion US dollars) 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, the World Bank. International Trade Statistics 2001-2014, the 
World Trade Organization.  
Notes: “Merchandise exports show the f.o.b. (free on board) value of goods provided to the rest of the 
world valued in current U.S. dollars.” (The World Bank, available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator) 
 
Figure 1.3 Merchandise trade to GDP ratio in China and the United States  
from 2000 to 2014 (annual %) 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, the World Bank. International Trade Statistics 2001-2014, the 
World Trade Organization.  
Notes: “Merchandise trade as a share of GDP is the sum of merchandise exports and imports divided 
by the value of GDP, all in current U.S. dollars.” (The World Bank, available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator) 
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Yet, such remarkable performance in China has been achieved in recent years, despite 
the underdeveloped financial and legal systems, which are not favourable to efficient 
economic activities. The Chinese phenomenal economic and exporting development 
has therefore been considered as a miracle, and scholars have been trying to 
comprehend how this miracle was made possible.  
 
Some scholars provide an institutional explanation for China’s development, 
suggesting that the relationship among the governments, market, and firms constitutes 
the main driving force through the interaction of the “visible hands” and “invisible 
hands” (Walder, 1995; Qian and Weingast, 1997; Jin and Qian, 1998). They state that 
during China’s economic transition, the government’s interventions help to maintain 
regional stability, which in turn support the firms’ development. Additionally, the 
government controls key products resources and grants favourable assistance to the 
politically connected firms, which accelerates the development of these firms and in 
turn enhances the economic growth. The positive relationship between political 
connections and firm performance has been demonstrated in several empirical studies, 
which define the political connections from the perspectives of state ownership, 
politically related entrepreneurs or large shareholders, and campaign contribution 
(Faccio, 2007, 2010; Chen et al., 2010; Goldman et al., 2009; Claessens et al., 2008; 
Zhang and Huang, 2009).  
 
However, China has a unique type of political connections called the lishu relationship. 
With the deepening of the economic transition, the “visible hands” meet the “invisible 
hands”, in which process a unique institutional variation, the lishu relationship, has 
6 
appeared to play a role of the “visible hands”. Lishu is a Chinese word that means 
“belonging to”, “subordinate to”, “affiliated to”, or “directly controlled by”. Through 
this relationship, the governments can control the firms both legally and directly, while 
the affiliated firms can obtain favourable support from the governments. It is therefore 
the lishu relationship that makes this research in China unique and interesting.   
 
Only few studies have looked at the lishu relationship in China. Both Li (2004) and 
Tan et al. (2007) estimate the links between the lishu relationship and firm 
performance with an insight into labour productivity, finding a U-shaped effect. That 
is, firms affiliated to the central and the lowest level of government (i.e. the township) 
are more productive than the firms connecting to the medium level of government (i.e. 
provincial, prefecture, and county). Guariglia and Mateut (2013) test the links 
between political affiliation and trade credit extension, concluding that politically 
affiliated firms can extend more trade credit than their non-affiliated counterparts. 
However, these studies assume that firms have been politically affiliated before 
conducting the empirical analysis, while overlook another important question: what 
types of firms are more likely to have political affiliation? This question motivates us 
to investigate the determinants of this unique political connection in China.  
 
In addition, as discussed above, China’s exports have contributed greatly to its 
economic growth. An extensive literature has explored firms’ exporting with the  
following focus: 1) the positive impact of exporting on firms productivity, size, and 
financial health (Bernard and Jensen, 1995; Baldwin and Gu, 2003; Greenaway et al., 
2007); 2) assuming the sunk entry costs and firm characteristics as the significant 
7 
determinants of firms’ exporting behaviour (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Bernard and 
Jensen, 1999; Liu and Shu, 2003; Das et al., 2007; Greenaway and Kneller, 2008; 
Manez et al., 2008; Manova, 2013). Although few studies have concentrated on the 
links between ownership and exporting (Lee, 2009; Yi and Wang, 2012; Yi, 2014; 
Dixon et al., 2015), the impact of political connections on firms’ exporting decisions 
and exporting intensity has not been explored yet, which motivates us to estimate the 
extent to which the lishu relationship affects exporting in the context of Chinese 
manufacturing firms.  
 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), a firm’s financing decisions should not 
affect its investment behaviour in a perfect capital market. Nevertheless, capital 
markets are not perfect due to information asymmetries and agency problems. A 
pioneering study by Fazzari et al. (1988) estimates financial constraints by looking at 
the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. The study reveals that cash flow tends to 
influence corporate investment significantly. Subsequently, a branch of literature has 
supported Fazzari et al.’s main conclusion not only from the perspective of fixed 
capital investment activities (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Carpenter and 
Guariglia, 2008), but also from the perspectives of inventory investment (Kashyap et 
al., 1994; Carpenter et al., 1998; Guariglia, 2000), innovation investment 
(Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Bond et al., 2005), employment (Sharp, 1994; 
Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999), and firms’ growth (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). 
Although some studies have looked at the cash flow-investment sensitivity and 
political connections in terms of ownership in China, they either employ a relatively 
small sample that is likely to suffer from the sample selection problem, or only look 
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at the listed firms that may not be a good representative of the whole population of 
Chinese firms. Therefore, we are motivated to investigate how the lishu relationship 
affects the sensitivity of investment to cash flow for the unlisted firms in China.1  
 
1.2 Thesis outline and proposed research questions 
 
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the development 
of private enterprises in China and summaries the relationship between the Chinese 
governments and enterprises in the development, providing background to understand 
the lishu relationship. For the first time in literature, I explore the different meanings 
of the lishu relationship under the different economic development stages in China. 
Moreover, I introduce the procedures of establishing, changing, and terminating the 
lishu relationship. I also elaborate the difference between the lishu relationship and 
ownership structure in this chapter for the first time in literature. Chapter 3 describes 
data and the key variables used for the empirical studies in this thesis.  
 
By examining the significance of firm heterogeneity in having the lishu relationship, 
Chapter 4 tests our first research question: what determines the likelihood of having a 
lishu relationship for Chinese unlisted firms? I test four sets of hypotheses, including 
hypotheses on firm heterogeneity, ownership status, financial factors, and profitability 
and growth opportunities, by using a pooled Probit model with clustering the 
observations by firms’ ID, a random-effects Probit model, and an ordered Probit 
model. We conclude that the probability of a firm being politically affiliated can be 
                                               
1 The “financial health” in this thesis is defined as “financial un-constraints”. Financially healthy firms refer to 
unconstrained firms that do not have difficulties in accessing to finance.  
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explained by the firm’s size, age, the region where it operates, ownership structure, 
financial health, profitability, and growth opportunities. We also find that firms are 
more prone to have the lishu relationship with the medium level of governments as 
they can access the important resources owned by the governments and enjoy certain 
autonomy to develop themselves.   
 
In Chapter 5, we discuss the second research question: to what extent does the lishu 
relationship affect firms’ exporting activities. Controlling for several firm 
characteristics within dynamic export models, we focus on the links between the lishu 
relationship and the propensity and intensity of exporting. The unobserved firm 
heterogeneity and initial conditions problem are also taken into account in our 
regressions. We find that sunk entry costs exist in the export markets and the lishu 
relationship has a significant negative influence on both the probability and the 
intensity of firms’ exporting. Other firm characteristics, such as firm size, total 
productivity, financial factors, types of ownership, and location are the significant 
determinants for firms’ exporting activities.   
 
Our third research question, to what extent does the lishu relationship affect firms’ 
financial health, is tested in Chapter 6. We first analyse financial constraints in China 
and conclude that the investment of Chinese firms is sensitive to the availability of 
internal funds. Then we focus on the links between the lishu relationship and the 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow in Chinese unlisted manufacturing firms by 
employing the first-difference Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) procedure. 
We find that the lishu relationship can mitigate the effects of financial constraints for 
10 
Chinese firms. This effect is more significant for the firms affiliated with a higher 
level of government. We also find that compared with private firms, foreign firms are 
more likely to encounter financial constraints; therefore, the lishu relationship can 
reduce their financial constraints significantly. Furthermore, firms locating in the 
western region have the least sensitivity of investment to the availability of internal 
financing due to the regional preferential policies. However, the lishu relationship can 
help firms in the central and coastal regions alleviate their financial constraints.    
 
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this thesis with a summary of the findings from the 
empirical studies; with a discussion of its implications; and with an elaboration of the 
limitations and the proposed future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 THE LISHU RELATIONSHIP 
This chapter introduces the development of private enterprises in China and 
summaries the relationship between the Chinese governments and enterprises in the 
development, providing background to understand the lishu relationship in section 2.1. 
Section 2.2 explores the different meanings of the lishu relationship under the different 
economic development stages in China for the first time in literature. The procedures 
of establishing, changing, and terminating the lishu relationship are presented in 
section 2.3. Section 2.4 illustrates the positive implications of the lishu relationship in 
enterprises. The difference between the lishu relationship and ownership structure is 
explored in section 2.5. 
 
2.1 The background of the lishu relationship: a chronological review of the 
economic development of China since the establishment of the PRC 
 
China has a unique type of political connections called the lishu relationship that 
means “belonging to”, “subordinate to”, “affiliated to”, or “directly controlled by”. 
Through this relationship, the government can control the firms both legally and 
directly, while the affiliated firms can obtain favourable support from the government. 
It is therefore the lishu relationship that makes this research in China unique and 
stimulating.   
 
The Chinese character “隶属”, or lishu, has to be comprehended with the background 
of the economic development in China. The lishu relationship has different content in 
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the Centralised Economic System1 (CES) and in the Socialised Market Economy 
System (SMES), even across the different development stages of the SMES. The 
understanding of the history of the economic development and the main stages of the 
development in China after 1949, when the PRC was established, therefore constitutes 
a prerequisite to comprehend the lishu relationship of enterprises in China.  
  
Since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949,2 the development of 
enterprises and their political participation in China has experienced a long history, 
which can be divided into the following four stages. 
 
2.1.1 SOEs dominated system (1949-1978): without a clear separation of 
functions between governments and enterprises (zheng qi bu fen) 
 
The first phase during this period starts from 1949 to 1952, which is the recovery 
period of the national economy. The traditional malpractice of the old Chinese 
economic system had a significantly negative influence on the national economy at 
the early stages of the establishment of the new China. In order to solve problems, 
such as the imbalance between demand and supply and the strained relationship 
between state-owned enterprises and individual-owned enterprises, the Central 
Financial and Economic Committee started to reform industry and commerce. The 
main content of this reform was to acknowledge the property rights and obligations 
of individual-owned companies and to stimulate the development of private 
                                               
1 It is also known as Planned Economic System, in which the ownership, the operation, and the management of 
enterprises were mixed and the state’s control is the centre of the economy (Hu, 1998; Cheng, 1986).  
2 The Old China refers to the China in the period between 1840 and 1st October 1949. On 1st October 1949, the 
government of the People’s Republic of China was established. Since then, China was called the New China.  
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businesses.    
 
During this recovery period, the relationship between the governments and private 
firms has been defined through the slogan: “Utilisation, restriction, and transformation” 
(li yong, xian zhi, gai zao)1 (Ji, 2003, p.253). The central government utilises private 
enterprises by administrative management, economic lever, industry self-discipline 
management, and mass movement (xing zheng guan li shou duan, jing ji gang gan 
shou duan, hang ye zu zhi zi lv shou duan, qun zhong yun dong shou duan)2 (Huang, 
2005). 
 
The guiding principal of the Chinese government is to ensure the leading status of the 
state-operated economy and to protect all capitalist industry and commerce, which 
were beneficial to the national economy and to people’s well-being. Therefore, the 
private businesses do not need to establish political connections actively but all of 
                                               
1 Utilising the private economy refers to the government stimulating the enthusiasm of private enterprises, by 
allowing them to obtain the normal profits which can support their production and expend reproduction, and by 
encouraging the material exchange between city and country and among different districts, in order to develop the 
national economy and mitigate the conflicts between demand and supply caused by material shortages. Restricting 
the private economy means that along with policies aimed at regulating capital, controlling trade, and strengthening 
planning, the government restricts those aspects of private economy which are detrimental to the nation’s economy 
and the people’s well-being from various perspectives (e.g. the range of the economic activities, tax policy, market 
prices, and labour conditions). Transforming private enterprises refers to the government adjusting industry and 
commerce, promoting rural-urban trade, and motivating market circulation based on the socialist principle. 
2 Administrative management includes the adjustment of the relationship between public economy and private 
economy, the improvement of the business environment for individual and private enterprises, and the enlargement 
of the amount of processing orders and government procurement from the private industries. Economic lever refers 
to easier money policy, demand promotion, tax adjustment, and tax items simplification. Industry self-discipline 
management involves formulating measures for industry so that the private firms in industry have to follow when 
they perform economic activities. For example, the government adjusts the relationship between labours and the 
companies by introducing consultative approach to deal with the conflicts in labour relations. Besides, the 
government requires the private enterprises to publish the production and marketing information in order to guide 
the entrepreneurs’ production and operation. Mass movement refers to two important political campaigns, named 
as Against Three Evils happened at the end of 1951 and Against Five Evils happened in the beginning of 1952. 
Against Three Evils refers to conduct the anti-corruption, anti-waste, and anti-bureaucratic in the national 
authorities and businesses. While Against Five Evils means to conduct anti-bribe, anti-tax evasion, anti-jerry work, 
anti-theft of the state property, and anti-theft of national economic intelligence. Through these two mass 
movements, the leading status of working-class and socialism state operated economy has been consolidated, the 
management system of workers and clerks monitoring production and participation in operation has been 
established, and the favourable conditions to conduct the socialism transformation of private industry and 
commerce have been created.   
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them are controlled and supervised by the government. Between 1949 and 1952, 
although the state-operated economy was the leading part of the Chinese economy, it 
did not have an overwhelming dominance over the private economy. On the contrary, 
the output value of private businesses took up approximately 50% of the total output 
value (see Table 2.1).  
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Table 2.1 The value of gross output of different kinds of enterprises from 1949 to 1978 
 
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. (1985). Chinese Statistics Summary 1985. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
Year Whole people ownership Collective ownership 
Joint public-private 
ownership 
Private 
ownership 
Individual ownership Total 
Absolute Value 
(100 million RMB) 
1949   36.80         0.70    2.20    68.30 32.30 140.30 
1952 142.60         11.20     13.70  105.20 70.60 343.30 
1957 421.50 149.20 206.30     0.40 6.50 783.90 
1965  1255.50 138.40  0.00   0.00   0.00 1393.90 
1978  3416.40 814.40  0.00   0.00   0.00 4230.80 
Proportion（%） 
1949 26.20 0.50 1.60 48.70 23.00 100.00 
1952 41.50 3.30 4.00 30.60 20.60 100.00 
1957 53.80 19.00 26.30 0.10 0.80 100.00 
1965 90.10   9.90     0.00   0.00   0.00 100.00 
1978 80.80   19.20     0.00   0.00   0.00 100.00 
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The second phase is the traditionally planned economic system stage that goes from 
the beginning of the socialist construction period (1952) to the reform and opening-
up period (1978).  
 
Since 1952, private enterprises in China experienced the Socialist Transformation (she 
hui zhu yi gai zao). When the national economy had recovered from the traditional 
malpractice of the old Chinese economic system, the Party Central Committee 
decided to transform from the New Democracy to Socialism. In the first session of the 
Secretariat of the Central Committee meeting in September 1952, Chairman Mao 
stated that the country would basically complete the transition to Socialism in the next 
ten to fifteen years. Then, in September 1953, the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China announced the general line for the transition period. The 
main part of the general line was to gradually implement socialist industrialisation, 
while the other important part was to gradually implement the socialist transformation 
of agriculture, handicrafts, the capitalist industry, and commerce. According to this 
general line, the whole country began to carry out the Three Socialist Transformations 
Movement, i.e. the agriculture socialist transformation, the handicrafts socialist 
transformation, and the capitalist industry and commerce socialist transformation. 1 
                                               
1 The agriculture socialist transformation is also known as the “cooperative movement of agriculture”, which is 
named after the cooperative society in Soviet Union. More specifically, the agriculture socialist transformation 
refers to the transfer of the small-scale peasant economy to the socialist collective economy through a cooperation 
approach under the supervision of the people’s democratic dictatorship. At the end of 1956, the agriculture socialist 
transformation was completed and the amount of peasant households who joined in the cooperative society reached 
up to 96.3%. The handicrafts socialist transformation refers to the transfer of the private ownership of means of 
production of small handicrafts workers to collective ownership through three stages, including the establishment 
of the handicrafts production group, the handicrafts supply and marketing cooperative, and the handicrafts 
production cooperative. At the end of 1956, the number of people who had joined the handicrafts cooperative made 
up 91.7% of the total number of handicrafts workers in the whole country, indicating that the handicrafts socialist 
transformation was completed. The capitalist industry and commerce socialist transformation means that based on 
the “peaceful purchase” policy (whereby means of production are nationalised through peaceful methods and 
purchased with compensation), the government transferred the national capitalist industry and commerce to 
socialist public owned enterprises through national capitalism. At the end of 1956, this transformation was 
completed and the enterprises characterised by a joint venture between the public and private sector accounted up 
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The Three Socialist Transformations Movement was completed in only four years, 
from 1952 to 1956. Through this transformation, the nature of production goods was 
changed from private ownership to socialist public ownership. China became a 
socialist society and initially established a basic system of Socialism.  
 
In the following 20 years, private enterprises disappeared because of the completed 
socialist transformation. Especially during the Culture Revolution period, every single 
private business was considered as a “remnant of capitalism”, which had to be got rid 
of. Private businesses experienced a miserable and difficult period. Until 1978, all 
private businesses were abandoned. The total number of individual workers in China 
in 1978 was only 140,000, which only made up 0.015% of the total population 
(962,590,000). There was no record of private businesses and private enterprises 
during this period (see Table 2.1).    
 
During this traditional planned economic period, the economic system was 
characterised as highly centralised planned economy. As the country stood at an 
economically backward starting point, the State-owned enterprises (SOEs) system 
was carried out so that China could meet the needs of an increasing development rate. 
With the absence of private firms, the SOEs system was compatible with the economic 
system in that particular period, suggesting that the SOEs were the major income 
source and major expenditure channels of the national finance. At that time, the 
resource allocation system was highly centralised and enterprises did not have 
autonomous rights in operation, which was controlled by the government. Therefore, 
                                               
to 99% of the total original capitalist industry households and workers.  
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China established a complete industrial system which covered extensive industrial 
categories only with the development of SOEs (Liu, 2009). 
 
Under a such highly centralised planned economic system, private enterprises were 
no longer an independent economic entity because of a lack of autonomy and 
independence. That is, there were no private firms, but only the SOEs and politically 
affiliated firms. Each enterprise was controlled by a corresponding administrative 
department. Governments supervised and commanded companies’ activities directly 
by administrative measures. The management rights were controlled by governments 
at different levels, indicating that managers in enterprises were only executors of the 
governments to carry out the governments’ operating decisions. All appointments and 
dismissals of enterprises’ leaders and recruitments of employees were controlled by 
governments.  
 
At that time, the affiliated enterprises became the production department of 
governments. All enterprise activities were based on governments’ administrative 
goals. For example, the operating activities of enterprises only took national planned 
aims into consideration, and the operating goal of enterprises was to accomplish 
governments’ planned targets. Without considering sales and customers’ demands, 
enterprises only cared about production quantity, instead of quality. The relationship 
between private firms and the governments was quite affinitive and there was no clear 
separation between the functions of governments and enterprises. 
 
However, this situation led to several problems, such as unscientific performance 
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evaluation mechanisms and incentive system, a lack of enthusiasm of employees, and 
serious bureaucracy problems (Bai and Ren, 2007).  
 
2.1.2 The rise and development of private enterprises (1978-1988) 
 
In the 1980s, the Chinese market started to open to individual-owned businesses. In 
1978, the reform and opening-up policy was carried out in order to break the planned 
economic system and to improve the enterprises system reform by introducing market 
mechanisms. With the gradual establishment of a modern enterprise system, the seeds 
of private enterprises were sown.  
 
In 1979, the government allowed for the first time urban and rural individual workers 
who had a valid residence registration to engage in the repair, service, and 
manufacturing industry, as a subsidiary and complement to socialist public ownership. 
However, they were not allowed to recruit labour. Therefore, the private firms during 
that time period were quite small and their development was stagnant. Before 1980, 
the policy of the Party and the government was not to encourage or to prohibit the 
private businesses, indicating that the private businesses did not have a legal status at 
that time.  
 
In August 1980, the central government held a National Employment Conference and 
decided to encourage and support the development of private enterprises in towns and 
cities. The new “3 in 1 combination” employment policy was presented at the 
conference, pointing out that employment could be improved by combining 
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employment by assignment through the Government Labour Department, voluntarily-
organised employment, and self-employment. More specifically, in the Several 
Political Provisions of the State Council on Urban Non-agricultural Individual 
Economy (guo wu yuan guan yu cheng zhen fei nong ge ti jing ji ruo gan zheng ce 
xing gui ding) published by the State Council in July 1981, individual businesses were 
allowed to employ others, but were limited to up to two assistants, and no more than 
five apprentices.  
 
These regulations ensured that the state would protect the legal rights and interests of 
private operators, but also imposed certain limits on their size and fields of operation. 
Only unemployed youths, the official urban residence, or retirees with certain skills 
to pass on were allowed to engage in individual businesses. Additionally, individuals 
could only engage in all kinds of small-scale handicrafts, retail commerce, catering, 
services, repairs, non-mechanised transport, and building repairs, which were 
beneficial to the national economy and did not involve the exploitation of others. The 
limits imposed were for political purposes and kept the private economy under the 
control of the socialist state and unlikely to develop any capitalist tendency.  
 
A new Constitution was passed on 4th December 1982, at the fifth session of the Fifth 
National People’s Congress (NPC). For the first time, the Constitution admitted the 
legal status of individual-owned businesses. After his first South Tour in January 1984, 
Deng Xiaoping decided to open up 14 coastal cities, which stimulated the prosperous 
development of private businesses, and this phenomenon was called as “xia hai”1 in 
                                               
1 The orginal meaning of “xia hai” is going to the sea. At the beginning of opening-up period, “xia hai” refers to 
people, especially those worked in government institutions, regisn from their old jobs and start doing business.  
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Chinese. At the end of 1986, the amount of township and village enterprises rose to 
15.15 million and the population of the labour force of these enterprises was almost 
80 million. The taxes they paid were 17 billion Yuan and the total value of output 
amounted to 330 billion, which accounted for 20% of the whole national total value 
of output (Wu, 2009).   
 
In order to supervise and protect the legal rights of individual businesses, the 
Provisional Administrative Regulation on Urban and Rural Individual Industrial and 
Commercial Households (cheng xiang ge ti gong shang hu guan li zan xing tiao li) 
was issued in September 1987. Then in October 1987, the Thirteenth National Party 
Congress pointed out that the socialist economic mechanism was a planned 
commodity economy on the basis of public ownership. A socialist planned commodity 
economy mechanism should be a unitary economic system of planned economy and 
market economy, indicating the markets were regulated and controlled by the state. In 
this congress, the legal existence and development of the private economy were 
admitted publicly for the first time. It was also stated that the State’s basic policy on 
the private economy was to encourage, protect, guide, supervise and manage the 
development of the private economy. Under this circumstance, private enterprises saw 
their first development boom.  
 
In April 1988, the first session of the Seventh National People’s Congress adopted an 
“Amendment to the Constitution of People’s Republic of China.”1 (zhong hua ren min 
                                               
1 The first article of the “Amendment to the Constitution of People’s Republic of China” states that Article 11 of 
the Constitution should include a new paragraph which specifies that: “The state permits the private sector of the 
economy to exist and develop within the restrictions prescribed by law. The private sector of the economy is 
complement to the socialist public economy. The state protects the legal rights and interests of the private sector 
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gong he guo xian fa xiu zheng an), suggesting the acknowledgement of the legal status 
of private enterprises was been written in the Constitution of China. In June 1988, the 
Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Private Enterprises 
(zhong hua ren min gong he guo si ying qi ye zan xing tiao li) was issued. It stated that 
assets of private enterprises belonged to individuals and admitted the legal rights for 
private businesses to employ more than eight employees. After this point, the Party 
Central Committee and the State Council have acknowledged private enterprises 
officially and the private economy finally had legal status.  
 
In these early years of market economy transition, the facilities and support to obtain 
the resources and access the market were quite deficient, which hindered the 
commercial environment. As a response, private enterprises in China attempted to 
establish political connections through “wearing a red hat” (dai hong mao zi) whereby 
they disguised their private ownership and registered as a public owned organisation 
by affiliating themselves to government agents. Many scholars (for example, Li, 2005; 
Luo et al., 1998; Putterman, 1995) have noticed the red hat phenomenon and 
developed various terms to describe it, such as disguised private enterprises, de facto 
privatisation, pseudo-collectives, or pseudo-SOEs.  
 
According to Pan (2006), the phenomenon of wearing a red hat was most popular in 
the 1980s, taking up 46.30% of the total number of private enterprises. Such prevalent 
activities could benefit both enterprises and public owned agents. At that time, the 
private entrepreneurs were worried that the Party and state policy might change 
                                               
of the economy, exercises guidance and supervision, and controls over the private sector of the economy.” 
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against them and were afraid that a socialist transformation might happen again. By 
wearing a red hat, not only their rights could be secured, but also they could utilise 
the prestige, customer network, and interpersonal relationships of public owned 
agents to obtain greater profits. On the other hand, in order to put on a red hat, private 
entrepreneurs needed good connections with government officials and had to pay a 
management fee to the affiliated government agency or public-owned firm.1 In this 
case, such management fee became one of the important income sources for public 
owned sectors.    
 
2.1.3 Unstable development of individual-owned businesses (1988-1992) 
 
In the middle of the 1980s, economic reforms swept over the country. Some new 
phenomena, such as the introduction of a contract system,2 appeared with the rapid 
development of social productivity. However, the level of people’s awareness still 
stayed at the traditional planned economy stage and did not catch up with the 
development of social productivity. In this case, these new phenomena were not 
understood and were considered as capitalism and some people claimed that they 
should be prevented.  
 
The most well-known event was called the “Guan Guangmei phenomenon”. Guan 
                                               
1 Chan (1992, p. 251-252) quotes a classic example on such affiliation activity. An official who had worked for 10 
years in a regional office of the Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Corporation decided to quit and run his 
own business, making use of the extensive network built up in his previous job. Instead of setting up a private firm, 
he made an arrangement with the local authority whereby the firm would be officially owned by the authority and 
subcontracted to it. According to the contract, the local authority would not invest any money but would be entitled 
to 30 percent of the firm’s profit. In return, the local authority would provide assistance to the firm in acquiring 
premises, licences, electricity and telephone lines, and in dealing with the Tax Bureau on the firm’s behalf. 
2 Contract System is a labour employment system, which did not exist before. Because of the highly centralised 
planned economy, the labour’s recruitment, wage, and distribution are all arranged by the state. The workers 
recruited are the permanent workers, who will never lose his/her job.   
24 
 
Guangmei was a worker in a vegetable company in Benxi, Liaoning Province. Since 
1985, she leased eight grocery stores consecutively. The profit she made during two 
years was one million RMB, which was 20 times of the average income of the whole 
population during that period. In this case, some people considered her as a capitalist, 
who did not follow socialism. Later that year, there was a heated debate on whether 
the private economy, contract, and lease operation method were characteristics of 
socialism or capitalism (xing zi hai shi xing she). Since the second half of 1988, the 
government started to manage the economic environment and rectify the economic 
order to control the chaos in economic life. Under these circumstances, the economic 
environment became strict for private entrepreneurs. In addition, a trend of bourgeois 
liberalisation started in 1989. Some people propagandised bourgeois freedom and 
democracy and took activities against the Party and socialism. After this political 
disturbance, the whole society started to criticise bourgeois liberalisation, 
westernisation and privatisation. Some people stated that the private economy posed 
a threat to the status of public ownership, and thus had a negative impact on national 
stability. Due to these unfavourable political and policy environments, although the 
private economy had already received legal status, the development of private 
enterprises was made very difficult, which weakened the development of the private 
economy.        
 
Under such an unfavourable environment during the early 1990s, many private 
enterprises tried to wear a “red hat” in order to secure political protection and obtain 
important resources such as energy and finance from the government (Naughton, 1994; 
Che and Qian, 1998). But it was difficult for them to obtain such political connections 
because they were considered to be against socialism. 
25 
 
2.1.4 Golden period of development (1992-2003) 
 
This represents the golden period of the development of the Chinese private economy. 
In order to find out whether the individual economy could be characterised as 
socialism or capitalism, between January and February 1992, Deng Xiaoping 
inspected the south of China and gave a speech, which scientifically explained the 
essence of socialism and the relationship between the planned and market economy, 
solved the ideological problem constantly obsessing the Chinese people, and defined 
directions of transition from a planned economy to a market economy.  
 
Deng Xiaoping stated that in the past the policy had focused on how to develop 
productivity, while it overlooked the importance of reform. Reform referred to a 
change in economic mechanisms, which fundamentally restricted the development of 
productivity, established the socialist economic system with vigour and vitality, and 
improved the development of productivity. In this case, reform also meant 
emancipation of the productive forces. He pointed out that thanks to the reform and 
opening-up activities, the development of the economy and the people’s living 
standards had improved.  
 
He also clarified that the criteria for judging the characteristics of the individual 
economy should be whether it promotes the growth of productive forces in a socialist 
society, whether it promotes the overall powers of the socialist country, and whether 
it improves people’s living standards. He suggested people should be bolder than 
before in conducting reform and opening to the outside world, by emancipating their 
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minds and attempting more experiments with courage.  
 
This speech generated reform and an opening-up policy, encouraged people to 
emancipate their minds, and woke up people’s awareness of doing business. 
Thereafter, the development of private businesses started to face a favourable political 
environment and private enterprises began to develop speedily.  
 
In October 1992, the 14th National Conference of the Communist Party of China (CPC) 
took a significant step of the reform and set an objective to establish a socialist market 
economy system. In 1997, the 15th National Conference of the CPC enhanced the 
status of private enterprises. It stated clearly that the non-public sector of the economy 
was an important component of China’s socialist market economy. It also confirmed 
that the basic economic system at the primary stage of socialism was keeping public 
ownership in a dominant position and developing multiple forms of ownership side 
by side. It indicates that the nature of the non-public sector of the economy had 
become an important component of the socialist economy, instead of a necessary 
supplement to the socialist economy. Afterwards, an increasing number of enterprises 
began to drop their “red hats” as the economic environment became more favourable 
for private firms.   
 
The second session of the Ninth NPC in 1999 passed a new “Amendment to the 
Constitution of People’s Republic of China” (zhong hua ren min gong he guo xian fa 
xiu zheng an), which acknowledged, for the first time, that individually-owned 
businesses, the private economy, and other non-public-owned economies were 
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important parts of the socialist market economy that could be written into the 
Constitution, legally protecting the development of the private economy.  
 
In his speech on the 80th anniversary of the Communist Party in July 2001, the 
Secretary-General of China, Jiang Zemin defined private entrepreneurs for the first 
time as constructors of the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and 
stated that constructors of the socialist cause, including private entrepreneurs, should 
be treated equally from a political perspective. In November 2002, the 16th National 
Conference of the CPC amended the Party Constitution, allowing private 
entrepreneurs to become Party members, which provided a favourable platform for 
private entrepreneurs to seek political status.   
 
During this decade from 1992 to 2002, the non-state economy witnessed a rapid 
development. For example, its output value increased from 20.5 billion up to 392.3 
billion RMB. The number of households, the number of employees and the amount 
of registered capital have seen a substantial increase (see Table 2.2).  
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Table 2.2 The development of individual enterprises and private 
enterprises in China from 1992 to 2002 
 
 Individual Enterprises Private Enterprises 
Year Households Employees Capital Households Employees Capital 
1992 1533.90 2476.70 601.00 13.90 231.90 221.00 
1993 1766.99 2939.30 854.90 23.80 372.60 680.50 
1994 2186.60 3775.90 1318.60 43.20 648.40 1447.80 
1995 2528.50 4613.60 1813.10 65.45 955.97 2621.71 
1996 2703.70 5017.10 2165.40 81.93 1171.13 3752.37 
1997 2850.00 5441.90 2574.00 96.10 1349.30 5140.10 
1998 3120.00 6114.00 3120.00 120.00 1710.00 7198.00 
1999 3160.00 6241.00 3493.00 151.00 2020.00 10287.00 
2000 2671.00 5070.00 3315.00 176.00 2406.00 13308.00 
2001 2433.00 4760.00 3436.00 202.85 2714.00 18212.00 
2002 2377.00 4743.00 3782.00 243.53 3409.00 24756.00 
Notes1: “Households” is the number of households, the unit is 10 thousand households; “Employees” 
refers to the number of employees, the unit is 10 thousand people; “Capital” stands for the amount of 
registered capital, the unit is a hundred million RMB.  
Data Source: Zhang, H and Ming, L. (2004). The Development Report of Non-Stated-Owned 
Enterprises: 2003. Beijing: Social Science Academic Press   
 
Although since the 15th CPC, more and more entrepreneurs began to get rid of their 
“red hats”, this does not mean that entrepreneurs in the private economy were no 
longer interested in establishing political connections. Actually, they become more 
and more active in participating in politics. According to Chen et al. (2012), since 
2001, about 600 private entrepreneurs and individual business owners became Model 
                                               
1 Individual enterprises and private enterprises are both included in the non-state economy. The former 
one refers to the enterprises where the means of production are owned by an individual or family and 
those can only hire less than 8 employees. While private enterprises are the firms that with private 
capitalist nature.  
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Workers (the best worker), while some of them were elected as chairmen of the 
Federation of Industry and Commerce at the province level, and some of them became 
members of the Party Congress at the city or province levels. More and more private 
entrepreneurs started to enter politics by obtaining membership to the People’s 
Congress (PC) or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). 
At that time, a great amount of people from the private sector started to actively 
participate in politics in the two months after the 16th Party Congress in November 
2002, and some of them obtained very high positions. The number of them was 
unprecedentedly high since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.  
 
In 2003, the China Business Times (zhong hua gong shang shi bao) reported the 
beginning of political activity of private entrepreneurs as one of the top 10 news of 
the Chinese private economy. It was also reported that in the 10th National Committee 
of the CPPCC, more than 65 members, accounting for 2.9% of the whole committee, 
were from the private economic sectors. According to the Wenzhou Federation of 
Industry and Commerce in 2006, 596 people, coming from private enterprises, were 
members of the PC or the CPPCC at the county level or above in this industrial city. 
Compared with the previous record, there was an increase of 414 people. Although 
the private economy developed in an unfavourable environment in China for a long 
time, private enterprises’ political participation has always been important during the 
development of private firms’ history in order to deal with incomplete market and 
allow firms to gain favourable support from governments.  
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2.2 The lishu relationship under the CES and the SMES 
 
The lishu relationship under the different economic development stages in China has 
different content because the roles of the government in the economic activities 
change (Zhou, 2006). Under the CES, all the enterprises in China had the 
lishu relationship and the relationship in certain enterprises even maintains and 
continues in the contemporary economy of China (Cheng, 1986). The governmental 
intervention in these enterprises and the political connections were therefore high. 
However, the lishu relationship under the SMES should be read differently in different 
forms of enterprises in China, which will be explored in this section.  
 
2.2.1 The lishu relationship under the CES in China 
 
Under the CES in the 1950s, all the enterprises should be affiliated to a government 
or a governmental organ of China, in which the lishu relationship connected all the 
macroeconomic and microeconomic activities closely to the government(s) (Cheng, 
1986).  
 
Before 1978, all the enterprises in China are state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) or 
public-private cooperative enterprises (PPCEs) in which the governments held shares 
in every enterprise (Cao, 1981; Gao, 1999; Fan, 1990). The governments acted on 
behalf of the “Chinese people” to hold shares of the enterprises. The lishu relationship 
therefore commonly existed in enterprises between 1950 and 1978. 
  
The lishu relationship and the political connections in the SOEs were generated since 
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the day an enterprise was established because it was the governments or governmental 
organs that directly set up (a new) or took over (an existing) enterprise. The lishu 
relationship did not maintain when the enterprise did not exist any longer. As well, the 
lishu relationship changed when the enterprise was affiliated to another government 
or governmental organ. For example, a Chinese private investor Jiaxi Ni purchased 
Yili (a foreign firm making transnational goods transactions) in 1946 from Nick, who 
was a Jew operating Yili Commercial Firm before the establishment of the PRC. In 
order to recover the economy of Beijing after the domestic war between 1945 and 
1949, the Beijing government established a PPCEs with Jiaxi Ni, creating an 
enterprise named as Beijing Yili Food Company in the 1950s. The lishu relationship 
was therefore generated between the Beijing government and Yili (Jiang, 2012). As is 
mentioned above, all the enterprises established in China were either SOEs or PPCEs1 
before 1978, the lishu relationship was thus a characteristic commonly existed in the 
enterprises.  
 
Managing the economic activities through the lishu relationship, the governments 
played the roles mixed with the administrative and economic tasks including planning 
production, allocating resources, arranging salaries, purchasing products, deploying 
labour force, collecting income and budgeting expenses directly (Zeng, 1999). 
Through the direct management of the enterprises, the governments determined the 
economic and personnel issues of the enterprises by the means of issuing 
                                               
1 It is noteworthy that another important form of enterprise: collective-owned enterprises (COEs) also exist, 
especially in the rural areas of China. But the COEs in either the cities/towns or the villages are controlled and 
operated by the “working people” collectively, rather than the “government” or “organ”. Therefore, this section 
does not explore the lishu relationship in COEs. See Regulation on the Collective-Owned-Enterprises in Cities and 
Towns of the PRC, released on 9th September 1991, entered into force on 1st January 1992, amended on 8th January 
2011; Regulation on the Collective-Owned-Enterprises in Villages of the PRC, released on 3rd June 1990, entered 
into force on 1st July 1990. 
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administrative orders.  
 
2.2.2 The lishu relationship under the SMES in China 
 
Since 1978, private enterprises (PEs) and foreign enterprises (FEs) began to emerge 
in China. In other words, governments and governmental organs are no longer the 
only participants in the economic system who can establish enterprises. Private 
natural/legal person, foreign natural/legal person, government/organs, etc. are all able 
to take part in the SMES but the lishu relationship does not exist in all enterprises 
anymore. During this period, the Chinese character “隶属” (lishu) actually has two 
different meanings.   
 
The first meaning of lishu relationship narrowly refers to the connection between an 
enterprise and the branches/offices affiliated to the enterprise. In this context, the 
branches or offices are considered as the affiliations of the enterprise under the lishu 
relationship. For instance, the international law firm, Linklaters, has set up three 
affiliations in China until March 2015. In pursuant to the Enforcement Rules of the 
PRC on Administration and Registration on Enterprise Legal Person (zhong hua ren 
min gong he guo qi ye fa ren deng ji guan li shi xing xi ze), 1 such affiliations should 
provide the information regarding the enterprises to which they are affiliated (lishu) 
to the administrative registration office. Furthermore, the Rules of the PRC on 
Administration and Registration on Individual Proprietorship Enterprise (ge ren du zi 
                                               
1 Enforcement Rules of the PRC on Administration and Registration on Enterprise Legal Person, released on 20th 
February 2014, entered into force on 1st March 2014, Articles 21&22. 
33 
 
qi ye deng ji guan li ban fa) 1  require the enterprise’s branches to provide the 
information of the affiliation body (the individual proprietorship enterprise) to the 
administrative office. 
 
However, such a lishu relationship does not refer to the theme of this thesis because it 
lacks the political connections. But it is noteworthy that such a lishu relationship has 
been stipulated explicitly in Chinese laws above and it is only one aspect of the 
meaning of the lishu relationship.  
 
The lishu relationship in this thesis is defined as the enterprises “belonging to”, or 
“subordinate to”, or “affiliated to”, or “directly controlled by” the governments or 
governmental organs. The lishu relationship establishes political connections through 
linking an enterprise to a specific level of governments/organs. Unlike the lishu 
relationship which was applied to all the enterprises under the CES above, the lishu 
relationship under the SMES is only established through contributions to the shares 
of an enterprise.  
 
In the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) where the governments or governmental organs 
control 51% shares of the enterprises or more, the share contributions (may exist in 
the forms of capital, land, properties and intellectual property) make the enterprises 
be affiliated to the governments or organs. For instance, the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC)2 was set 
                                               
1 Rules of the PRC on Administration of Registration on Individual Proprietorship Enterprise, released and entered 
into force on 13th January 2000, Articles 39. 
2 It is a commission of the State Council (SC) of the PRC being responsible for managing the SOEs, appointing 
top executives and approving mergers and acquisitions. Indeed, SASAC is among the many governmental organs 
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up in 2003, representing the state and the people to hold shares only in certain 
enterprises (Shi and Zhao, 2003; Wu, 2003; Zhao, 2004). The State Development & 
Investment Corporation (SDIC) is a pure SOE wholly owned by the SASAC. SDIC 
invested 100% shares of China International Investment and Trade Company (CIITC), 
Guangzhou Textile Resources Company (GTR) and Tianjin Tianyuan Trade Company 
(TTT). Moreover, in Beijing Textile Resources Limited (BTR) and Shenzhen Sanhuan 
Industrial Corporation (SSI), SDIC is also holding the majority shares (Yan, 2006; 
Luo, 2007; Guo, 2013). Because the shares of CIITC, GTR, TTT, BTR and SSI are 
fully or majorly held by the SASAC, they are affiliated to the SASAC, which is a 
governmental organ at the central level. As the SASAC is a component of the State 
Council (SC) system of China, the enterprises listed above are therefore having the 
lishu relationship with a central governmental organ in China and such a relationship 
is established on the basis of the shares of the SASAC in the enterprises.  
 
The lishu relationship and the political connections also exist in the private enterprises 
(PEs), in which the private holds the 51% shares of the enterprises or more. In this 
circumstance, the lishu relationship exists because of the existence of the shares of the 
governments or governmental organs. Such PEs differ from the SOEs although they 
have governmental shares because these PEs do not have compulsory public functions 
for the society, which should be undertaken as the main duty of the SOEs (Qiao and 
Liu, 2010; Hao and Shao, 2006). The governmental shares do not constitute the 
majority shares of certain enterprises because some SOEs are in the process of 
privatisation (transferring to PEs) in which the state’s shares are decreasing but have 
                                               
that are still imposing political connections on the economy and the lishu relationship is hence established in the 
circumstances where the governmental organs (or governments) are involved. 
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not been removed completely (Hu, 2004; Xu, 2002). In other PEs where the 
governmental shares are the minority, the governmental participation aims to improve 
the capacity and profitability of the governmental capital, instead of controlling the 
enterprises or the sectors (Lin, 2008; Xu, 2015). For instance, China Mengniu Dairy 
Company (Mengniu) is a manufacture producing and distributing dairy products, 
which was established by a Chinese citizen Gensheng Niu in 1999 as a PE. In 2009, 
China National Oils, Foodstuffs and Cereals Corporation (COFCO) purchased 20% 
stake of Mengniu (Ye and Qiu, 2008). Because the COFCO is a SOE wholly owned 
and directly administrated by the SC (Gao et al., 2012), the lishu relationship was 
created between Mengniu and the central level of government in China.     
 
From the perspective of shares contributions of the government/organ, foreign 
enterprises (FEs) can also have the lishu relationship. According to Chinese laws, 
foreign investors/capitals can enter into China only in the forms of Sino-Foreign Joint 
Venture, China-Foreign Cooperative Enterprise or Foreign-Capital Enterprise.1 In the 
first two forms of FEs, the capitals or non-capital properties from the governments or 
governmental organs may exist, which generate the lishu relationship. For instance, 
Beijing Youshi Contact Lens Co. Ltd. (Beijing Youshi) is a Sino-Foreign Joint Venture 
established in Beijing, in which Beijing Yishang Group (former: Beijing First 
Commercial Bureau) holds 40% shares (Meng, 2009). Because Beijing Yishang 
Group is wholly owned and directly operated by the Beijing government, Beijing 
Youshi therefore has the lishu relationship with this government.   
                                               
1 See Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign-Capital Enterprises, Law of the People's Republic of 
China on Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Ventures, and the Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-foreign 
Co-operative Enterprise. 
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Because the governments or governmental organs hold certain shares in PEs or FEs, 
they are able to elect the governmental representatives as the directors, supervisors, 
or managers. Because the governments or governmental organs also work to maintain 
and increase the value of their shares in the PEs, they tend to utilise the lishu 
relationship to achieve the targets.  
 
In spite of the difference of the lishu relationship in the CES and the SMES, the 
enterprises having the lishu relationship are commonly affiliated to a government or 
governmental organ. The possible affiliated governments are broadly expanded to: (1) 
all the administrative levels of governments in China including the central government 
(State Council (SC)), province-level governments (the number of provincial 
governments in China is 34, sic passim), city-level governments (333), county-level 
governments (2,856), and town-level governments (40,906); (2) governmental organs 
including the ministries, committees, commissions, bureaus and offices of the SC, and 
bureaus, committees departments and offices of the other levels of governments.   
 
2.3 Procedures establishing and changing the lishu relationship 
 
In SOEs, PEs, COEs and FEs, the lishu relationship is established once the 
government(s) or governmental organ(s) contribute to the shares of the enterprises. In 
a PE, a government or governmental organ can input capitals, land or production 
equipment to the enterprise. Also, the PE can seek the governmental participation in 
its shares. Either by accepting the governmental input or seeking the governmental 
contribution, the PE can obtain the lishu relationship accordingly. For instance, since 
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all the economic activities were controlled by different levels of governments in China 
before 1978, a natural person had to obtain the lishu relationship with a government 
or governmental organ before she/he can establish an enterprise. The Public-Private 
Joint Operation Enterprise at the time was created to spread the lishu relationship to 
all the enterprises across the country (He, 2003; Zhang, 2007; Yang and Yan, 2010). 
Apart from obtaining the lishu relationship through the means above, the enterprises 
shall complete the legal procedure to record the relationship in written, as is discussed 
below.  
 
Under the CES, the lishu relationship was required to be recorded in the memorandum 
of the enterprises to demonstrate the governments or governmental organs affiliated.1 
The lishu relationship shall be illustrated explicitly in the registration of enterprises 
under the SMES. As a procedural requirement, the Enforcement Rules of the PRC on 
Administration and Registration on Enterprise Legal Person stipulates that the 
enterprises having the lishu relationship shall provide the information of the lishu 
relationship as part of the business registration. 2  Accordingly, the administrative 
offices will handle the registration issues within 15 days from accepting the 
application and will record the lishu relationship on the registration certificate of 
enterprises.  
 
The lishu relationship of an enterprise may change either because the shares 
contribution from the governments/organs is changed or because the 
                                               
1 Provisional Regulation on the Public-Private Joint Operation Enterprise, released and entered into force on 2nd 
September 1954, Articles 19&22. 
2 Enforcement Rules of the PRC on Administration and Registration on Enterprise Legal Person, released on 20 th 
February 2014, entered into force on 1st March 2014, Article 19. 
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governments/organs themselves have changed. According to the Examining and 
Endorsing Regulation (the Regulation) on the Change of the lishu Relationship,1 the 
enterprises should reach agreement with the old and new governments/organs before 
they change the lishu relationship. It is further stipulated explicitly that the lishu 
relationship cannot be changed by any governmental or administrative organ without 
a pre-consent among the enterprise, the current government/organ and the new 
government/organ.   
 
The Regulation also requires the current government with which an enterprise is 
having the lishu relationship to submit a formal application in written to the State 
Economic and Trade Committee (SETC)2  in order to complete the procedure of 
changing the lishu relationship. As a necessary part of the application, the (1) written 
consent of the government/organ; (2) the agreement of changing the lishu relationship 
among the enterprise, the current government/organ and the new government/organ; 
and (3) statement letters regarding the operation, property, credit and debit of the 
enterprise, shall be submitted so that the SETC can make the decisions accordingly.3  
 
In the situation where the lishu relationship is changed only through the agreement 
among the enterprise, the current government/organ and the new government/organ, 
but without fulfilling the registration procedure, such change will not be recognised 
                                               
1 Examining and Endorsing Regulation on the Change of the lishu Relationship (1994 amendment), released and 
entered into force on 19th November 1994, Article 2.3. 
2 Note: the application should be submitted to the National Commission for Restructuring the Economic System. 
See Examining and Endorsing Regulation on the Change of the lishu Relationship (1990 version), released and 
entered into force on 20th July 1990, Article 3.1. 
3 Examining and Endorsing Regulation on the Change of the lishu Relationship (1994 amendment), released and 
entered into force on 19th November 1994, Article 3.4. 
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by law and the agreement is considered null in law.1 It is thus clear that the change of 
the lishu relationship shall be requested by the current government or governmental 
organ to which an enterprise is affiliated. However, the request has to be made in the 
form of a formal application, which has to be approved by the administrative 
registration offices so that the application to change the lishu relationship is valid in 
law.  
 
The termination of the lishu relationship of an enterprise can be attributed to the shares 
withdrawal of the government or governmental organ from the enterprise, or to the 
fact that the affiliated government or governmental organ no longer exists (Li, 2014; 
Han, 1989; Zou, 2001). Because the information regarding the lishu relationship is 
recorded in the registration certificate of the enterprise, the termination of the 
relationship shall be considered as a modification of the certificate. For instance, the 
Reply of the State Administrative Bureau of Industry and Commerce on the 
Termination of the lishu Relationship requires that the enterprise in question shall 
submit: (1) the application to terminate the lishu relationship; and (2) the statement 
letter regarding the reasons causing the termination of the lishu relationship, to the 
administrative registration office. For example, Goubuli Food Company was founded 
in 1858 (Goubuli Bun Shop) and transferred as a SOE in 1956 by the Tianjin 
government. By making and selling buns, the Goubuli has become one of China’s 
longest established food brands having the lishu relationship with the Tianjin 
government (Liu, 2007). In 2005, the Goubuli Food Company was purchased by a PE 
in Tianjin (Tianjin Tong Ren Tang Company) from the Tianjin government. The 
                                               
1 The Reply of the State Administrative Bureau of Industry and Commerce on the Termination of the lishu 
Relationship, issued on 30th March 1991, Article 2. 
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governmental share in Goubuli was withdrawn and the lishu relationship was 
terminated thereof.  
 
Although both the change and the termination of the lishu relationship should 
experience the reviewing procedure through the SETC or the Administrative 
Registration Office for Industry and Commerce, the bodies that initiate the application 
are different. The change of the lishu relationship shall be applied by the current 
government or governmental organ affiliated by an enterprise, rather than by the 
enterprise. Such a requirement indicates that the viewpoints of the government or 
governmental organ shall be respected to emphasise the influence of the political 
connections (Zhao and Zhang, 2015). But when it comes to the termination of the 
lishu relationship, the enterprise in question initiates the application largely because 
the lishu relationship, the government, and the governmental organ does not exist any 
longer and it is more convenient and feasible for the enterprise (rather than any other 
body) to provide the information.  
 
2.4  The positive implications of the lishu relationship in enterprises 
 
Under the CES before 1978, enterprises had “no choice” not to establish the lishu 
relationship because the state in the CES had a desire to control every aspect of the 
economy (Liu et al., 1985). Because the state owned all the social resources during 
1950 and 1978, the lishu relationship helped the enterprises obtain the resources. 
Although the enterprises lost the initiative and autonomy because of the close 
connections with the government (Cheng, 1986), the lishu relationship did play a 
crucial role of “concentrating national resources to get big tasks done” (Liu et al., 
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1985, p.67). For example, the construction of Daqing oil exploration field, the 
successful research and development of nuclear power, the establishment of the first 
vehicle manufacturing factory (Hongqi Vehicle Manufacturing Factory), and the 
production of the seamless iron and steel pipe were all achieved under the CES (Su 
and Yang, 2000).  
 
After 1978, the influence of the lishu relationship on enterprises differs in SOEs, PEs 
and FEs. The lishu relationship of the SOEs mainly achieves the governmental 
functions to control the life-line of national economy, to maintain the national 
economic order, and to instruct the direction of the national economy (He, 1998; Bai 
and Yan, 2004). Through the close connections between the enterprises and the 
government by the lishu relationship, the enterprises can be allocated the national 
resources to achieve these goals.  
 
In practice, PEs with the lishu relationship tend to obtain governmental support 
directly or indirectly including equipment, machinery, labour resources and capital, 
which are beneficial to the operation of the enterprises. For instance, the PEs having 
the lishu relationship with the Ministry of Commerce and the SETC in the sector of 
international trade tend to obtain more trade opportunities globally because these 
governmental organs put such PEs in a preferential place in the allocation of resources 
and information (Wu, 2011).  
 
Apart from the benefits the PEs can obtain through the lishu relationship, the lishu 
relationship in the FEs contributes to the FEs in a unique way of opening a door to 
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foreign capitals to Chinese market (Xu, 1996; Xu, 2003; Cui and Zhang, 2013). Such 
a role of the lishu relationship results from the restrictions on the entry of foreign 
investments/investors in China. According to the Negative List for Foreign 
Investment in the Free Trade Zone of the PRC, and the Directory Category of 
Industries for Foreign Investments in the PRC,1 foreign capitals are restricted to enter 
into certain sectors in China. And the only way to establish an enterprise in China for 
these investors is to create a Sino-Foreign Joint Venture or China-Foreign Cooperative 
Enterprise. Such FEs thus shall not be wholly owned by the foreign investor(s) and 
some shares must be obtained by either Chinese private investor(s) or Chinese 
government or governmental organ. For instance, the FEs exploring and developing 
oil and natural gas shall be in the form of either Sino-Foreign Joint Venture or China-
Foreign Cooperative Enterprise. 2  It is the Chinese participation (private or 
governmental) in the FEs that makes such economic activities possible and feasible 
in the territory of China. And the lishu relationship contained in the governmental 
participation is therefore an element assisting the establishment of the FEs in China.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 Limitations on foreign investments are stipulated in the Industry Category Guide for Foreign Investment (applied 
across China except for the free trade zones (FTZs)) and the National Negative List for Foreign Investment (applied 
in the free trade zones). Negative list is formally named in governmental documents as Special Regulatory 
Measures on the Entry of Foreign Investment in Certain Free Trade Zone. For instance, the Negative Lists for 
foreign investment in Shanghai FTZ have undergone the 2013 version and 2014 version. The 2015 version has 
been issued by the State Council of the PRC, applying in all the FTZs in China. A 2018 version has been planned 
at the 16th Meeting of China Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepen Reforms on 21st September 2015. The 
latest version of the Industry Category Guide for Foreign Investment is the Industry Category Guide for Foreign 
Investment 2015, which was released on 10th March 2015 and entered into force on 10th April 2015 (the 2015 
Investment Guide replaces the 2011 Revision of Industry Category Guide for Foreign Investment).  
2 Special Management Measures on the Entry of Foreign Investment in the Free Trade Zone of the PRC (Negative 
List), released on 8th April 2015, entered into force on 7th May 2015, Article 2.4. 
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2.5  Further exploration of the lishu relationship: ownership and lishu 
 
A lishu relationship, which refers to the political affiliation and the link between 
government and firm, differs from ownership in the following perspectives: 
 
Firstly, ownership refers to property rights and is established and protected by the 
basic law, namely the Constitutional Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
Specifically, the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are owned by the state, private 
enterprises (PEs) are owned by the legal entities and individual investors, foreign 
enterprises (FEs) are owned by investors from abroad, and collectively-owned 
enterprises (COEs) are owned by all the workers working in the collective. However, 
the lishu relationship refers to a political connection though the governmental 
jurisdictions. China has 34 provinces and municipalities, 333 prefectures (di qu), 
2,856 counties and 40,906 towns (xiang and zhen) (The National Bureau of Statistics). 
Correspondingly, all firms with a lishu relationship are controlled by the hierarchically 
structured governments, from low to high levels, including the township governments, 
county governments, prefecture governments, provincial or municipal governments, 
and the central government (Li, 2004; Tan et al., 2007; Guariglia and Mateut, 2013). 
According to the state statistical survey regulation, an enterprise can establish an 
affiliation only with one of these five levels of governments. On the basis of the 
features of a firm, its operation, location, and size can determine the affiliated 
government. Generally, SOEs are more likely to affiliate with higher levels of 
governments, while PEs tend to be affiliated with lower governments.  
 
Secondly, in the four types of ownerships, only SOEs and COEs have political 
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connections with the Chinese government. However, a firm can establish political 
affiliation through the lishu relationship regardless of its ownership structure. Put 
another way, political connections intended as ownership can only exist in SOEs and 
COEs, while political connections intended as the lishu relationship can stand in any 
type of ownership structure.   
 
Thirdly, at the time of establishing the firm, ownership is decided. That is, firms are 
born with an ownership. For SOEs and COEs, they are born with a close “political 
blood relation”. However, firms can decide whether or not to have the lishu 
relationship after they have been established. That is, the lishu relationship is acquired 
rather than inherent.  
 
Lishu represents an administrative power through which the government controls over 
every aspect of the affiliated enterprises. According to the CNPC (1993, 1994), the 
administrative controls through the lishu relationship include naming the firms; 
regulating firms’ structure through appointing the directors, chairmen of the board, 
and general manager; reviewing firms’ feasibility reports and business plans; 
approving licences and major projects; deciding business domain and the amount of 
taxes and fees; determining the major decisions such as profit distribution and 
investments; issuing bank loans; and monitoring bank transactions.      
 
The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) provides detailed codes for the lishu 
relationship. Specifically, enterprises affiliating with the central authorities are coded 
as 10, enterprises affiliating with the provincial governments are coded as 20, 
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enterprises affiliating with the city and prefecture (di qu) governments are coded as 
40, enterprises affiliating with the county (xian) governments are coded as 50, 
enterprises affiliating with the sub-district, town, or village governments are coded as 
60, enterprises affiliating with the residents’ and villagers’ committee governments 
are coded as 70, and firms with no affiliation are coded as 90.1 
                                               
1 See Appendix for more details about political affiliation. 
46 
 
Appendix 2A 
 
Table 2A.1 Codes of political affiliation (the lishu relationship) 
 
Code Affiliated level Detail 
10 Central authorities 
including Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, Chinese Communist Party 
Central Committee, ministries and commission 
under the State Council and affiliated organisations, 
offices and organisations directly under the State 
Council and affiliated organisations 
20 Provincial 
including autonomous regions and municipalities 
directly under the Central Government 
40 
City and prefecture 
(di qu) 
including autonomous prefecture, league (meng), 
provincially administered municipality, the 
popedom of municipality directly under the Central 
Government (county) (xian) 
50 County (xian) 
including municipality directly under the prefecture 
(sub-prefecture, league), the popedom of 
municipality directly under province, autonomous 
county (Banner) (qi), banner (qi), county-level city 
60 
Sub-district, town, 
village 
 
61 Sub-district  
62 Town  
63 Village  
70 
Residents’ and 
villagers’ committee 
 
71 
Residents’ 
committee 
 
72 
Villagers’ 
committee 
 
90 No affiliation  
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CHAPTER 3 DATA AND KEY VARIABLES 
  
This chapter describes data and the key variables used for the empirical studies in this 
research. The dataset is described in section 3.1. And section 3.2 introduces the key 
variables used for the empirical studies in this thesis.  
 
3.1 Data 
 
We use firm-level dataset for this study as it can avoid aggregation problems in 
estimation, and make it possible to take firm heterogeneity into account (Bond and 
Van Reenen, 2007). The firm-level data are taken from the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (NBS) over the period 2000-2007 and include all types of firms in 
China, including both state-owned and non-state-owned firms with annual sales of 
more than five million RMB Yuan.1 
 
This dataset comes from the annual accounting reports, maintained and complied by 
the NBS, and provides comprehensive economic information of each firm covered, 
including both basic information such as the firm’s registration code, the year founded, 
location, employment, and financial variables such as current and fixed assets, 
liabilities, annual sales, and total wage bill. These firms come from 31 provinces or 
province-equivalent municipal cities (except Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) all over 
China and operate in a wide range of industrial sectors, within the mining and 
                                               
1 The official RMB yuan exchange rate per US dollar during the sample period was 8.2785 in 2000, 
8.2771 in 2001, 8.2770 in 2002 and 2003, 8.2768 in 2004, 8.1943 in 2005, 7.9734 in 2006, and 7.6075 
in 2007 (World Development Indicators, World Bank). Therefore, the threshold for including in the 
dataset is equivalent to between USD 604,098 and USD 657,246 over the sample period.  
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manufacturing sectors.  
 
The dataset includes a majority of firms which are not traded on the stock market. 
Compared to listed firms, which are typically large, financially healthy, long-
established, and with good credit rating, unlisted firms are more likely to be 
characterised by a short track record, poor solvency, and a low level of real assets. It 
is therefore more interesting to look at the political connections, intended as the lishu 
relationship, in those unlisted firms. 
 
3.2  Key variables  
 
Key variables used in this thesis are firm characteristic variables and financial 
variables. Firm characteristic variables mainly include firm size, political affiliation 
intended as the lishu relationship, ownership types, and location. Financial variables 
mainly include cash flow-to-capital ratio and leverage ratio. Firm ownership, political 
affiliation, and location construction are introduced as follows.  
 
Although the NBS includes the registration codes of firms, we use the fraction of paid-
in-capital by the various groups in every year to define ownership categories.1 In total, 
there are six types of investors: the state; foreign investors (excluding those from 
                                               
1 We prefer to use the fraction of capital paid-in to define ownership for three reasons. Firstly, there 
are considerable delays in updating firms’ registration codes, which in turn cause these codes to be 
unreliable (Dollar and Wei, 2007). Another reason is that in order to take advantage of the benefits (for 
example, the tax benefits) assigned to certain types of firms, they might falsely register as these types 
of firms. Finally, we exclude the firms with mixed ownership by using this way to categorise firms into 
different ownership classes. Mixed ownership firms refer to the firms with no group has a majority 
share. For example, a firm is characterised by a 35% state ownership, a 35% private ownership, and a 
30% foreign ownership. In the sample, there are around 1.5% of firms with this type of ownership and 
these firms are excluded.  
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Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan); investors from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan; 
legal entities; individuals; and collective investors. As investments from Hong Kong, 
Macao, and Taiwan are characterised as the “Round-Tripping” Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI),1 we separate them from other foreign investors. State legal persons 
and private legal persons are included in the legal entity, which is a form of corporate 
ownership.2 As for collective firms, they are managed by local governments and 
typically owned collectively by communities in urban areas (known as Urban 
Collective Enterprises or UCEs) or rural areas (known as Township and Village 
Enterprises or TVEs). Based on the majority average shares of paid-in-capital 
contributed each year by the four types of investors over the sample period,3 we group 
all the firms in four categories: state-owned; privately-owned (which includes all 
firms owned by legal entities and individual investors); 4  foreign owned (which 
includes investors from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and other parts of the world); 
and collectively-owned.  
 
                                               
1 “Round-Tripping” FDI means that the return of Chinese capital includes part of FDI to China. That 
is, domestic firms go abroad first and reinvest back later. These domestic capital registers as foreign 
invested capital from nearby regions in the form of FDI in order to take advantage of benefits (such as 
tax preferential policy, property rights protection, loose exchange controls, and competitive financial 
services) that granted to foreign invested firms (Huang, 2003; Xiao, 2004).  
2  Legal persons include a mix of different domestic institutions, such as industrial enterprises, 
construction and real estate development enterprises, transportation and power enterprises, securities 
enterprises, trust and investment enterprises, foundations and funds, banks, technology and research 
institutions and so on.  
3 For example, if the average share of its capital owned by the state is at least 50%, we then classified 
this firm as state-owned firm. Similar approach is applied for the private firms, foreign firms, and 
collective firms (Dollar and Wei, 2007; Ayyagari et al., 2010; Guariglia et al., 2011).  
4 Firms owned by individuals make up about 60% of the total private firms group. There are two 
reasons to include the firms owned by state legal persons into this privately-owned category. Firstly, it 
is caused by the limitation of our dataset, which does not allow us to separate state legal persons from 
non-state legal persons. Therefore, we cannot exclude the state legal persons from our privately-owned 
firms category. Secondly, according to Wei et al. (2005), although the state’s principal interest is mainly 
political, i.e. maintaining employment levels or control for the strategic industries, all legal entities are 
profit-oriented, which could justify their inclusion in this category.   
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Political affiliation is defined as the lishu relationship in this thesis. All firms with a 
lishu relationship are controlled by hierarchically structured governments, from low 
to high levels, including the township governments, county governments, prefecture 
governments, provincial or municipal governments, and the central government (Tan 
et al., 2007; Guariglia and Mateut, 2013; Li, 2004). According to the state statistical 
survey regulation, an enterprise can establish an affiliation only with one of these five 
levels of government. Furthermore, we differentiate firms into four groups according 
to their degree of political affiliation provided by the NBS, namely firms without a 
lishu relationship, firms affiliated with the high level of government (including the 
firms affiliated with the central and provincial governments), firms affiliated with the 
medium level of government (including the firms affiliated with the city and 
prefecture, and county governments), and firms affiliated with the low level of 
government (including the firms affiliated with the rest levels of governments).1 
 
The 31 provincial units fall into three categories: 22 provinces (sheng); 5 autonomous 
regions (zi zhi qu) (Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Ningxia, and Guangxi); and 4 
municipal cities (zhi xia shi) under direct supervision of the central power (Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Beijing, and, since 1997, Chongqing). Due to the differences in economic 
development, education level, and infrastructure, we group each firm into one of the 
three regions: coastal, central, and western, according to its location and following the 
study by Qin and Song in 2009.2 Detailed definition of the variables used in each 
empirical study is presented in the Appendix of each subsequent chapters.  
                                               
1 See Appendix for more details about different groups.  
2 Also see Appendix for Chinese provincial units by region.  
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Appendix 3A 
Table 3A.1 Different political affiliation groups 
 
Groups Code 
Firms affiliated with the high level of government 𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑢 ≤ 20 
Firms affiliated with the medium level of government 20 < 𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑢 < 60 
Firms affiliated with the low level of government 60 ≤ 𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑢 < 90 
Firms with no political affiliation 𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑢 = 90 
 
Table 3A.2 Chinese provincial units by region (except Hong Kong, Macao, and 
Taiwan) 
 
Coastal region Central region Western region 
Beijing Shanxi Chongqing 
Tianjin Inner Mongolia Sichuan 
Hebei Jilin Guizhou 
Liaoning Heilongjiang Yunnan 
Shanghai Anhui Tibet 
Jiangsu Jiangxi Shaanxi 
Zhejiang Henan Gansu 
Fujian Hubei Qinghai 
Shandong Hunan Ningxia 
Guangdong  Xinjiang 
Guangxi   
Hainan   
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CHAPTER 4 DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL 
CONNECTIONS 
 
In this chapter, we investigate the determinants that affect firms’ decisions on having 
political connections, intended as the lishu relationship. We use a panel dataset 
covering 113,549 Chinese firms in the sector of manufacturing, the majority of which 
are unlisted firms, covering the period 2001-2007 and test 4 sets of hypotheses, 
including hypotheses on firm heterogeneity, ownership status, financial status, and 
profitability and growth opportunities. We conclude that the probability of a firm 
being politically affiliated can be precisely determined by the firm’s size, age, the 
region where it operates, the type of ownership, financial status, profitability, and 
growth opportunities. These effects are more pronounced for private firms than 
foreign firms. We also find that firms are more prone to have the lishu relationship 
with the medium level of government. Furthermore, we do not observe a significant 
effect of cash flow-to-capital ratio on political affiliation for the firms which are 
located in the central and western regions in China due to the regional policy 
development.  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Politically connected enterprises are a universal and a crucial component of the global 
economy. The understanding of the influences of political connections on firm 
performance and financial health is an important issue from both macroeconomic and 
microeconomic perspectives. There are two schools of thought that deal with this issue. 
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The first one emphasises that politically connected firms can obtain several kinds of 
favours, such as the favourable treatment to obtain bank loans (Brandt and Li, 2003; 
Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Faccio, 2006; Fraser et al., 2006; Claessens et al., 2008), 
favourable tax treatment (Adhikari et al., 2006; Faccio, 2010), profitable government 
contracts and crucial licences (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Goldman et al., 2010), 
as well as higher market share (Faccio, 2007; Faccio, 2010).  
 
The alternative argument is that politically associated firms underperform when 
compared with the non-associated firms. This idea is supported by many studies, 
including Fan et al. (2007), Faccio (2010), and Peng et al. (2011), who argue that 
politically connected firms have poorer accounting performance than firms without 
such connections. One of the reasons is that firms with politically connected CEOs 
are more likely to appoint current or previous government officials to the board. These 
officials tend to be less professional and lack experience in running a business. 
Moreover, Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) point out that the investments in political 
relationships could lose their value overnight because of regime changes. Therefore, 
investing in political relationships could be extremely risky, and managers may have 
to spend lots of time and resources to re-establish the relationships with the new 
government. In this case, political connections may not always be beneficial to 
enterprises’ long-term development. 
 
Moreover, although political connections have attracted worldwide academic interest, 
the definition of political connections and their influences on enterprises are different 
between China and the western world as they have different political regimes. A large 
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amount of existing literature has studied private enterprises with political connections 
in countries such as the United States, Malaysia and Thailand (for instance, Roberts, 
1990; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Adhikari et al., 2006; 
Charumlind et al., 2006; Fraser et al., 2006; Gul, 2006; Claessens et al., 2008; 
Goldman et al., 2009, 2010; Cooper et al., 2010). A few studies focus on China (see, 
for example, Chow et al., 2010; Li et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2011a; Fan et al., 2008; 
Tan et al., 2007).  
 
There is a vast quantity of evidence on the correlation between political connections 
and economic benefits. Most literature assumes that enterprises are politically 
connected before conducting any empirical analysis. Only few researchers (for 
example, Li et al., 2006; Boubakri et al., 2008; Masters and Keim, 1985; Chen et al., 
2012) have looked at another important question: what are the factors that determine 
political connections. In other words, what types of enterprises are more likely to have 
political connections?  
 
In order to fill this literature gap, this chapter aims at investigating the determinants 
of political connections, intended as the lishu relationship for Chinese manufacturing 
firms. Specifically, this research contributes to the literature in the following ways. 
Firstly, the lishu relationship is a unique type of political connections that only exists 
in China. Firms can establish connections with the governments by affiliating with 
different levels of government. There is hardly any research on the relationship of firm 
performance, financial health and political connections intended as the lishu 
relationship. As an institutional variation during the economic transition in China, it 
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is worth exploring the lishu relationship. For the first time, we estimate the 
determinants of political connections from the aspect of the lishu relationship.  
 
Secondly, a large dataset is adopted, which is provided by the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (NBS) between 2000 and 2007. This dataset contains 
comprehensive economic information of firms coming from 31 provinces or province-
equivalent municipal cities (except for Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) across China. 
Moreover, as the existing studies focus on listed firms, which do not represent the 
population of Chinese firms, research on unlisted firms is very limited. This dataset 
comprises a large proportion of small and young unlisted firms, representing the 
population of Chinese firms better than listed firms. To the best of our knowledge, the 
hypothesis on the determinants of political connections has never been explored using 
such a comprehensive dataset mainly covering unlisted firms. 
 
Thirdly, having experienced extraordinary economic growth in the past thirty years, 
never in the past has China become more important world-widely than now. Given a 
relatively undeveloped legal and financial system caused by significant intervention 
of the government, the miracle growth speed of the Chinese economy is often 
considered as a puzzle. It is the first time to explore what factors determine the lishu 
relationship of firms in the context of China. Finally, we take into account various 
perspectives of firm heterogeneity.  
 
To summarise our main results, we find that older and larger firms, as well as the 
financially healthy firms, are more likely to have a lishu relationship, as they are more 
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capable of affording the costs of having political relationships. Firms with foreign 
ownership that are located in the east of China are less likely to affiliate with the 
governments. However, firms with high profitability and sales growth do not prefer 
to put their economic advantages into the risk of having political affiliation as such 
relationship could lose its value overnight due to regime changes.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 endeavours to 
review the relevant literature on the determinants of political connections. The 
conceptual framework and hypotheses are provided in section 4.3. Section 4.4 
introduces the specification and estimation methodology. Data sample and summary 
statistics are introduced in section 4.5. Section 4.6 is devoted to presenting the 
empirical analysis of the determinants of political connections. Additional tests are 
presented in section 4.7. Finally, section 4.8 concludes this chapter.  
 
4.2 Literature review 
 
In this section, we summarise the literature on the different measurements of political 
connections between China and the rest of the world, and on the determinants of 
political connections.  
 
4.2.1 Measuring political connections  
 
Politically connected firms in the literature which looks at countries other than China 
are typically defined in five ways. Firstly, at least one of the large shareholders, who 
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control 10% or more of the company’s voting rights directly or indirectly, is a 
politician (e.g. a national congress member, a government minister, or a head of state) 
(Faccio, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2010). Secondly, at least one of the company’s top officers 
(e.g. the CEO, president or chairman) is a politician (Faccio et al., 2006; Chen et al., 
2010). A company, which is closely related to a top politician or a political party leader 
through friendship, family members, and relationships with foreign politicians falls 
into the third type (Faccio, 2002; Gul, 2006; Faccio et al., 2006; Leuz and Oberholzer-
Gee, 2006). The fourth group includes firms with state ownership (Boardman and 
Vining, 1989; Belka et al., 1995; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001). The final type of 
connection is established by campaign contribution, which refers to a relationship 
between a firm and an election candidate. That is, a firm, having supported an election 
candidate in the campaign, will in return gain favours from the politician (Claessens 
et al., 2008; Goldman et al., 2009; Cooper et al., 2010).  
 
The Chinese socialist political system has attracted growing interests among scholars 
studying political connections. After almost four decades of economic reform since 
1978, various economic institutions in China have obtained increasing authority to 
operate on market principles. However, according to Guthrie (2000), firms are still 
involved in relationships with different levels of government and such relationships 
can influence both firms’ strategy and performance. In addition, the Chinese 
government continues to play an important role in the allocation of critical resources, 
and state-owned enterprises enjoy preferential treatment in receiving bank funding 
and other important resources (Chow et al., 2010; Li et al., 2008; Poncet et al., 2010). 
Along with this line of research, the existing literature analyses political connections 
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in China from three different perspectives: political connections based on ownership, 
political connections intended as in the other countries, and the lishu relationship.  
 
The first form of political connections in China is established and protected by the 
basic law, namely China’s Constitutional Law. Based on the ownership structure, 
firms in China can be distinguished into stated-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
collectively-owned enterprises (COEs), private enterprises (PEs) or foreign 
enterprises (FEs). According to China’s Constitutional Law, SOEs and COEs play a 
dominant role in the socialist market economy. That is, SOEs and COEs are born with 
a close “state blood relation” (Liang, 2010). In this circumstance, political connections 
established through ownership can be considered as a father-son blood relationship, 
which is strong and long-lasting.  
 
This type of political connection is innate rather than acquired. Unlike political 
connections in western countries, SOEs and COEs are conferred with a political 
relationship the moment they are established, indicating that these enterprises need no 
more effort to seek political ties. In addition, such political connections are established 
by the government, mainly for the purpose of controlling the life-lines of the national 
economy. Chen et al. (2011a) show that the Chinese government makes use of SOEs 
and COEs to achieve social and political goals. In fact, core sectors (such as natural 
resources, civil aviation, real estate, and finance) are only open to SOEs and COEs in 
China and the government can determine the direction of the macro economy by 
directly controlling these enterprises. 
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The second form of political connections in China is similar to those in other countries. 
Private firms in China seek to establish ties with politicians and governments to 
survive in an environment characterised by discrimination (Liang, 2010). Most private 
firms try to establish political ties by hiring current or former government officers as 
their chairman or CEO (Chen et al., 2011a; Xu et al., 2011), acting as government 
advisers in certain government bodies and government-affiliated organisations (Chen 
et al, 2011b; Zhang and Zhang, 2005), campaigning for membership of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC), the National People's Congress 
(NPC) or the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Feng et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2011b), 
and even offering bribes and political contributions to the politicians in charge (Bai et 
al., 2005; Fan et al., 2008).  
 
Finally, China has a specific type of political connections called the lishu relationship, 
which is exclusive to China, and the most important political connections during the 
economic transition. Detailed definition of the lishu relationship and the differences 
between the lishu relationship and ownership have been explored in Chapter 2. Lishu 
is a Chinese word which means “belonging to”, “subordinate to”, or “directly 
controlled by”. Firms can be affiliated with various levels of government. Through 
this relationship, the governments can maintain administrative power to control 
various aspects of the firm both directly and legally (Tan et al., 2007; Li, 2004). 
Specifically, a lishu relationship implies that the government controls firms’ structures, 
directors and senior manager appointments, business plans, major projects, and 
operational decisions (CNPC, 1993, 1994).  
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4.2.2 Determinants of political connections 
 
The existing studies investigate the determinants of political connections from three 
perspectives, namely enterprises’ characteristics, entrepreneurs’ personal 
characteristics, and the institutional analysis.  
 
The institutional analysis can be further divided into two categories based on 
corporate governance mechanisms, namely internal and external institutional 
mechanisms. Internal mechanisms consist of functions and procedures created to 
supervise and affect the firm’s management activities. They include board 
characteristics, such as the size of the board of directors, the proportion of non-
executive directors on the board, the debt financing, the executive directors’ 
shareholdings, the audit committee, the internal audit function, and the choice of 
external auditors (Davidson et al., 2005). External mechanisms refer to the market 
and institutions that support the firms’ development.  
 
4.2.2.1 Firm-specific characteristics 
 
Boubakri et al. (2008) use 245 privatised firms in 14 developed and 27 developing 
countries during the period 1980-2002, and perform logit regressions, to identify the 
determinants of political connections. They consider that a company is politically-
connected if at least one member of its board of directors or its supervisory board is 
or was a politician, including a parliament member, a minister or any other top officer. 
In order to define the determinants of political connections, the authors apply logit 
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regressions to test a set of firm-specific variables (i.e. size, sector, location and 
leverage), as well as a set of privatisation variables (i.e. residual government 
ownership, fraction held by foreigner investors, and privatisation method).  
 
Their results suggest that privatised firms located in a major city and in a regulated 
sector (utilities, telecommunication and petroleum) are more prone to be politically 
connected. Firms with a higher leverage ratio are more likely to have political 
connections in order to keep them from defaulting. Moreover, politically connected 
firms are generally larger with thousands of employees and more reluctant to dismiss 
employees. As for privatisation variables, the results show that the residual stake of 
the government yields a positive and highly significant coefficient, while the 
coefficient associated with the percentage held by foreign investors is significantly 
negative. These results indicate that the more significant the residual stake of the 
government is, the more likely the firm is politically connected. That is, if the 
government remains a larger stakeholder after privatisation, it will be more able to 
appoint governmental officials as directors. Furthermore, firms privatised through 
private sales are less likely to be politically connected as this type of privatisation is 
characterised as concentrated ownership by private investors who focus on 
profitability rather than political goals.  
 
Masters and Keim undertake a research on the determinants of participation in the 
Political Action Committee (PAC) among 1981 Fortune-ranked large corporations in 
the United States. Using a logit regression, they test how firm characteristics can affect 
the probability of a corporation having an active PAC in the 1981-1982 election cycle. 
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Masters and Keim (1985) define that the firms are politically-connected if they have 
a PAC that contributed money to federal candidates in the election cycle.  
 
Their results suggest that larger firms with more employees have a higher likelihood 
of having a PAC. The authors point out that the administrative employees are 
generally considered as the main objective of abundant PAC fund-raising and the 
proportional relationship between the number of employees and the number of 
administrators in a corporation is positive. Therefore, larger firms with more assets 
are able to hire more employees; and a larger employment base of the firm may 
indicate more administrative employees. In turn, the probability of forming a PAC is 
increased with firms’ assets and the number of employees. They also find that firms 
in the manufacturing or mining industries, the banking or financing or real estate 
industries, the wholesale or retail trade or service industries, and the construction 
industries are less likely to have a PAC. On the contrary, firms in the transportation, 
energy and communication industries are more likely to have an active PAC. It has 
been identified that corporations in certain industries have historically been more 
heavily regulated by the federal government, in the pricing and market entrance 
(Pittman, 1977; Long and Link, 1983). Therefore, firms in these industries have a 
greater incentive to engage in political actions.  
 
Masters and Keim (1985) also suggest that the greater the degree of unionisation in 
the firm’s industry, the higher the probability the firm will participate in political 
activity. This is because unions in an industry can raise incentives for corporations to 
participate in politics by increasing government involvement in setting the minimum 
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wage and labour health standards. Additionally, the number of firms in an industry 
may affect the political participation of some firms because of free rider problems. 
There are strong incentives to free ride in industries with a large number of firms. In 
this case, the motivation of one firm to participate in political activity decreases as the 
number of firms in this industry increases. However, they do not find a precisely 
determined relationship between firms’ economic performance and the decision-
making on PAC participations.  
 
Some empirical studies have been conducted in the context of China. Li et al. (2006) 
examine the determinants of political participation in China by using a matched firm-
institution data set, which is from a nationwide survey of privately owned enterprises 
and provincial-level institutional indices. Their sample contains 3,258 privately 
owned enterprises, including large firms and individual household businesses, drawn 
from 31 provinces in mainland China. The authors define private entrepreneurs’ 
membership in the Chinese People’s Congress (PC) or the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) as political participation. Their results show that 
firms with a longer history or a larger size are more prone to participate in the PC or 
the CPPCC. 
 
By applying the same definition of political connections in Li et al. (2006), Chen et 
al. (2008) study the determinants of political participation of private enterprises, using 
survey data of enterprises and entrepreneurs from Liuzhou in the Guangxi Province 
of China. The authors conclude that the entrepreneurs in the firms with greater 
registered capital, longer history, and larger number of employees are more likely to 
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participate in the PC or the CPPCC. However, they do not document ownership as an 
important factor for entrepreneurs entering politics.  
 
Yeh et al. (2010) adopt a broad definition of political connections1  and test the 
determinants of political connections for Chinese listed firms over the period 1998-
2006. The dataset was jointly collected from the Taiwan Economic Journal, Market 
Observation Post System, and Taiwan Stock Exchange. As the ruling party changed 
from Kuomingtang (KMT) to Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2000, they 
divide the sample period into two periods, 1998-2000 and 2001-2006. Their final 
sample comprises 303 firms per year for the first period and 555 firms per year for the 
second period. The authors find that politically connected firms are characterised by 
higher return on assets (ROA), lower R&D intensity, and larger size than non-
connected firms in both subsample periods. Specifically, politically-connected firms 
are associated with a significantly higher average ROA (5.03% in the 1998-2000 
period and 5.41% in the 2001-2006 period) than the non-connected firms (3.90% in 
the 1998-2000 period and 3.93% in the 2001-2006 period), indicating that firms with 
political connections have more profitable assets in generating revenue.  
 
 
 
                                               
1  They define firms as politically connected to a certain political party when at least one of the 
following four conditions is met: “(1) the firm was founded or run by the political party; (2) the political 
party is one of the firm’s large shareholders; (3) the chairman or CEO publicly supports the presidential 
candidate representing a certain political party, participates in or has his/her employees participate in 
the presidential campaign, or was referred or reported by at least one of the major newspapers as being 
supportive of a certain political party; (4) one of the large shareholders, director, or top officers is/was 
a member of parliament, a minister, or a top government official”(Yeh et al., 2010, p.16-17).  
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4.2.2.2 Entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics 
 
Some researchers focus on the importance of corporate executives’ personal attitudes 
and personal characteristics. Jacobson (1980), for example, argues that “the individual 
motives and attitudes of corporate officers are crucial in determining both the degree 
of political involvement and the form it takes” (p.83). Miller et al. (1981) point out 
that higher levels of education, income, and occupational status may encourage 
entrepreneurs to actively engage in the political area.  
 
Li et al. (2006) test the determinants of being a member of the PC or the CPPCC in 
China by looking at the entrepreneur’s age, education background, years of 
management experience, whether the entrepreneur has a rural origin, whether the 
entrepreneur is a party member, and whether the entrepreneur is a former public firm 
manager. They find that older entrepreneurs with more management experience are 
more likely to participate in politics. Their results also show that the more education 
an entrepreneur receives, the more likely he/she is to have political connections. 
Additionally, entrepreneurs in the rural origin have a higher likelihood of being a 
member of the PC, rather than the CPPCC, indicating that the PC can represent more 
evenly the majority of the population coming from rural areas. Being a party member 
or having previous work experience as a public firm manager also increases the 
probability of political participation.1 The authors also suggest that both the PC and 
the CPPCC pay more attention to good human capital when selecting their members. 
However, party members and former public firm managers are more prone to be the 
                                               
1 In China, being a Party member does not necessarily lead to the membership of the PC or the CPPCC. 
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members of the PC but not of the CPPCC.  
 
Chen et al. (2008) evaluate entrepreneurs’ characteristics, including age, political 
status, gender, education, household registration and family background and test their 
relationship with the participation in the PC or the CPPCC. The authors find that 
younger entrepreneurs are less likely to become members of the PC or the CPPCC, 
while gender, education and household registration status do not significantly affect 
their decisions. In addition, their results show that entrepreneurs with membership in 
the Chinese Communist Party or other democratic parties have a greater probability 
of participating in politics. Compared with other democratic parties’ membership, 
those entrepreneurs belonging to the Communist Party have a much higher (five times) 
probability of political participation. Chen et al. (2008) also find that entrepreneurs’ 
family political background is an important determinant affecting the probability of 
entering politics. Parent leadership identity is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the 
entrepreneurs’ parents are officials in governments above the county level or in the 
army at the corresponding level; 0 otherwise. The result indicates that parent 
leadership identity increases the likelihood of entering politics for entrepreneurs, 
significantly from 1.25% to 10.13%. They consider entrepreneurs’ political status and 
family background as a formal de jure political power, and suggest that such political 
power is a personal advantage of entrepreneurs which can be used to secure more 
formal political power and to participate in politics.  
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4.2.2.3 The external institutional analysis 
 
There is a huge amount of literature examining the underdevelopment of markets and 
market-supporting institutions in developing and transition countries. According to 
Bartels and Brady (2003), the institutional environment in transition economies 
shapes motivations, information, and opportunities in which decisions on political 
connections are made.  
 
There are four kinds of institutional difficulties faced by private enterprises in these 
countries. First, according to McMillan (1997), in the early stage of the transition, 
private businesses can hardly depend on the markets, as financial markets are non-
existent and product and labour markets are elementary and undeveloped. In these 
countries, the allocation of resources, including credit, is in fact tightly controlled by 
the government or state-owned enterprises (Nee, 1992; McMillan, 1997; Brandt and 
Li, 2003). Second, the governments may intervene in the corporate world by imposing 
unnecessary regulations, known as red tape (Brunetti et al., 1997; Guriev, 2004). 
According to Li et al. (2008) and Guriev (2004), red tape can be defined as excessive 
official routines, and unnecessary rules or procedures resulting in delays. Firms have 
to spend considerable time and resources, including pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
ones, in getting through the bureaucracy. In addition, heavy formal and informal tax 
burdens cost private firms substantially in transitional economies. Johnson et al. (2000) 
find that the effective tax rates in Russia and Ukraine are extremely high. Local 
governments may also impose different kinds of fees on corporations, and in many 
cases theses fees are illegal. Finally, apart from the failures of the governments and 
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market, the legal system in these countries is also very rudimentary and weak. The 
legal system can only play a limited role in protecting the property rights and the 
enforcement of contracts because a sound legal framework is either non-existent or 
not enforced (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Johnson et al., 2002).    
 
Because of the high degree of control applied by governments and the imperfections 
in the market and legal systems, private firms cannot rely on markets and market-
supporting institutions to do businesses and do not have too many choices in response 
to these state and market failures. They either become passive victims or have to rely 
on other organisations to do business. For example, firms in Russia and Eastern 
European countries tend to go underground to reduce the high tax burdens and avoid 
excessive regulations (Johnson et al., 1997, 2000; Friedman et al., 2000). 
Alternatively, firms may also rely on ad hoc substitutes for the incompetent formal 
institutions. Particularly, firms build their own organisations in order to succeed in 
such an economy, also know as self-help (McMillan and Woodruff, 2002). For 
example, corporations in Vietnam rely heavily on interfirm relationships to do 
business because of the lack of the contract enforcement laws (McMillan and 
Woodruff, 1999). According to Hay and Shleifer (1998), the consequence of the 
absence of a sound legal system in Russia is that private mechanisms, such as social 
norms or arbitration, are used to resolve disputes.  
 
Instead of being passive victims or relying on other institutions, entrepreneurs can 
actively participate in politics to overcome these difficulties. Many entrepreneurs in 
Russia, for example, are eager to attend the Duma, the popularly elected lower house 
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of Russia’s legislature, so that they can protect themselves from higher taxes and 
excessive regulations. Similarly, a growing number of entrepreneurs are campaigning 
for the membership of the National Assembly, which is the highest legislative body in 
Vietnam.  
 
Boubakri et al. (2008) perform a cross-country analysis and define a politically 
connected firm as at least one politician on its board of directors or its supervisory 
board. The authors test how the judicial and political variables (i.e. government tenure, 
influence of political competition, and extent of judicial independence) and 
environment variables (i.e. economic development, bureaucracy, and corruption) 
influence the political connections.  
 
The authors find that political and judicial variables can significantly explain the 
existence of politicians on the boards of newly privatised firms. For example, there is 
a negative and significant relationship between the extent of judicial independence 
and the likelihood of political connections, indicating that political appointments are 
more popular in lower judicial independence countries. The results also suggest that 
in order to obtain voting support and minimise frictions among veto players, a 
government that features a higher fractionalisation and that has been in power for only 
a few years is more likely to keep politicians on the boards of firms. As for the 
institutional and macroeconomic variables, the authors do not observe a significant 
explanatory power. For instance, the coefficient on bureaucracy is negative but 
insignificantly related to the likelihood of political connections. Additionally, there is 
no relationship between corruption and getting political connections for privatised 
firms.  
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Li et al. (2006) construct an institutional index, including the development of product 
markets, the development of credit markets, government regulations, the informal tax 
burden, and the legal system. The authors point out that the underdevelopment of the 
market, especially the credit market, can raise the likelihood of political participation, 
indicating that the credit market is more specific according to different provinces and 
is more crucial in deciding political connections. They also illustrate that firm owners 
in provinces with an overregulation burden and without a sound legal enforcement are 
more prone to have political connections. The effect of the informal tax burden, 
however, is less significant in these regressions. The findings suggest that one 
standard deviation increase in the institutional indices can decrease the probability of 
entrepreneurs entering politics by 8% to 20%, supporting the view that the 
institutional environment shapes the motivation of private firms’ owners to create 
political connections.     
 
4.2.2.4 The internal institutional analysis 
 
Instead of analysing the rationale for political connections from an external 
governance perspective, some researchers explore the determinants of political 
connections from the perspective of firms’ internal governance structure. According 
to Yeh et al. (2010), an internal institutional analysis can be done based on the 
following two reasons.  
 
First, the external governance structure and legal protection for minority shareholders 
are weak in most developing countries. For example, according to Claessens and Fan 
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(2002), in some regions in Asia characterised by weak institutions and poor property 
rights, the limited protection of minority rights allows controlling shareholders to 
expropriate the minority shareholders. It is therefore unrealistic to rely on an external 
corporate governance mechanism.  
 
In addition, the relations between some firms’ characteristics affected by the internal 
governance structure and political connections remain ambiguous. According to 
previous studies, the relations between political connections and firms’ performance 
can be positive or negative. For example, according to Bunkanwanicha and 
Wiwattanakantang (2009), the market-to-book value of equity of the politically 
connected firms can increase astonishingly by more than 200%. However, Bertrand 
et al. (2006) find that accounting and stock market performance of firms with 
politically connected CEOs are lower than those of non-connected firms in France. 
Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the relationship between internal governance 
and the likelihood of having political participation.  
 
Yeh et al. (2010) point out that the quality of corporate governance is related to firms’ 
decisions to engage in political connections and can be illustrated from both a cost-
benefit perspective and a demand-side perspective.  
 
The costs of political connections include governmental interferences and rent 
expropriated by the connected politicians (Yeh et al., 2010). According to Black et al. 
(2006) and Brown and Caylor (2006), corporate governance is a crucial factor in 
determining firm value and performance. Firms with a superior governance structure 
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are supposed to be associated with better performance or higher firm value. In contrast, 
firms with an inferior governance structure are expected to have poorer performance 
or lower firm value. For the latter firms, governmental interventions, such as bailout 
when firms face financial distress, are important and therefore, the marginal benefit 
of such interventions is supposed higher. Therefore, governmental interventions are 
particularly helpful for firms with poor governance structure and the rent charged by 
politicians is likely to be small compared with the huge benefits they can offer, 
indicating that the cost of political connections for these firms is minimal.  
 
As for the demand-side perspective, firms with poor governance would demand more 
political connections in order to obtain more help and aid from such connections. 
Because aid and interventions are crucial to the development of firms with poor 
governance, the marginal benefit of having these connections can almost offset the 
marginal cost. These firms are therefore more willing to spend money and other 
resources in having political connections. At the same time, it is easier for firms with 
poor governance structure to reallocate resources for political connections, because 
poor governance does not require enterprises to follow accurate accounting standards 
and thus the firms have more cash to use for other activities, such as political 
connections.  
 
Before analysing the relationship between quality of internal corporate governance 
and political connections, Yeh et al. (2010) exclude the external governance 
environment from their hypothesis development. They assume that the external 
governance structure is fixed for all firms and is related to a lower marginal cost and 
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a higher marginal benefit when the external governance structure is ineffective.  
 
According to Bøhren and Ødegaard (2003), the true relationship between firm 
performance and corporate governance may not be appropriately captured if corporate 
performance relates to one particular aspect of corporate governance. Inspired by this 
argument, Yeh et al. (2010) emphasise the internal governance structure to develop a 
single governance index, which is a scorecard that measures a firm’s corporate 
governance over three dimensions: ownership structure (including four dummies: 
controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights, voting rights, the voting-cash deviation, 
and pledge ratio), board structure (including two dummies: board control and 
supervisory control), and related party transactions (including four dummies: sale, 
purchase, loan, and guarantee). This corporate governance index (CGI) is constructed 
by summing these ten dummies. The value falls in the range between 0 and 10. The 
average score of CGI is 4.97 in the 1998-2000 period and 5.40 in the 2001-2006 period, 
indicating that the overall corporate governance structure improved marginally over 
time.  
 
The results suggest that politically connected firms have a lower corporate governance 
index. Specifically, the average CGI of politically connected firms (4.38 in the 1998-
2000 period and 4.56 in the 2001-2006 period) is significantly lower than that of their 
non-connected counterparts (5.40 in the 1998-2000 period and 5.52 in the 2001-2006 
period), suggesting that politically connected firms have worse corporate governance 
structure than the non-connected firms. 
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4.3 Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
 
4.3.1 Conceptual framework in the existing literature 
 
Researchers in political science and economics have given theoretical consideration 
to the political participation of private enterprises. They provide three different 
perspectives to explain why a firm might want to have political connections: the 
political science perspective, the organisational science perspective, and the economic 
cost-benefit perspective.  
 
4.3.1.1 Political science perspective 
 
Political scientists state that both non-pecuniary and economic motives are the 
determinants for enterprise participating in politics. According to Bentley (1995), 
political participation results from the demands of social interests or social welfare. 
Verba (1987) points out that effective political participation has a particularly crucial 
relationship with all other social and political goals. It represents a procedure by which 
goals are set and means are chosen in relation to all sorts of social issues. Through 
participation, the goals of the society are set in a way that is assumed to maximise the 
allocation of benefits in a society to match the needs and desires of the whole 
population. In this case, participation is not committed to any social goal, but is a 
technique for setting goals, choosing priorities, and deciding what resources are 
required to achieve goals. Entrepreneurs are therefore willing to participate in politics 
so that they can communicate firms’ needs with the governmental demands. Verba 
75  
  
(1987) also points out that participation in politics brings satisfaction to entrepreneurs: 
satisfaction with governments and satisfaction with their own role.  
 
Olson (2002) points out that the willingness of an enterprise to have political 
connections is due to the expectation of obtaining additional benefits from the 
government. The author states that political institutions have clear organisational 
structures which determine that they are more prone to provide benefits to particular 
individuals and groups, instead of any collective group with common interest. The 
political institution is “at best interested in patronage, and at worse on outright graft” 
(Olson, 2002, p.165). Many businessmen are willing to make contributions to political 
parties so that they can obtain support from the governmental officials. In other words, 
this provides economic motives and incentives for entrepreneurs to join these political 
organisations or to make political patronage to officials so that they can obtain benefits 
that are available only to a minority group.  
 
4.3.1.2 Organisational science perspective 
 
Organisation theorists apply a resource dependency theory, suggesting that political 
action is motivated by an institution’s dependency on governments. According to 
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), resource dependence suggests that some organisations 
have more power than others because of their control of resources and their location 
in the social space. For instance, the government is a crucial provider of resources to 
a number of industries and firms. Under these circumstances, organisations which rely 
heavily on the government have more incentives to participate in politics in order to 
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get more resources and power. Therefore, the resource dependency theory may be the 
basis for the entrepreneurs to make the decision to get involved in politics.    
 
4.3.1.3 Economic cost-benefit perspective 
 
Economists emphasise that an economic cost-benefit analysis is key to political 
participation. Pittman (1977) considers that an economic system includes two actors, 
namely individual firms, which are rational actors, and governments, the other 
important actors. Firms can benefit or be restrained due to various actions taken by 
governments. Each firm would like to affect government activities for its own benefit, 
which can be achieved by political involvement. However, such benefits only come 
at a cost. Therefore, only those firms who expect the benefits of influencing policy to 
outweigh the costs of political engagement will make the effort to participate in 
politics.  
 
According to Pittman (1977), the benefits which can be achieved from impacting the 
government depend on the government’s role in a particular industry. For example, 
the government plays a role in some industries from the perspectives such as making 
health and safety regulations and laws. In these industries, the government’s role is 
important enough so that the potential benefits of the influence can be considerable. 
Yet for some industries, the government’s role is so small that the potential benefits 
of influencing may be small, indicating it is not worth to invest in political 
involvement. Pittman (1997) considers three aspects of government’s intervention in 
industry, including government regulation, government purchase of output, and 
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government antitrust investigation, and suggests that any of them could substantially 
augment the benefits available to a firm by affecting government policy. Although the 
costs of impacting the government may be higher for some firms than others, they are 
of a comparable scale for all participants and always measured in dollar terms. Pittman 
(1977) presents a theory of political involvement, which suggests that a firm is willing 
to be involved in politics only if the policy influence is worth the cost, which would 
happen if the government plays an important role in the industry in which the firm 
operates.     
 
Data limitations hinder the full specification and testing of any framework. For 
example, the non-pecuniary motivations for firms’ political participations may be 
extremely difficult to capture. In addition, executives’ ideologies are also difficult to 
measure. In this analysis, the expected costs-benefits framework is explored. It intends 
to capture the common argument that profit motivation is behind firms’ political 
investments. It is literally impossible to measure these costs and benefits on a firm-
specific basis, as data on the costs and benefits related to political participation are 
unavailable. However, it is possible to identify several organisational and contextual 
factors that may have influence on these expected costs and benefits. These factors 
form the basis of our hypotheses described below.  
 
4.3.2 Hypotheses 
 
In this section, we propose four sets of hypotheses on firm heterogeneity, ownership 
types, financial status, and profitability and growth opportunities.  
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4.3.2.1 Hypotheses on firm heterogeneity 
 
This section presents the hypotheses on firm heterogeneity, including firm size and 
location.1  
 
A. The firm size 
 
The ability of corporations to have connections with politicians depends heavily on 
the size of the resource base they have. A firm’s size can be measured from two 
dimensions: total number of employees and total assets.  
 
According to Masters and Keim (1985), administrative employees are generally 
considered as the prime targets of creating political connections, as corporations raise 
most of their political connection money from administrative or managerial 
employees compared with shareholders or non-managerial employees. In addition, an 
increase in the total number of employees will lead to an increase in the number of 
                                               
1 According to the previous literature, firm age, in terms of how many years ago the firm has come into 
existence, is a significant determinant for political connections. However, there are two different views 
on the interaction between firms’ age and the likelihood of political participation. One school of thought 
argues that firms in their early lives are more eager to create connections with governments because 
they are in greater need of political help when they establish themselves in the concentrated business 
environment (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). Another school of thought states that entrepreneurs 
from long-standing enterprises are more likely to be involved in politics. For example, in the Chinese 
context, Li et al. (2006) show that entrepreneurs from firms with a longer history are more prone to 
participate in politics suggesting that the probability of political participation rises with firms’ age. In 
addition, Chen et al. (2008) point out that politically connected corporations are three years older than 
their non-connected counterparts, and that increasing one year in enterprises history will increase the 
probability of political participation. It is therefore interesting to look at how the lishu relationship is 
affected by firm age using our large dataset in Chinese unlisted firms. As the missing value of firm age 
in our dataset are 246,250 firm-year observations. We only perform the test including firm age and 
report the results in Appendix. And our result supports the latter thought by showing that firm age a 
positive and precise determinant for firms’ political participation. The results for other variables are 
robust.  
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administrative staff in a firm. Along with this line of research, firms with a larger 
employment base should have more administrative employees who are more likely to 
make sufficient money for the candidates in a political campaign, as political 
contributions. Therefore, the firms can obtain favourable support from such 
candidates in the future. Li et al. (2006) use 3,258 privately owned enterprises and 
individual household businesses in China, and indicate a positive interaction between 
the number of employees and political participation, suggesting that firms with a large 
scale of employment are more likely to have political connections.  
 
In China, the current election system regarding the representatives of the People’s 
Congress (PC) at various levels provides a channel for private entrepreneurs to 
participate in political areas, which stimulates entrepreneurs from enterprises with a 
large employment base to get involved in politics. According to Article 24 of Chapter 
6 of the Electoral Law of the People's Republic of China, the electorates for the PC 
committee are not exclusively divided on the basis of territory. When territory is not 
applicable, the division of electoral districts depends on the voters’ residence or 
industry, including the basis of production units, institutions units and work units. 
  
In practice, especially in cities, the People’s Congress and its Standing Committee at 
the relative levels accept a method that combines both industry and residence to divide 
electoral districts. Dividing electoral districts by residence refers to dividing them on 
the basis of people’s household registration or habitual residence, especially the 
amount of population in the area with concentrated large enterprises. In this case, the 
more employees the firm has, the more votes an entrepreneur can have as a candidate, 
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thus the larger probability he/she becomes a member of the PC. 
 
Dividing electoral districts by industry suggests dividing a large firm into one or more 
electoral districts if the firm has a large number of employees in different industries. 
For example, election committees divide districts of the large state-owned enterprises 
affiliated with local governments, according to resources, finance, trade and 
transportation, in order to make these districts more representative. Under these 
circumstances, a large firm with a large number of employees in various industries 
has more opportunities to vote its entrepreneurs as representatives of the PC to 
represent different industries. Therefore, the political participation can be enhanced 
by this channel (Chen et al., 2008).        
 
In addition to the total number of employees, the total assets a firm has should also be 
positively related to the probability of having political affiliation. Masters and Keim 
(1985) point out that the incremental costs of raising more contribution funds are 
relatively small for larger firms as the initial fixed costs of connecting with the 
politicians can be spread over a larger asset base. This should increase the chances 
and the amount of money that larger firms can raise. Therefore, the larger firms have 
more money to afford the expenditure on having political connections with political 
candidates. Because larger firms have more assets to take the risk of connecting with 
politicians and thus are able to obtain a larger share of political benefits caused by 
corporate political activities, they are more likely to be politically connected than 
smaller firms.  
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Yeh et al. (2010) also find that the probability for firms to engage in political activity 
is positively associated with the firm’s total assets. Boubakri et al. (2008) define firm 
size as the natural log of total sales when the privatisation occurred and find that firms 
with political connections are larger than non-connected firms. In addition, Agrawal 
and Knoeber (2001) and Faccio (2006) find that political connections are more 
common in larger firms. Chen et al. (2008) illustrate that the incremental probability 
of entrepreneurs’ political participation increases from 0.08% to 1.11% if the 
registered capital is doubled, indicating that entrepreneurs from large firms have a 
higher probability of participating in politics. In line with these studies, we therefore 
expect that a firm’s size has a positive relationship with the likelihood of political 
participation.  
 
Hypothesis 1A (H1A): A firm’s size is positively related to the probability that the firm 
has a lishu relationship, ceteris paribus. 1    
 
B. Firm location 
 
Firm location can also influence political connections. Boubakri et al. (2008) use 245 
privatised firms, the headquarters of which are located in 14 developed and 27 
developing countries during 1980 and 2002, pointing out that firms locating in the 
major cities are more likely to have politicians on their boards, and these firms are 
more likely to attract political support. In addition, Chen et al. (2005) point out that, 
                                               
1 As the correlation between the number of employees and the firms’ total assets is 0.554, we use the 
number of employee as a substitution for the total assets and report the results in Appendix. The results 
are robust.  
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in China, family firms in provinces with less developed markets are prone to have 
political connections. Similarly, business transactions are more likely to depend on 
personal relationships in regions with less developed markets. In these regions, local 
governments usually have more flexibility in setting policies and regulations. In China, 
the western region is generally considered as the less developed area, while the coastal 
region is considered as more developed. Roberts (1990), Fan et al. (2007), and Khwaja 
and Mian (2005) support the relationship between firm location and the decision of 
political participation. According to this line of research, it is expected that firms 
located in the west of China are more likely to have political affiliation.  
 
Hypothesis 1B (H1B): A firm located in the west (coastal) of China has a higher 
(lower) probability of having a lishu relationship, ceteris paribus. 
 
4.3.2.2 Hypothesis on firm’s ownership status 
 
According to Boubakri et al. (2008), the likelihood of having political connections in 
newly privatised firms is positively associated with government residual ownership 
and negatively related to foreign ownership. The government has more power to 
appoint the “friends” as directors if a significant governmental shareholding remained 
in the firm after privatisation. For example, Bertrand et al. (2006) use all publicly-
traded firms in France over the period 1987 to 2002 and find that CEOs with political 
connections are more likely to head previously state-owned enterprises. It suggests 
that the higher the residual stake of the government, the higher the probability that the 
privatised firm will have political connections.  
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Using a cross-country dataset, Dyck (2001) states that foreign investors are less likely 
to accept the political judgment of bureaucrats, as they monitor managers’ actions 
closely and pay more attention to profitability than political goals. Therefore, it is 
expected that firms are less likely to have political affiliation when foreign investors 
are involved in the ownership structure.  
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Foreign-owned (State-owned) firms are less (more) likely to have 
a lishu relationship, ceteris paribus. 
 
4.3.2.3 Hypotheses on firm’s financial status 
 
A large number of finance and macroeconomics literature studies the presence and 
importance of financing constraints and its relationship with firms’ behaviour. 
According to the Pecking Order Model and Trade-off Theory, the first choice for a 
company is internal financing, followed by debt and equity (Myers, 1984). In 1958, 
Modigliani and Miller (MM) demonstrated that the firm’s value is irrelevant to its 
capital structure, as internal financing and external financing can substitute each other 
perfectly. However, this hypothesis does not hold in the real world, because of the 
asymmetric information and the agency problem in the market. Lamont et al. (2001) 
define financial constraints as frictions which can deter firms from funding all their 
investments. It is therefore expected that less financially constrained firms are more 
able to invest in political connections. A firm’s financial status can be measured by 
the external financing and the internal financing.  
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A. External financing 
 
We use the leverage ratio as a proxy for preferential access to the credit market. The 
leverage ratio is defined as a firm’s total debt to total assets ratio (Johnson and Mitton, 
2003; Faccio et al., 2006; Faccio, 2007).  
 
In the previous literature, a high leverage ratio is associated with soft budget 
constraints. Therefore, the firms with high leverage ratio are more likely to have 
political connections. The literature provides two possible interpretations for the high 
leverage ratio observed in private firms with political affiliation (for instance, Lamont 
et al., 2001; Faccio et al., 2006; Boubakri et al., 2008). First, lenders can obtain 
offsetting benefits from governments for making loans to politically connected firms. 
Second, highly indebted private firms’ executives are more prone to appoint 
politicians to keep them from defaulting. In this case, politically connected borrowers 
will be bailed out when they encounter economic distress.  
 
Therefore, it is expected that politically affiliated firms would have a higher leverage 
ratio than their non-connected peers, i.e.: 
 
Hypothesis 3A (H3A): A firm with a higher (low) leverage ratio is more (less) likely 
to have a lishu relationship, ceteris paribus. 
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B. Internal financing  
 
Cash flow is commonly used in empirical work as a proxy of the firm’s internal funds 
(for example, Schiantarelli, 1995; Hubbard, 1998; Bond and Van Reenen, 2003; 
Guariglia, 2008).1 According to Schiantarelli (1995), cash flow is not only a proxy 
for internal net worth, but also delivers information about what percentage of 
investment spending can be financed internally. In this case, a firm with a higher level 
of cash flow faces less internal financial constraints and may find it easier to fund 
firms’ investment. Along with this research, it is expected that firms with higher level 
of cash flow are more likely to have a lishu relationship. 
 
 Hypothesis 3B (H3B): A firm with higher (lower) cash flow is more (less) likely to 
have a lishu relationship, ceteris paribus. 
 
4.3.2.4 Hypotheses on profitability and growth opportunities 
 
A firm’s profitability can also influence the probability to be politically affiliated. 
However, there is a debate over how profitability can affect the decision making of 
political participation. On the one hand, political participation can be encouraged in 
firms with more profits, as they have more resources to allocate to such political 
activities. Focusing on Taiwanese firms, Yeh et al. (2010) find that the average return 
on assets (ROA) is significantly higher for the connected firms (5.03% in 1998-2000 
                                               
1 Liquidity ratio is another common proxy for the level of internal funds available to the firm. However, 
as the correlation between liquidity ratio and leverage ratio is -0.650, we only report the results by 
using liquidity ratio in Appendix. And the results are robust.   
86  
  
period and 5.41% in 2001-2006 period) than that for the non-connected firms (3.09% 
in the 1998-2000 period and 3.93% in the 2001-2006 period), indicating that firms 
with higher ROA are more likely to connect with politicians. It is also argued that this 
result suggests that firms with abundant resource can spend money to create political 
connections.  
 
On the other hand, lucrative firms may not want to put their economic position at risk 
by involving themselves in political activities. Salamon and Siegfried (1977) analyse 
the firms in the United States and argue: “Firms earning higher than average profits 
may shy away from political action if they fear that such action would attract public 
attention to the monopoly position that yields them such large profits” (p.1033). In 
addition, according to Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006), investing in political 
relationship could be extremely risky in Malaysia, because political connections can 
lose their value overnight. In this case, these lucrative firms might not want to put 
their profits at risk, especially in developing countries.  
 
In order to examine whether a firm’s profitability is positively related to its likelihood 
of political participation or not, we employ an accounting-based measurement for firm 
profitability, the return on sales (ROS) (Tallman and Li, 1996; Hitt et al., 1997). We 
hypothesise that:  
 
Hypothesis 4A (H4A): A firm’s ROS is negatively related to its likelihood of having a 
lishu relationship, ceteris paribus. 
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Yeh et al. (2010) consider sales growth as one of the factors that determine the choice 
of political participation. In their analysis, politically connected firms have a lower 
sales growth (4.63% in the 1998-2000 period and 18.50% in the 2001-2006 period) 
compared with the non-connected firms (10.01% in the first period and 31.76% in the 
latter period). Firms with poor performance associated with lower sales growth may 
need to seek more help from governments, suggesting that firms with a higher sales 
growth are less likely to engage in political connections. In line with Yeh et al.’s (2010) 
research, it is expected that sales growth is negatively related to political connections.  
 
Hypothesis 4B (H4B): A firm with a high (low) sales growth has a lower (higher) 
probability of having a lishu relationship, ceteris paribus. 
The hypotheses can be summarised as shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Summary of hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis Number Variables Expected Sign 
H1A Total Assets + 
H1B 
Western Region + 
Coastal Region _ 
H2 
State Ownership + 
Foreign Ownership _ 
H3A Leverage Ratio + 
H3B Cash Flow Ratio + 
H4A ROS _ 
H4B Sales Growth _ 
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4.4 Specification and estimation methodology 
 
In this section, we analyse the determinants of the probability of having a lishu 
relationship. To this end, we estimate a model with a qualitative dependent variable, 
which assumes the value of 1 in cases where enterprises have a lishu relationship in a 
given year, and the value of 0 for enterprises without such a relationship. For 
enterprise i in year t, we denote this as political affiliation 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡, where 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡  ∈  {0,1}. 
Therefore, 
 
            𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑢 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 
            𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑢 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 
 
The equation is: 
 
𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑊𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                            (1) 
 
where the subscript i indexes firms, while t refers to time, where t = 2000-2007. 𝑃𝐴 
is the political affiliation status of the firm, which is a dummy variable that equals to 
1 if the firm has a lishu relationship and 0 otherwise, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is defined as the firms’ 
total real assets, 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 is calculated as the ratio of current liabilities plus non-
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current liabilities to total assets of the firm, 𝐶𝐹𝐾 is defined as the ratio of cash flow 
over the tangible fixed assets, and 𝑅𝑂𝑆 is the return on sales, a measure of the firm’s 
profitability. Regional dummies include: Western Region = 1 if the firm is located in 
the western region, and 0 otherwise; Coastal Region = 1 if the firm is located in the 
coastal region, and 0 otherwise. Ownership dummies include: Foreign Ownership = 
1 if the firm is owned by foreign investors (including investors from Hong Kong, 
Macao, and Taiwan), and 0 otherwise; State Ownership = 1 if the firm is owned by 
the state, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Industry dummies define firms to be located in one of the following ten industrial 
sectors: metal and metal products; non-metal products and petroleum processing; 
chemicals and plastic; machinery and equipment; electrical equipment; transport 
equipment; food and tobacco; textile; leather, timber and furniture; and mining and 
logging. Year dummies are also included to account for business cycle effects and 
firm-invariant market factors such as changes in government policy.  
 
According to our Hypothesis 1A, we expect the β1 to show a positive sign. Firms 
with higher leverage ratio and cash flow-to-capital ratio are expected to be positively 
related to the probability of having a lishu relationship. We also expect that less 
profitable firms with lower growth opportunities are more prone to have a lishu 
relationship. Firms locate in the west of China are more likely to be politically 
affiliated, while firms locate in the east are less likely to have a lishu relationship. 
Compared with SOEs, foreign firms are more reluctant to affiliate with the 
governments.   
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In order to mitigate problems stemming from reverse causality (for example, the 
causality is from having a lishu relationship to larger size), all the variables, except 
for dummies, are once-lagged, following the research of Cull et al. (2009).  
 
As the dependent variable is dichotomous, linear multiple regression is not 
appropriate for estimating the model. We therefore use a Probit model instead to 
estimate the effect of how the independent variables affect the probability of a firm 
having a lishu relationship. We firstly employ a pooled Probit and then a random-
effects Probit models to control for the unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
 
4.5 Data and summary statistics  
 
This section describes the dataset used in this chapter, and presents summary statistics. 
 
4.5.1 Data 
 
The firm-level data used in this study are taken from the National Bureau of Statistics 
of China (NBS). In order to strengthen the reliability of our analysis, we first drop 
observations which make little sense, such as those with negative real assets, negative 
age, and negative leverage ratio. Second, we eliminate firms without completed 
records on our main regression variables. Finally, in order to control the potential 
effect of extreme values, we drop the outliers, which are the observations beyond the 
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1st and the 99th percent tails for each continuous main regression variables.1 After 
these adjustments, our final panel dataset includes 469,938 firm-level observations, 
covering 113,549 mainly unlisted firms over the period 2001-2007.2 The sample has 
an unbalanced structure,3 with a number of observations ranging from a minimum of 
33,855 in 2001 to a maximum of 86,577 in 2005. 
 
Table 4.2 presents the distribution of the full sample, affiliated group, and non-
affiliated group by year and industry. On average, around 46.13% of our firm-year 
observations have a lishu relationship. This can be explained that the political and 
market environment has become more supportive for the private firms in China 
because of the economic reforms since the 1990s. Therefore, these firms can develop 
in a relatively stable environment. However, governments still play a crucial role in 
China. Focusing on the industry groups, we find that the number of observations for 
affiliated firms only beats that for non-affiliated firms in food and tobacco (50.16% 
vs. 49.84%) and mining and logging industry (54.54% vs. 45.46%), while firms in 
other industries are less likely to have a lishu relationship. Since 1981, the State 
Council of China has established the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration, which 
fully controls the tobacco industry all over China. Besides, the food industry is crucial 
to people’s livelihood. Therefore, the political affiliation is prevalent in these 
                                               
1 It is quite common in the literature (see Greenaway et al., 2007; Guariglia, 2008; Carpenter and 
Guariglia, 2008; Yan, 2012) to eliminate extreme values in this way.  
2 It should be noted that our dataset include a very small proportion of listed firms for two reasons. 
First of all, according to Liu and Xiao (2004), when firms become listed, their legal identification 
numbers are changed; it is therefore hard to track these firms. The second reason is that there is no 
separate identification of Chinese publicly listed firms in the NBS dataset. However, they only 
comprise a very small portion of the whole sample. Over the whole considered period, only 
approximately 1,000 listed firms in the manufacturing and mining sectors, accounting for less than 0.3% 
of the total number of firms in the sample.  
3 See Appendix for details about the structure of the panel. 
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industries. Mining and logging industries are closely related to the sustainable 
development of natural and energy resources. Therefore, these firms are prone to have 
political connections to obtain favourable licence, while the governments also need to 
control over these industries. In this case, we observe greater political connections in 
the food and tobacco and mining and logging industries. 
 
Table 4.2 Distribution of the number of observations by year and industry 
 
Year Full Sample 
Affiliated 
Group 
Non-affiliated 
Group 
 Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct. 
2001 33,855 7.20 24,490 72.34 9,365 27.66 
2002 46,372 9.87 30,737 66.28 15,635 33.72 
2003 62,905 13.39 36,853 58.59 26,052 41.41 
2004 73,082 15.55 25,078 34.31 48,004 65.69 
2005 86,577 18.42 28,618 33.05 57,959 66.95 
2006 85,700 18.24 25,515 29.77 60,185 70.23 
2007 81,447 17.33 23,275 28.58 58,172 71.42 
Average   46.13 53.87 
       
Industry       
Metal & Metal products 41,172 8.76 15,996 38.85 25,176 61.15 
Nonmetal products & 
Petroleum processing 44,018 9.37 21,127 48.00 22,891 52.00 
Chemicals & Plastic 78,692 16.75 34,493 43.83 44,199 56.17 
Machinery & 
Equipment 53,868 11.46 23,771 44.13 30,097 55.87 
Electrical equipment 60,156 12.80 21,835 36.30 38,321 63.70 
Transport equipment 21,789 4.64 10,068 46.21 11,721 53.79 
Food & Tobacco 17,983 3.83 9,020 50.16 8,963 49.84 
Textile 72,657 15.46 21,641 29.79 51,016 70.21 
Leather & Timber & 
Furniture 43,898 9.34 17,143 39.05 26,755 60.95 
Mining & Logging 35,705 7.60 19,472 54.54 16,233 45.46 
Total 469,938 100.00 194,566 41.40 275,372 58.60 
Notes: Obs. stands for the number of observations. Pct. stands for the percentage. 
 
 
We further classify the affiliated sub-sample into three different levels of the lishu 
relationship: firms affiliated with the low level of government, firms affiliated with 
the medium level of government, and firms affiliated with the high level of 
93  
  
government. Table 4.3 reports the distribution of the number of observations by year 
and industry for these three different groups. We observe that for the firms with the 
lishu relationship, most of them are affiliated with the medium level of government 
(20.29%), followed by firms affiliated with the low level of government (19.96%), 
while only 5.88% of our firm-year observations have a high level of lishu relationship. 
A similar pattern is observed in the industry distribution. Most of the industries are 
affiliated with the medium level of government. This might be attributed to the fact 
that the government at this level can access important resources, as well as enjoy some 
authorities to support the firms’ development.   
 
Table 4.3 Distribution of the number of observations for three affiliated groups 
by year and industry 
 
Year 
Low Medium High 
Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct. 
2001 10,906 32.21 10,510 31.04 3,074 9.08 
2002 14,391 31.03 12,678 27.34 3,668 7.91 
2003 17,963 28.56 14,930 23.73 3,960 6.30 
2004 9,056 12.39 12,131 16.60 3,891 5.32 
2005 11,318 13.07 13,484 15.57 3,816 4.41 
2006 9,814 11.45 12,108 14.13 3,593 4.19 
2007 8,960 11.00 11,110 13.64 3,205 3.94 
Average  19.96  20.29  5.88 
       
Industry       
Metal & Metal products 8,427 20.47 5,706 13.86 1,863 4.52 
Nonmetal products & 
Petroleum processing 9,664 21.95 9,467 21.51 1,996 4.53 
Chemicals & Plastic 14,137 17.96 16,152 20.53 4,204 5.34 
Machinery & Equipment 9,806 18.20 9,746 18.09 4,219 7.83 
Electrical equipment 8,567 14.24 9,694 16.11 3,574 5.94 
Transport equipment 3,279 15.05 4,075 18.70 2,714 12.46 
Food & Tobacco 2,091 11.63 5,736 31.90 1,193 6.63 
Textile 11,750 16.17 8,417 11.58 1,474 2.03 
Leather & Timber & 
Furniture 7,939 18.09 6,840 15.58 2,364 5.39 
Mining & Logging 6,748 18.90 11,118 31.14 1,606 4.50 
Total 82,408 17.54 86,951 18.50 25,207 5.36 
Notes: Obs. stands for the number of observations. Pct. stands for the percentage. 
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Focusing on the distribution of the affiliated firms by four ownership types in Table 
4.4, I find that on average, above 94% of SOEs have a lishu relationship, followed by 
COEs (83.25%) and PEs (39.88%), while only 28.06% of FEs are politically affiliated. 
This can be explained that foreign firms generally operate in an established 
distribution network and can gain support from their home country or parent company. 
Therefore, they have less motivation to affiliate with the government.  
 
As for the industry distribution, I find that SOEs in mining and logging industries are 
most politically affiliated, while PEs and COEs in chemicals and plastic industries are 
more likely to have a lishu relationship. As these industries are generally involved 
with crucial resources and licence, firms in these industries have higher motivation to 
have a lishu relationship. Foreign firms in the textile industry are more likely to have 
a lishu relationship with the government. This may associate to the fact that textile 
industry is generally characterised by abundant labourers and lower labour costs. 
Therefore, foreign firms in this industry need to be connected with the government 
somehow to get financial and non-financial support. 
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Table 4.4 Distribution of the number of observations for affiliated group by year, industry, and ownership  
 
Year 
SOEs PEs  FEs        COEs 
Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct. 
2001 4,162 97.93 11,554 70.73 3,140 44.60 3,798 91.36 
2002 4,752 97.62 14,553 60.65 4,342 45.71 4,817 90.32 
2003 5,041 96.52 18,632 50.83 5,071 43.28 5,666 89.67 
2004 4,746 93.54 11,551 25.57 1,964 14.81 5,078 78.39 
2005 4,346 93.83 14,541 25.42 2,817 18.42 5,116 80.06 
2006 3,737 91.35 13,370 23.27 2,229 14.59 4,612 77.63 
2007 3,022 89.86 12,561 22.67 2,175 15.00 4,083 75.32 
Average  94.38  39.88  28.06  83.25 
         
Industry         
Metal & Metal products 1,497 5.02 8,212 8.49 1,597 7.35 3,606 10.87 
Nonmetal products & Petroleum processing 3,455 11.59 10,547 10.90 1,228 5.65 4,449 13.41 
Chemicals & Plastic 4,190 14.06 18,656 19.28 3,739 17.20 5,513 16.62 
Machinery & Equipment 4,149 13.92 12,762 13.19 1,737 7.99 3,816 11.50 
Electrical equipment 2,411 8.09 11,045 11.41 3,852 17.72 3,010 9.07 
Transport equipment 2,102 7.05 4,809 4.97 812 3.74 1,580 4.76 
Food & Tobacco 1,950 6.54 4,305 4.45 1,238 5.70 833 2.51 
Textile 1,417 4.75 11,130 11.50 4,257 19.58 3,213 9.69 
Leather & Timber & Furniture 3,079 10.33 7,425 7.67 2,359 10.85 3,198 9.64 
Mining & Logging 5,556 18.64 7,871 8.13 919 4.23 3,952 11.91 
Total 29,806 100.00 96,762 100.00 21,738 100.00 33,170 100.00 
Notes: Obs. stands for the number of observations. Pct. stands for the percentage. The ownership classification is based on the majority average ownership shares (at least 50%). 
SOEs, PEs, FEs, and COEs refer to state-owned enterprises, private enterprises, foreign enterprises, and collectively-owned enterprises. 
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Table 4.5 presents the distribution of the affiliated firms by three different regions, i.e. 
the coastal region, the central region, and the western region. Not surprisingly, we find 
that the coastal region exhibits the least propensity of having a lishu relationship 
(40.91%), while the firms located in the central and western regions are more likely 
to have political affiliation (61.43% and 63.42%, respectively). Firms in mining and 
logging industries still exhibit a high percentage of having a lishu relationship in the 
central region, while firms in chemicals and plastic industries in the coastal and 
western regions are the most politically affiliated. The results may be attributed to the 
fact that the mining and logging resources are rich in the central region but the 
governments control these resources strictly. In order to obtain the mining and logging 
permit from the governments, firms may tend to have a lishu relationship with the 
governments in the central region. The chemicals and plastic industries usually 
generate contaminations to the environment. Firms in these sectors may seek the lishu 
relationship with the aim to receive the relaxed environmental measures.
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Table 4.5 Distribution of the number of observations for affiliated group by 
year, industry, and region 
 
Year 
Coastal Central Western 
Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct. 
2001 17,004 67.37 4,398 89.79 3,088 83.03 
2002 21,307 61.29 5,283 84.69 4,147 77.20 
2003 25,962 54.35 6,214 73.7 4,677 69.75 
2004 15,929 28.75 5,090 50.56 4,059 53.28 
2005 18,023 27.62 5,718 45.95 4,877 54.90 
2006 15,602 24.08 5,296 43.11 4,617 53.49 
2007 14,127 22.90 4,940 42.22 4,208 52.30 
Average  40.91  61.43  63.42 
       
Industry       
Metal & Metal products 11,396 8.91 2,135 5.78 2,465 8.31 
Nonmetal products & 
Petroleum processing 10,821 8.46 5,535 14.98 4,771 16.08 
Chemicals & Plastic 22,924 17.92 6,068 16.43 5,501 18.54 
Machinery & 
Equipment 16,789 13.12 4,338 11.74 2,644 8.91 
Electrical equipment 17,331 13.54 2,389 6.47 2,115 7.13 
Transport equipment 6,262 4.89 2,092 5.66 1,714 5.78 
Food & Tobacco 5,053 3.95 1,984 5.37 1,983 6.68 
Textile 17,831 13.94 2,591 7.01 1,219 4.11 
Leather & Timber & 
Furniture 11,598 9.06 3,029 8.20 2,516 8.48 
Mining & Logging 7,949 6.21 6,778 18.35 4,745 15.99 
Total 127,954 100.00 36,939 100.00 29,673 100.00 
Notes: Obs. stands for the number of observations. Pct. stands for the percentage. 
 
4.5.2 Summary statistics 
 
Table 4.6 provides descriptive information, including the number of observations in 
each category, mean, median, and standard deviation (S.D.), relative to variables used 
for the whole sample and for different sub-samples of firms (firms with a lishu 
relationship and firms without a lishu relationship). 1  The p-values from an 
                                               
1 See Appendix for detailed definitions of the variables used in this chapter. The correlation matrix is 
also presented in Appendix. 
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independent mean-equality test between these two groups are also reported in the last 
column in Table 4.6. All differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 
More specifically, the average total real assets and the number of employees of the 
affiliated firms in column (2) are 753.45 (thousands of yuan) and around 317 
employees, respectively, compared with an average of 542.56 (thousands of yuan) and 
249 employees of the non-affiliated firms in column (3), supporting our H1A. 
Affiliated firms also display a higher leverage ratio (58.60%), which supports our H3A 
and indicates these affiliated firms suffer from soft budget constraints. However, 
contrary to our H3B, the cash flow-to-capital ratio is significantly higher in non-
affiliated firms (37.49%), compared to that in affiliated firms (30.66%). ROS and sales 
growth are lower for firms with the lishu relationship (0.03% and 9.09%, respectively), 
which are consistent with our H4A and H4B. Moreover, firms without the lishu 
relationship are generally younger (9 years, compared with 16 years for affiliated 
firms) and located in the coastal region.  
   
Focusing on the three different levels of the lishu relationship in Table 4.7, we observe 
that while the level of the lishu relationship is upgrading, the firms’ size, in terms of 
real assets and the number of employees, as well as firms’ age are increasing. In 
addition, the profitability and sales growth are decreasing when the level of political 
affiliation is increasing. As for the leverage ratio, we find that firms affiliated with the 
medium level of government have the highest leverage ratio and the lowest cash flow-
to-capital ratio. 
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Table 4.6 Descriptive statistics (sample mean, median, and S.D.) 
 
Variables 
Full sample 
(1) 
Firms with a lishu relationship 
(2) 
Firms without a lishu relationship 
(3) Diff 
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. 
lishu 3.165 1.000 2.935 6.229 7.000 2.187 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000*** 
Real Assets 629.874 221.407 1,262.470 753.450 257.594 1,451.825 542.561 200.047 1,101.035 0.000*** 
Employee 277.178 154.000 344.056 317.031 177.000 383.059 249.020 143.000 310.519 0.000*** 
Age 11.985 9.000 10.048 16.021 11.000 12.949 9.308 8.000 6.224 0.000*** 
Leverage 56.610 58.275 24.693 58.595 60.054 24.756 55.207 56.960 24.551 0.000*** 
CFK 34.661 20.768 45.044 30.664 17.282 43.514 37.486 23.124 45.887 0.000*** 
ROS 0.035 0.025 0.079 0.030 0.020 0.089 0.040 0.028 0.070 0.000*** 
Sales Growth 10.804 10.190 34.451 9.089 8.623 33.700 12.016 11.357 34.922  0.000*** 
Region 1.349 1.000 0.660 1.495 1.000 0.745 1.246 1.000 0.571 0.000*** 
Observations            469,938             194,566             275,372  
Notes: Real Assets are expressed in thousands of yuan. Leverage, CFK, ROS, and Sales growth are expressed in percentage terms. S.D. stands for standard deviations. The last 
column (Diff) presents p-values from an independent samples mean-equality test between firms with a lishu relationship and firms without a lishu relationship. *, **, *** 
indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and1% level, respectively. See Appendix for complete definitions of all variables. 
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Table 4.7 Descriptive statistics for three levels of the lishu relationship (sample mean, median, and S.D.) 
 
Variables 
Low Medium High 
Diff1 Diff2 Diff3 
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. 
lishu 4.051 5.000 1.387 7.410 7.000 0.492 9.276 9.000 0.447 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Real Assets 420.170 174.168 862.491 837.390 319.726 1,486.636 1,553.474 659.132 2,277.423 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Employee 236.368 141.000 287.259 352.887 202.000 407.644 457.050 264.000 494.288 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Age 12.108 10.000 7.654 17.980 11.000 14.698 20.483 13.000 15.468 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
Leverage 56.155 57.815 24.474 61.501 63.104 24.541 56.552 57.102 25.336 0.000***  0.025** 0.000*** 
CFK 40.151 24.165 48.478 23.138 12.674 36.959 25.620 13.574 41.296 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
ROS 0.042 0.029 0.071 0.021 0.013 0.096 0.019 0.015 0.111 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 
Sales Growth 11.175 10.797 34.012 7.655 6.995 34.110 7.216 7.301 30.762 0.000*** 0.000***  0.066* 
Region 1.274 1.000 0.566 1.675 1.000 0.812 1.594 1.000 0.828 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Obs. 82,408 86,951 25,207    
Notes: Real Assets are expressed in thousands of yuan. Leverage, CFK, ROS, and Sales growth are expressed in percentage terms. S.D. stands for standard deviations. The last 
three columns present p-values from an independent samples mean-equality test between the low level of lishu group and the medium level of lishu group (Diff1), between the 
low level of lishu group and the high level of lishu group (Diff2), and between the medium level of lishu group and the high level of lishu group (Diff3). *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and1% level, respectively. See Appendix for complete definitions of all variables. 
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Table 4.8 provides a comparison of the main variables across firms’ ownership types. 
SOEs and FEs are generally large in real assets and the number of employees, 
compared with PEs and COEs. SOEs have the oldest firms age (27 years) and highest 
political affiliation level, followed by COEs with 17 years and the second highest 
political affiliation level. While the FEs are the youngest as most of the foreign firms 
entered into China after the 1990s. SOEs also suffer from soft budget constraints 
indicated by their highest leverage ratio, while COEs enjoy the highest cash flow-to-
capital ratio. Table 4.8 also illustrates that the ROS and sales growth are higher for 
private firms and foreign firms than that for SOEs and COEs. Finally, we observe that 
the FEs prefer to locate their firms in the coastal region, while SOEs are more likely 
to locate their firms in the inner region of China.  
 
Table 4.9 provides descriptive statistics for three different regions of China. We 
observe that firms located in the central and western regions exhibit higher political 
affiliation levels. In addition, firms in the west of China have the largest size, in terms 
of real assets (709.83 thousands of yuan) and the number of employees (319 people); 
and they are older (15.48 years) than the firms in the eastern and central China. 
Interestingly, firms locate in the central region have the highest ROS and sales growth. 
This may be attributed to their location advantage, which is close to the heart of China, 
Beijing, with enormous markets. The firms in the western region also show the highest 
leverage ratio and lowest cash flow-to-capital ratio. The lowest leverage ratio for firms 
operated in the coastal region may suggest that these firms depend more on their 
internal funds and foreign financing, instead of debt.  
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In summary, politically affiliated firms display a larger size measured in the forms of 
total assets and the number of employees, a higher leverage ratio and are older, while 
unaffiliated firms have more cash flow, higher profitability and sales growth. These 
rough statistics provide a primary description of our sample, and support most of our 
hypotheses preliminarily. Therefore, a more thorough test of the hypotheses is 
necessary, within a regression analysis framework.         
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Table 4.8 Descriptive statistics for ownership (sample mean, median, and S.D.) 
 
Variables 
SOEs PEs FEs COEs 
Diff1 Diff2 Diff3 
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. 
lishu 7.676 8.000 1.916 2.693 1.000 2.671 2.255 1.000 2.479 4.242 4.000 2.459 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Real Assets 985.579 345.796 1,748.771 523.598 186.599 1,107.429 954.273 383.202 1,591.924 358.945 171.822 645.723 0.000*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 
Employee 425.579 235.000 486.372 242.497 140.000 304.793 351.867 205.000 398.223 239.369 145.000 287.214 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Age 27.206 29.000 15.616 10.542 8.000 9.027 9.181 9.000 3.577 17.390 14.000 11.186 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Leverage 64.026 65.381 25.776 58.603 60.699 23.803 46.346 46.376 24.129 58.304 59.710 25.366 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
CFK 14.512 7.296 29.290 35.097 21.354 44.000 38.110 23.798 47.486 39.513 22.405 51.341 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
ROS 0.003 0.005 0.115 0.038 0.027 0.070 0.038 0.026 0.085 0.036 0.024 0.081 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.823 
Sales Growth 5.571 5.268 34.627 12.297 11.531 34.827 9.247 9.008 33.031 8.442 7.915 34.234 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Region 1.805 2.000 0.823 1.368 1.000 0.672 1.080 1.000 0.349 1.415 1.000 0.677 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Obs.          31,501          292,241          86,590 40,039    
Notes: Real Assets are expressed in thousands of yuan. Leverage, CFK, ROS, and Sales growth are expressed in percentage terms. S.D. stands for standard deviations. The ownership 
classification is based on the majority average ownership shares (at least 50%). SOEs, PEs, FEs, and COEs refers to state-owned enterprises, private enterprises, foreign enterprises, and 
collectively-owned enterprises. The last three columns present p-values from an independent samples mean-equality test between the SOEs group and the PEs group (Diff1), between SOEs 
group and the FEs group (Diff2), and between PEs group and FEs group (Diff3). *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and1% level, respectively. See Appendix for complete 
definitions of all variables. 
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Table 4.9 Descriptive statistics for region (sample mean, median, and S.D.) 
 
Variables 
Costal Central West 
Diff1 Diff2 
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. 
lishu 2.784 1.000 2.735 4.004 4.000 3.093 4.789 7.000 3.302 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Real Assets 633.649 224.529 1,268.047 550.322 185.111 1,151.683 709.830 252.300 1,355.499 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Employee 266.051 150.000 333.045 305.371 170.000 373.508 319.779 186.000 374.318 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Age 11.228 9.000 8.889 13.987 9.000 12.615 15.476 10.000 13.453 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Leverage 56.218 58.084 24.428 56.672 57.598 26.374 59.367 60.246 24.074 0.000*** 0.000*** 
CFK 37.049 22.874 45.876 30.258 15.180 44.525 23.277 13.220 36.694 0.000*** 0.000*** 
ROS 0.036 0.026 0.073 0.039 0.024 0.091 0.024 0.015 0.101  0.000** 0.000*** 
Sales Growth 10.724 10.288 33.890 12.035 10.721 36.603 9.728 8.678 35.434  0.000***  0.000*** 
Obs. 354,900 66,063 48,975   
Notes: Real Assets are expressed in thousands of yuan. Leverage, CFK, ROS, and Sales growth are expressed in percentage terms. S.D. stands for standard deviations. The 
last two columns present p-values from an independent samples mean-equality test between the coastal region group and the central region group (Diff1), and between the 
coastal region group and the western region group (Diff2). *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and1% level, respectively. See Appendix for complete definitions 
of all variables. 
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4.6 Empirical findings 
 
4.6.1 Estimations with pooled Probit and random-effects Probit models  
 
Table 4.10 reports the regression results by employing the pooled Probit model 
clustering by firms ID (column (1)) and the random-effects Probit model (column (2)) 
for the entire sample. Because of the non-linear model, the coefficient estimates are 
not informative about the magnitude of the effects of the outcome variables. Therefore, 
we also report the estimates of marginal effects (ME) in Table 4.10. The coefficients 
of all variables are statistically significant at 1% level, except for the coefficient on 
western region variable in the pooled Probit model.  
 
Focusing on column (1) in Table 4.10, the coefficient on the firms’ size, in terms of 
the total assets, is positively related to the probability of the firm having a lishu 
relationship. This result is consistent with our first hypothesis (H1A) and with the 
literature, which suggests that firms with larger size are more prone to have political 
affiliation (for example, Li et al., 2006; Guariglia and Mateut, 2013; Masters and 
Keim, 1985). According to the marginal effects (0.048 for the total assets), an increase 
in a firm’s total assets by 0.1, or 10 percentage points, is associated with an increase 
in the probability of having a lishu relationship by 0.0048 (i.e. 0.48 percentage points). 
The marginal effects are tested larger by using the random-effects Probit, i.e. a 10% 
increase in a firm’s asset is associated with an increase in the probability of having a 
lishu relationship by 0.0107 (which is 1.07 percentage points).  
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Focusing on regional dummies, we find that the coefficients on the coastal region 
dummy are negative and statistically significant at 1% level in both estimations, while 
the coefficients on the western region dummy are positive in both estimations (but 
insignificant using the pooled Probit). These results suggest that regional factors can 
also affect the likelihood of having a lishu relationship. In China, the coastal area 
generally provides a better and a more open environment for firms to develop, while 
enterprises in the West, which are usually associated with fewer investment 
opportunities, higher transaction costs and more informative asymmetries, could be in 
greater need of political help. Our results indicate that firms locate in the west of China 
are more likely to affiliate with politicians, while being a coastal firm decreases the 
probability of having political affiliation. More specifically, the marginal effects imply 
that a firm locating in the west of China has a 0.06% and 0.47% higher probability of 
having a lishu relationship in the pooled Probit model and the random-effects Probit 
model, respectively, while a firm locating in the coastal of China has a 1.21% and 
3.24% lower likelihood of political participation, respectively. These results are 
consistent with our Hypothesis 1B, suggesting that firms located in the western region 
have higher motivation to connect with the governments.  
 
From both columns in Table 4.10, we can also find that the ownership types precisely 
determine the firms’ decision on political affiliation. The coefficient on the foreign 
ownership dummy is negative and significant, while that on the state ownership is 
positive and significant. These results indicate that foreign firms are less likely to have 
political affiliation, while state-owned firms are more likely to be politically affiliated. 
This is consistent with our Hypothesis 2 and with findings in Boubakri et al. (2008), 
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Bertrand et al. (2006), and Dyck (2001). More specifically, the marginal effects 
suggest that being a foreign (state-owned) firm has a 1.65% and 4.04% (5.13% and 
14.67%) lower (higher) probability of having a lishu relationship in the pooled Probit 
model and the random-effects Probit model, respectively. 
 
The coefficients on the leverage ratio and cash flow-to-capital ratio are positive and 
significant, indicating that the relationship between leverage ratio (cash flow-to-
capital ratio) and the probability of having political affiliation is positive, which is 
consistent with our Hypothesis 3A and 3B. According to the marginal effects (0.017 
for leverage and 0.038 for cash flow-to-capital ratio) in the pooled Probit model, an 
increase in a firm’s leverage (cash flow-to-capital ratio) by 0.1, or 10 percentage 
points, is associated with an increase in the probability of having a lishu relationship 
by 0.17 percentage points (0.38 percentage point). The marginal effects are tested 
similarly by using the random-effects Probit. This finding is supported by some 
existing studies.  
 
According to Johnson and Mitton (2003) and Khwaja and Mian (2005), a higher 
leverage ratio indicates that firms can benefit from soft budget terms, suggesting that 
firms with a higher leverage ratio are more likely to obtain external financing. In this 
case, these firms are more able to have political affiliation. Contrary to the descriptive 
statistics, the cash flow has a positive and significant influence on the probability of 
firms having the lishu relationship. This can be explained considering that it is widely 
acknowledged that investment spending of firms should depend on their internal funds 
as the first choice, which can be measured by liquidity and cash flow. Firms with 
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greater liquidity or cash flow will have more investment opportunities. In this case, 
these firms may be prone to have connections with the governments to obtain 
favourable support, such as crucial licences, profitable investment projects and 
advantageous help in dealing with investment disputes (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 
2006). 
  
From Table 4.10, we observe that ROS exhibits negative and significant coefficients 
in both estimations, indicating that the relationship between profitability and the 
likelihood of having political affiliation is negative. These results are consistent with 
Hypothesis 4A. According to Salamon and Siegfried (1977), in order to avoid 
unexpected economic losses, firms with higher profitability are less likely to get 
involved in political activities. Specifically, a 10% decrease in ROS is related to an 
increase in the probability of having political affiliation by 1.82 percentage points in 
column (1) and 1.68 percentage points in column (2). In addition, the significant and 
negative coefficients on the sales growth in both estimations support our Hypothesis 
4B, suggesting that firm’s growth opportunities may also affect the political 
connections decisions. In summary, firms with lower sales growth, large size, soft 
budget constraints, and high cash flow ratio may need more help from governments 
to obtain favourable projects and expand their investment opportunities.  
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Table 4.10 Determinants of the lishu relationship 
 
Variables 
 (1)  (2) 
Coefficient ME Coefficient ME 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.153*** 0.048*** 0.340*** 0.107*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.054*** 0.017*** 0.069*** 0.022*** 
 (0.014) (0.004) (0.025) (0.008) 
𝑪𝑭𝑲𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.121*** 0.038*** 0.094*** 0.029*** 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.013) (0.004) 
𝑹𝑶𝑺𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.579*** -0.182*** -0.535*** -0.168*** 
 (0.047) (0.015) (0.071) (0.022) 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.218*** -0.068*** -0.152*** -0.048*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003) 
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑶𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 1.632*** 0.513*** 4.664*** 1.467*** 
 (0.023) (0.007) (0.051) (0.019) 
𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒏 𝑶𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 -0.524*** -0.165*** -1.285*** -0.404*** 
 (0.011) (0.003) (0.025) (0.008) 
𝑪𝒐𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 -0.385*** -0.121*** -1.031*** -0.324*** 
 (0.011) (0.003) (0.028) (0.009) 
𝑾𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 0.019 0.006 0.149*** 0.047*** 
 (0.015) (0.005) (0.039) (0.012) 
Obs. 469,938 469,938 469,938 469,938 
Log likelihood -260,149  -173,561  
Note: The dependent variable 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡 is a binary variable which equals to one if the firm has a lishu 
relationship, and zero otherwise. Column (1) presents results estimated by pooled Probit model 
clustering observations by firms’ ID. Column (2) reports results estimated by random-effects Probit 
model. Coefficients and marginal effects (ME) are presented for each equation. Robust standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. Industry dummies and year dummies are included in all estimations. Obs. 
stands for the number of observations. Log likelihood is the log likelihood of the fitted model. *, **, 
*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
4.6.2 Estimation with ordered Probit model 
 
In this section, we further divide the political affiliation of firms into four groups, i.e. 
firms without a lishu relationship (coded as 1), firms with a low level of lishu 
relationship (including the firms affiliated with the rest levels of governments and 
coded as 2), firms with a medium level of lishu relationship (including the firms 
affiliated with the city and prefecture, and county governments and coded as 3), and 
firms with a high level of lishu relationship (including the firms affiliated with the 
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central and provincial governments, and coded as 4). As our dependent variable is an 
ordinal polychotomous variable, we perform the ordered Probit estimation for the full 
sample and report the results in Table 4.11.  
 
We start with focusing on the coefficients column. 1  The positive and significant 
coefficient on firms’ real assets indicates that an increase in firms’ real assets would 
yield a decrease in the probability of having no lishu relationship, and an increase in 
the probability of having a lishu relationship with the high level of government. 
Looking at the marginal effects for the first group (firms without a lishu relationship), 
we find that the probability of having no political affiliation decrease by 0.81 
percentage points as firms size increases by 10%. We also find that for the other three 
groups where firms have political affiliation, an increase in firms’ real assets by 0.1, 
or 10 percentage points, is associated with an increase in the probability of having a 
low/medium/high level of lishu relationship by 0.23/0.48/0.11 percentage points, 
respectively. These findings support our H1A.  
 
Focusing on the regional factors in Table 4.11, we notice a negative coefficient on the 
coastal region variable, suggesting that being a coastal firm necessarily is associated 
with a higher probability of having no political affiliation and a lower probability of 
having high political affiliation. However, the positive and significant coefficient on 
                                               
1 According to Cameron and Trivedi (2010), the sign of the coefficients can be immediately interpreted as 
determining whether the dependent variable increases with the regressor. If coefficient 𝛽𝑗 is positive, then an 
increase in 𝑥𝑖𝑗 decreases the probability of being in the lowest category (𝑦𝑖 = 1) and increases the probability 
of being in the highest category. The marginal effects are expected to have the opposite signs to coefficients for 
the first outcome (𝑦𝑖 = 1) and have the same signs with coefficients for the rest outcomes. In our case, the first, 
second, third, and fourth outcomes refer to firms without a lishu relationship (the lowest category), firms with a 
low level of lishu relationship, firms with a medium level of lishu relationship, and firms with a high level of lishu 
relationship (the highest category), respectively.   
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western region variable suggests that being a western firm would be related to a lower 
probability of having no lishu relationship and a higher probability of affiliating with 
the high level of government. These findings are consistent with our H1B. Specifically, 
being a coastal/western firm is associated with a 1.27%/0.62% higher/lower 
likelihood of being a non-affiliated firm. Moreover, being a firm located in the east 
(west) of China is related to a 0.35%/0.75%/0.17% (0.17%/0.36%/0.08%) lower 
(higher) probability of having a low/medium/high level of lishu relationship, 
respectively. 
 
Similar results can also be found by looking at the ownership variables. That is, being 
a foreign (state-owned) firm is related to a higher (lower) in the likelihood of having 
no lishu relationship and a lower (higher) in the probability of having a high level of 
lishu relationship. Focusing on the marginal effects for non-affiliated firms, we find 
that being a foreign (state-owned) firm is associated with a 1.80% (5.54%) higher 
(lower) likelihood of being a non-affiliated firm. For the other three groups, being a 
foreign (state-owned) firm is associated with a 0.50%/1.06%/0.24% 
(1.53%/3.26%/0.75%) lower (higher) probability of having low/medium/high level of 
political affiliation, respectively. These results support our Hypothesis 2.  
 
As for the financial status variables, the positive and significant coefficients on 
leverage ratio and cash flow ratio indicate that an increase in leverage ratio/cash flow 
ratio would yield a decrease in the propensity of being non-affiliated firms and an 
increase in the propensity of being highly affiliated firms. These findings are 
consistent with our H3A and H3B.  
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The negative and significant coefficients on ROS and sales growth in Table 4.11 
support the Hypothesis 4A and 4B, suggesting that an increase in ROS/sales growth 
is associated with a rise in the likelihood of having no lishu relationship and a drop in 
that of having a high level of lishu relationship. Specifically, a 10% increase in 
ROS/sales growth relates to an increase in the likelihood of being a non-affiliated firm 
by 2.57/0.75 percentage points. Furthermore, an increase in ROS (sales growth) by 
0.1, or 10 percentage points, would yield a decrease in the probability of having a 
low/medium/high level of lishu relationship by 0.71/1.51/0.35 (0.21/0.44/0.10) 
percentage points, respectively. 
 
Furthermore, changes in variables would be associated with changes in the probability 
of having the lishu relationship by a larger percentage point for firms affiliated with 
medium level of government than those affiliated with low/high level of government. 
This might relate to the fact that the government at this level can access important 
resources, as well as enjoy authority to support the firms’ development. Therefore, 
firms are more willing to have the lishu relationship with the governments at the 
medium level.  
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Table 4.11 Determinants of the lishu relationship (four levels of the lishu 
relationship) 
 
Variables 
ordered Probit 
Coefficient ME (1) ME (2) ME (3) ME (4) 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.209*** -0.081*** 0.023*** 0.048*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.030** -0.012** 0.003** 0.007** 0.002** 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
𝑪𝑭𝑲𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.075*** -0.029*** 0.008*** 0.017*** 0.004*** 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
𝑹𝑶𝑺𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.658*** 0.257*** -0.071*** -0.151*** -0.035*** 
 (0.043) (0.017) (0.005) (0.010) (0.002) 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.192*** 0.075*** -0.021*** -0.044*** -0.010*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑶𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 1.421*** -0.554*** 0.153*** 0.326*** 0.075*** 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒏 𝑶𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 -0.461*** 0.180*** -0.050*** -0.106*** -0.024*** 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
𝑪𝒐𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 -0.325*** 0.127*** -0.035*** -0.075*** -0.017*** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
𝑾𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 0.158*** -0.062 0.017*** 0.036*** 0.008*** 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
      
/cut1 1.303***     
 (0.021)     
/cut2 1.923***     
 (0.021)     
/cut3 3.101***     
 (0.022)     
Obs. 469,938 469,938 469,938 469,938 469,938 
Log likelihood -441,090     
Note: The dependent variable 𝑃𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡 is an ordinal variable which equals to 1 if the firm has no lishu 
relationship, 2 if the firm has a low level of lishu relationship, 3 if the firm has a medium level of lishu 
relationship, and 4 if the firm has a high level of lishu relationship. Coefficients and marginal effects 
(ME) for each outcome are presented. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Industry 
dummies and year dummies are included in all estimations. Obs. stands for the number of observations. 
Log likelihood is the log likelihood of the fitted model. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively.  
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4.7 Further tests 
 
4.7.1 Determinants of the lishu relationship by ownership  
 
We firstly estimate the determinants of the lishu relationship by ownership types.1 
Table 4.12 presents the coefficients and marginal effects estimated by the pooled 
Probit and random-effects Probit models. As we find that around 94% of state-owned 
firms and 84% of collectively-owned firms are politically affiliated, we only report 
the results for private firms (in column (1)), which accounts for more than 60% of our 
full sample, and foreign firms (in column (2)), which are generally the youngest and 
vigorous firms in China. 
 
The coefficient on firm’ size is positive and significant for both types of firms in both 
estimations, suggesting that having the lishu relationship increases as firms’ size 
increase. The magnitude of marginal effects is larger for private firms (a 10% increase 
in firms’ size is associated with a 0.64 percentage points using the pooled Probit model 
                                               
1 I have estimated the regressions for firms getting the lishu relationship (from having no lishu relationship to 
having a lishu relationship at any level) and for firms ending the lishu relationship (from having a lishu relationship 
at any level to having no lishu relationship). The results are robust and available on request.  
In addition, I have estimated the regression by considering the initial conditions and for firms improving and 
decreasing their lishu level. And the results are robust and available on request. 
I also have estimated the regressions for ten different industries available in our dataset, i.e. Metal and metal 
products industry, Non-metal products and petroleum processing industry, Chemicals and plastic industry, 
Machinery and Equipment industry, Electrical equipment industry, Transport equipment industry, Food and 
Tobacco industry, Textile industry, Leather, Timber and Furniture industry, and Mining and Logging industry. And 
the results are robust overall. However, three industries out of ten have some different situations. Firstly, the 
coefficients and marginal effects of ROS for the Mining and logging industry are positive and significant. This 
might due to the fact that minerals and forest resource are owned by the public in China. Therefore, the firms with 
high profitability in this industry are more prone to have political connections to access resource and licences 
(Zhang, 2006; Jiang, 2000; Sun, 2004). Secondly, the transport equipment industry and textile industry show 
negative and significant coefficients and marginal effects on “Western Region” variable. This might be because of 
the fact that during our sample period, there were many local policies that provide many favourable treatments, 
such as land lease, taxes, and subsidies, which were only available to the transport equipment industry and textile 
industry in the western region (Wei, 2007; Su, 1999; Hui, 2008; Sun and Jiang, 2015; Luo and Cao, 2005). For 
example, according to Yang (2004), Xinjiang Province has set up 20 billion RMB subsidies and provided free land 
to facilitate the development of textile enterprises. Shaanxi Province has provided tax deduction and extra finance 
and subsidies to the transport industry. In this case, these two industries locating in the western region are less 
likely to have political connections during our sample period. The results are available on request.  
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and 0.69 percentage points using the random-effects Probit model), compared with 
that for foreign firms (a 10% increase in firms’ size is associated with a 0.24 
percentage points using pooled Probit model and 0.10 percentage points using 
random-effects Probit model).  
 
As for the regional variables, we find similar results to our previous estimations for 
both private firms and foreign firms. As for private firms, being a coastal (western) 
firm is associated with a 1.49% and 1.94% (0.17%) lower (higher) probability of 
having a lishu relationship by using the pooled Probit model and random-effects 
Probit model, respectively. Looking at the foreign firms in column (2), we find that 
being a coastal (western) firm is related to a 0.70% (0.88%) and 0.35% (0.47%) lower 
(higher) probability of having a lishu relationship by using the pooled Probit model 
and the random-effects Probit model, respectively. 
 
Looking at the leverage ratio and cash flow ratio, we observe a positive and significant 
relationship for both types of firms, expect for the leverage ratio in the foreign firms, 
which have insignificant effects. Overall, these results suggest that the higher level of 
leverage ratio and cash flow ratio are associated with higher probability of having a 
lishu relationship. Focusing on the profitability and sales growth, we find that the 
coefficients of ROS become insignificant for foreign firms. But the results are still 
robust for the private firms and for sales growth of foreign firms. ROS and sales 
growth significantly and negatively affect firms’ political participation, and this effect 
is larger for private firms than foreign firms.1  
                                               
1  The coefficients of ROS for foreign firms are positive and insignificant, which indicates ROS is a poor 
determinant for foreign firms political participation. These positive sign might be related to the fact that some 
foreign firms with high profitability need to transfer more return to their home countries. This behaviour is 
associated with the law and regulation. In this case, profitable foreign firms might use political connections as one 
method to facilitate the transfer (Zhang, 2011; Zhu and Song, 2002; Fang, 2002; Qi, 2008).  
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Table 4.12 Determinants of the lishu relationship by ownership (PEs vs. FEs) 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) 
pooled Probit RE Probit pooled Probit RE Probit 
Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.207*** 0.064*** 0.435*** 0.069*** 0.083*** 0.024*** 0.185*** 0.010*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.015) (0.001) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.084*** 0.026*** 0.098*** 0.016*** 0.013 0.004 0.011 0.001 
 (0.018) (0.006) (0.030) (0.005) (0.034) (0.010) (0.059) (0.003) 
𝑪𝑭𝑲𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.086*** 0.027*** 0.078*** 0.012*** 0.091*** 0.026*** 0.080*** 0.004*** 
 (0.010) (0.003) (0.016) (0.003) (0.017) (0.005) (0.029) (0.002) 
𝑹𝑶𝑺𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.910*** -0.282*** -0.859*** -0.137*** 0.130 0.037 0.095 0.005 
 (0.064) (0.020) (0.094) (0.015) (0.090) (0.026) (0.142) (0.008) 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.212*** -0.066*** -0.164*** -0.026*** -0.112*** -0.032*** -0.041 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.015) (0.004) (0.027) (0.001) 
𝑪𝒐𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 -0.481*** -0.149*** -1.215*** -0.194*** -0.244*** -0.070*** -0.668*** -0.035*** 
 (0.012) (0.004) (0.031) (0.006) (0.045) (0.013) (0.113) (0.006) 
𝑾𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 0.001 0.001 0.109** 0.017** 0.307*** 0.088*** 0.888*** 0.047*** 
 (0.017) (0.005) (0.042) (0.007) (0.069) (0.020) (0.171) (0.009) 
Obs. 292,241 292,241 292,241 292,241 86,590 86,590 86,590 86,590 
Log likelihood -160,109  -109,896  -43,984  -30,011  
Note: The dependent variable 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡 is a binary variable which equals to one if the firm has a lishu relationship, and zero otherwise. Columns (1) and (2) present results 
for PEs and FEs, respectively. The regressions are estimated by pooled Probit model clustering observations by firms’ ID and random-effects Probit model. Coefficients 
(Coeff.) and marginal effects (ME) are presented for each regression. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Industry dummies and year dummies are included 
in all estimations. Obs. stands for the number of observations. Log likelihood is the log likelihood of the fitted model. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively.  
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4.7.2 Determinants of the lishu relationship by region 
 
Table 4.13 presents the results estimated by the pooled Probit and random-effects 
Probit models for three regions, i.e. the coastal (column (1)), central (column (2)), and 
western (column (3)) region.  
 
In terms of firms’ size, we find that no matter which region the firm is located in, an 
increase in firms’ size is generally associated with an increase in the probability of 
having a lishu relationship. Similar results are found with firms ownership types. 
Being a SOEs is generally related to an increase in the likelihood of having political 
affiliation, while firms with foreign ownership are less likely to be politically affiliated.  
 
The coefficient on leverage ratio is positive and significant at the 1% level for firms 
locating in the central and western regions, suggesting that these firms with soft 
budget constraints are more prone to have the lishu relationship. However, we find 
that the cash flow-to-capital ratio is a significant determinant only for firms in the east 
of China. This may be due to the Chinese regional development policies. Although 
the open-door policy and the coastal development strategy before the 1990s promoted 
the development of the east of China considerably, they also brought seriously 
regional unbalance and inequality. In order to reduce these disparities, China has 
changed its focus from the east to the inner regions. The central government carried 
out a series policies to support the development of the inner regions, i.e. 
“Development of the Western Region in China” (xi bu da kai fa) in the late 1990s, 
“Revitalizing the Northeast Old Industries Strategy”(zheng xing dong bei lao gong ye 
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ji di) in 2003, and the “Rise of Central China Strategy” (zhong bu jue qi zhan lve) in 
2004. With these favourable policies, a great amount of funding has been injected in 
these areas. Therefore, firms locating in the central and western regions may have less 
dependence on the availability of their internal funds to invest, including having 
political affiliation. 
 
Looking at the ROS and sales growth, our previous results are still robust across the 
three regions. That is, an increase in ROS or sales growth relates to a decrease in the 
probability of firms’ political participation.  
 
119  
  
Table 4.13 Determinants of the lishu relationship by region 
 
 
Variables 
                         (1) (2) (3) 
     pooled Probit         RE Probit       pooled Probit    RE Probit  pooled Probit       RE Probit 
 Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.161*** 0.050*** 0.380*** 0.070*** 0.133*** 0.042*** 0.266*** 0.093*** 0.136*** 0.044*** 0.294*** 0.078*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.015) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.020) (0.005) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.021 0.006 0.060 0.011 0.375*** 0.118*** 0.451*** 0.158*** 0.113*** 0.037*** 0.230*** 0.006*** 
 (0.017) (0.005) (0.030) (0.006) (0.033) (0.010) (0.054) (0.019) (0.043) (0.014) (0.072) (0.019) 
𝑪𝑭𝑲𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.156*** 0.048*** 0.137*** 0.025*** 0.003 0.001 0.056 0.020 0.008 0.003 0.029 0.008 
 (0.009) (0.003) (0.015) (0.003) (0.020) (0.006) (0.032) (0.011) (0.028) (0.009) (0.045) (0.012) 
𝑹𝑶𝑺𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.795*** -0.247*** -0.708*** -0.131*** -0.042 -0.013 -0.448*** -0.157*** -0.253** -0.082** -0.152 -0.040 
 (0.062) (0.019) (0.091) (0.017) (0.101) (0.032) (0.157) (0.055) (0.108) (0.035) (0.165) (0.044) 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.221*** -0.069*** -0.140*** -0.026*** -0.189*** -0.060*** -0.171*** -0.060*** -0.221*** -0.072*** -0.160*** -0.042*** 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.015) (0.005) (0.025) (0.009) (0.018) (0.006) (0.030) (0.008) 
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑶𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 1.708*** 0.531*** 5.227*** 0.968*** 1.438*** 0.453*** 3.547*** 1.239*** 1.616*** 0.526*** 4.226*** 1.116*** 
 (0.032) (0.010) (0.071) (0.019) (0.041) (0.012) (0.088) (0.030) (0.048) (0.014) (0.116) (0.034) 
𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒏 𝑶𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 -0.537*** -0.167*** -1.374*** -0.254*** -0.646*** -0.204*** -1.416*** -0.495*** -0.351*** -0.114*** -0.731*** -0.193*** 
 (0.012) (0.003) (0.028) (0.006) (0.047) (0.015) (0.104) (0.037) (0.054) (0.017) (0.134) (0.036) 
Obs. 354,900 354,900 354,900 354,900 66,063 66,063 66,063 66,063 48,975 48,975 48,975 48,975 
Log likelihood -194,586  -126,255  -36,567  -26,686  -27,908  -19,376  
Note: The dependent variable 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡 is a binary variable which equals to one if the firm has a lishu relationship, and zero otherwise. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present results for the coastal 
region, the central region, and the western region, respectively. The regressions are estimated by pooled Probit model clustering observations by firms’ ID and random-effects Probit model. 
Coefficients (Coeff.) and marginal effects (ME) are presented for each regression. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Industry dummies and year dummies are included in 
all estimations. Obs. stands for the number of observations. Log likelihood is the log likelihood of the fitted model. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
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4.8 Conclusion 
 
Although political connections have attracted worldwide academic interests, most of 
the studies focus on the benefits provided by political connections to the connected 
firms. An important question, what types of firms are more likely to have political 
connections, has been neglected.  
 
After almost four decades of economic reform since 1978, various economic 
institutions in China have gained increasing authority to operate on market principles. 
However, the government continues to play an important role in the allocation of 
critical resources and policy making. And the firms remain involved in the 
relationship with different levels of government. As a unique institutional variation, 
the lishu relationship has received the least attention in previous research. Little is 
known about this particular relationship through which the Chinese government can 
maintain its administrative control over the affiliated firms. To the best of our 
knowledge, this study represents the first effort to empirically estimate the 
determinants of political connections, intended as the lishu relationship in China.  
 
In this chapter, we use a sample of 113,549 mainly unlisted firms in China over the 
period 2001 to 2007, to test four sets of hypotheses regarding the determinants of the 
probability of having political connections, measured as the lishu relationship. Our 
empirical work shows that the likelihood of a firm being politically affiliated can be 
explained by the firms’ characteristics, ownership types, financial factors, profitability, 
and sales growth.   
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We find that firm size is a positive and precise determinant in explaining firm’s 
political affiliation. Firms locating in the coastal region are less likely to have a lishu 
relationship than those in the west of China. In addition, state-owned firms are more 
prone to have a lishu relationship, compared with foreign firms. Moreover, the 
relationship between leverage ratio/cash flow-to-capital ratio and the probability of 
having a lishu relationship is positive and significant, indicating that non-financially 
constrained firms are more likely to invest in political relationships. However, firms 
with higher profitability and sales growth do not prefer to be politically affiliated.  
 
Then we divide the full sample into four different levels of the lishu relationship, i.e. 
firms without a lishu relationship, firms affiliated with the low level of government, 
firms affiliated with the medium level of government, and firms with the high level of 
government. Our findings suggest the similar patterns for firms’ size, regional factors, 
ownership types, financial status, profitability, and sales growth. Furthermore, we also 
find that changes in these variables would be associated with changes in the 
probability of having a lishu relationship by a larger number for firms affiliated with 
the medium level of governments than those affiliated with the low/high level of 
government. We attribute this finding to the fact that firms affiliated with medium 
level of governments can obtain important resources and retain flexibility to operate.  
 
Looking at the ownership types, i.e. private firms and foreign firms, we find the 
similar results to our previous analysis. And the magnitude of marginal effects is larger 
for private firms than that for foreign firms. As for the estimations based on three 
regions, i.e. the coastal, central, and western regions, similar results are found. 
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However, we do not find that cash flow is a significant determinant for firms in the 
central and western areas due to the regional development policies. These favourable 
policies include the “Development of the Western Region in China” (xi bu da kai fa), 
“Revitalising the Northeast Old Industries Strategy” (zheng xing dong bei lao gong ye 
ji di), and the “Rise of Central China Strategy” (zhong bu jue qi zhan lve). With these 
favourable policies, a great amount of funding has been injected in these areas. 
Therefore, firms locating in the inner regions may have less dependence on the 
availability of their internal funds to develop and invest in political affiliation. 
   
Following the economic and political reforms in China, the non-state economy 
continues to play a more important role in every aspect of the country’s development. 
Given a relatively underdeveloped legal and market environment, having the lishu 
relationship may be an effective and active way for entrepreneurs to operate their 
business in the transitional economy. Therefore, exploring the factors that affect 
political participation helps understand the economic and political development in 
China. Our findings have some implications for firms and policy-makers. First, not 
all of the firms are good candidates to have the lishu relationship. As China is 
geographically large and has different levels of governments, for firms without a lishu 
relationship, they should be prepared to deal with not only one government, but at 
least five layers of governments in the vertical hierarchy. Especially for the foreign 
firms that are new to China. Second, China has a system of economic decentralisation 
and political centralisation, in which local governments have the authority to make 
economic policies. As many firms are more willing to be affiliated with these medium 
level of governments, the policy makers should establish relevant policies to support 
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the firms’ development. At the same time, they should be cautious not to induce 
further regional imbalance and inequity.  
 
Further research can be undertaken from the following direction. As we use the pooled 
Probit and random-effects Probit models for estimations, it would be interesting to 
test whether the results are robust by using other estimations, such as the special 
regressor estimator proposed by Lewbel (2000). Compared with the IV Probit or Tobit 
model, the special regressor allows us to include the categorical variables as regressors.  
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Appendix 4A 
 
Table 4A.1 Definition of the variables used 
 
Variable Definition 
PA 
a dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm has a lishu relationship and 0 
otherwise 
PAV 
an ordinal dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm has no lishu 
relationship, 2 if firm has lishu relationship with the low level of 
government, 3 if firm affiliated with the medium level of government, 4 
if firm has lishu relationship with the high level of government 
Total  Assets 
sum of the firm’s fixed and current assets, where fixed assets include 
tangible fixed assets, intangible fixed assets, and other fixed assets; and 
current assets include inventories, accounts receivable, and other current 
assets 
Size 
natural logarithm of total real assets (the number of employees in the 
Appendix Table 3A.8) 
Leverage ratio ratio of total debt to total assets 
CFK ratio of cash flow to tangible fixed assets 
ROS 
return on sales, ratio of profit before tax and interest to total sales, a 
measure of profitability 
Sales growth growth of total real sales 
State ownership a dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is state-owned and 0 otherwise 
Foreign 
ownership 
a dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is owned by foreign investors 
(including investors from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) and 0 
otherwise 
Coastal region 
a dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is located in the coastal region 
in China and 0 otherwise 
Central region 
a dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is located in the central region 
in China and 0 otherwise 
Western region 
a dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is located in the western region 
in China and 0 otherwise 
Age a firm’s age is calculated since the year the firm was established 
Liquidity ratio 
a ratio of the difference between current assets and current liabilities to 
total assets 
Employee total number of people employed by the firm 
Deflators 
all variables (except tangible fixed assets) are deflated using provincial 
ex-factory producer price indices (pdsales) taken from various issues of 
the china statistical yearbook. tangible fixed assets are deflated using a 
deflator for fixed capital formation (pdgoods) 
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Table 4A.2 The correlation matrix of the main variables 
 
 
Table 4A.3 Structure of the unbalanced panel 
 
Year No. of Observations Percent Cumulative 
2001 33,855 7.20 7.20 
2002 46,372 9.87 17.07 
2003 62,905 13.39 30.46 
2004 73,082 15.55 46.01 
2005 86,577 18.42 64.43 
2006 85,700 18.24 82.67 
2007 81,447 17.33 100.00 
Total 469,938 100.00  
 
No. of Observations 
per firm 
No. of firms Percent Cumulative 
5 31,252 27.52 27.52 
6 23,341 20.56 48.08 
7 24,634 21.69 69.77 
8 34,322 30.23 100.00 
Total 113,549 100.00  
 
No. of Observations 
per firm 
No. of Observations Percent Cumulative 
5 81,190 17.28 17.28 
6 78,566 16.72 34.00 
7 106,228 22.60 56.60 
8 203,954 43.40 100.00 
Total 469,938 100.00  
 
Real 
Assets 
Employee Age Leverage Liquidity CFK ROS 
Sales 
Growth 
Real 
Assets 1.000        
Employee 0.554 1.000       
Age 0.084 0.175 1.000      
Leverage -0.004 0.032 0.110 1.000     
Liquidity -0.022 -0.065 -0.068 -0.650 1.000    
CFK -0.012 -0.051 -0.103 -0.164 0.346 1.000   
ROS 0.069 0.003 -0.130 -0.250 0.228 0.455 1.000  
Sales 
Growth 0.033 0.020 -0.095 0.009 -0.022 0.129 0.145 1.000 
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Table 4A.4 Determinants of the lishu relationship (including firms’ age) 
 
Variables 
 (1)  (2) 
Coefficient ME Coefficient ME 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.129*** 0.038*** 0.288*** 0.087*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.009) (0.003) 
𝑨𝒈𝒆𝒊𝒕 0.036*** 0.011*** 0.117*** 0.035*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.079*** 0.023*** 0.064* 0.019* 
 (0.018) (0.005) (0.033) (0.010) 
𝑪𝑭𝑲𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.133*** 0.040*** 0.106*** 0.032*** 
 (0.010) (0.003) (0.017) (0.005) 
𝑹𝑶𝑺𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.397*** -0.118*** -0.303*** -0.092*** 
 (0.059) (0.018) (0.092) (0.028) 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.156*** -0.047*** -0.113*** -0.034*** 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.014) (0.004) 
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑶𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 1.352*** 0.402*** 3.955*** 1.194*** 
 (0.031) (0.009) (0.072) (0.026) 
𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒏 𝑶𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 -0.448*** -0.133*** -1.051*** -0.317*** 
 (0.013) (0.004) (0.030) (0.010) 
𝑪𝒐𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 -0.309*** -0.092*** -0.877*** -0.265*** 
 (0.015) (0.004) (0.039) (0.012) 
𝑾𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 0.054*** 0.016*** 0.254*** 0.077*** 
 (0.020) (0.006) (0.053) (0.016) 
Obs. 297,595 297,595 297,595 297,595 
Log likelihood -156,456  -103,910  
Note: The dependent variable 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡 is a binary variable which equals to one if the firm has a lishu 
relationship, and zero otherwise. Column (1) presents results estimated by pooled Probit model 
clustering observations by firms’ ID. Column (2) reports results estimated by random-effects Probit 
model. Coefficients and marginal effects (ME) are presented for each equation. Robust standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. Industry dummies and year dummies are included in all estimations. Obs. 
stands for the number of observations. Log likelihood is the log likelihood of the fitted model. *, **, 
*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 4A.5 Determinants of the lishu relationship (employee) 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) 
Coefficient ME Coefficient ME 
𝑬𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒐𝒚𝒆𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.142*** 0.045*** 0.278*** 0.086*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.008) (0.003) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.067*** 0.021*** 0.113*** 0.035*** 
 (0.014) (0.004) (0.025) (0.008) 
𝑪𝑭𝑲𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.079*** 0.025*** 0.046*** 0.014*** 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.013) (0.004) 
𝑹𝑶𝑺𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.349*** -0.110*** -0.299*** -0.093*** 
 (0.046) (0.014) (0.071) (0.022) 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.210*** -0.066*** -0.143*** -0.045*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003) 
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑶𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 1.658*** 0.525*** 4.765*** 1.484*** 
 (0.022) (0.007) (0.052) (0.019) 
𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒏 𝑶𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 -0.453*** -0.143*** -1.129*** -0.351*** 
 (0.011) (0.003) (0.025) (0.008) 
𝑪𝒐𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 -0.333*** -0.105*** -0.941*** -0.293*** 
 (0.010) (0.003) (0.029) (0.009) 
𝑾𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 0.052*** 0.016*** 0.226*** 0.070*** 
 (0.015) (0.005) (0.040) (0.012) 
Obs. 469,938 469,938 469,938 469,938 
Log likelihood -262,029  -174,185  
Note: The dependent variable 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡 is a binary variable which equals to one if the firm has a lishu 
relationship, and zero otherwise. Column (1) presents results estimated by pooled Probit model 
clustering observations by firms’ ID. Column (2) reports results estimated by random-effects Probit 
model. Coefficients and marginal effects (ME) are presented for each equation. Robust standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. Industry dummies and year dummies are included in all estimations. Obs. 
stands for the number of observations. Log likelihood is the log likelihood of the fitted model. *, **, 
*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 4A.6 Determinants of the lishu relationship (liquidity) 
Variables 
(1) (2) 
Coefficient ME Coefficient ME 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.156*** 0.049*** 0.343*** 0.108*** 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) 
𝑳𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.150*** 0.047*** 0.161*** 0.051*** 
(0.013) (0.004) (0.022) (0.007) 
𝑪𝑭𝑲𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.093*** 0.029*** 0.073*** 0.023*** 
(0.008) (0.003) (0.013) (0.004) 
𝑹𝑶𝑺𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.669*** -0.210*** -0.590*** -0.186*** 
(0.047) (0.015) (0.070) (0.022) 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.210*** -0.066*** -0.148*** -0.046*** 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003) 
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑶𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 1.633*** 0.513*** 4.667*** 1.468*** 
(0.023) (0.007) (0.051) (0.019) 
𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒏 𝑶𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 -0.546*** -0.172*** -1.310*** -0.412*** 
(0.011) (0.003) (0.025) (0.008) 
𝑪𝒐𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 -0.381*** -0.120*** -1.027*** -0.323*** 
(0.011) (0.003) (0.028) (0.009) 
𝑾𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 0.021 0.007 0.153*** 0.048*** 
(0.015) (0.005) (0.039) (0.012) 
Obs. 469,938 469,938 469,938 469,938 
Log likelihood -260,009 -173,539 
Note: The dependent variable 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡 is a binary variable which equals to one if the firm has a lishu 
relationship, and zero otherwise. Column (1) presents results estimated by pooled Probit model 
clustering observations by firms’ ID. Column (2) reports results estimated by random-effects Probit 
model. Coefficients and marginal effects (ME) are presented for each equation. Robust standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. Industry dummies and year dummies are included in all estimations. Obs. 
stands for the number of observations. Log likelihood is the log likelihood of the fitted model. *, **, 
*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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CHAPTER 5 POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND EXPORTING 
Using data from 111,460 mainly unlisted Chinese manufacturing firms between 2001 
and 2007, we explore the research question: to what extent does a lishu relationship 
affect firms’ exporting behaviour. We adopt a dynamic model to analyse the effect of 
the lishu relationship on the propensity and the intensity of exporting of Chinese firms. 
We also control for the unobserved firm heterogeneity and initial conditions problem, 
which have often been overlooked in the existing research on firms’ exporting 
activities. We find that political affiliation has a negative impact on both the 
propensity and the intensity of exporting. Interestingly, this negative effect is only 
significant for firms affiliated with the low or medium levels of government, but not 
for firms affiliated with the high level of government. Previous exporting experience 
has a strong effect on firms’ exporting behaviour in the current period, indicating the 
presence of sunk entry costs. In addition, the estimate of sunk entry costs decreases, 
when the initial conditions problem is appropriately controlled for. Being consistent 
with the findings of current studies, we also find that firm size, total factor productivity, 
financial factors, types of ownership, and location are the significant determinants for 
firms’ exporting activities.   
5.1 Introduction 
The internationalisation of the business environment has become one of the most 
significant developments in the modern era. The increasing liberalisation, integration, 
globalisation, and competition in the world economies since the post-war period have 
130 
triggered a growing engagement of firms in exporting activities. 
The study of firms’ exporting behaviour goes back to the 1960s. According to Lopez 
(1967, p.126), long distance trade “became the driving force of economic progress, 
and in the end affected every aspect of human activity almost as decisively as the 
Industrial Revolution changed the modern world.”  
The existing literature provides a comprehensive study on exporting from the 
perspectives of public policy makers, managers, and researchers. According to 
Czinkota (1994), in the view of public policy makers, exporting is an important way 
to accumulate foreign exchange reserves, to increase employment levels, to improve 
productivity, and to enhance social prosperity. As for business managers, exporting 
can boost the growth of enterprises, improve financial performance, strengthen 
competitive ability, and make sure companies survive in a highly internationalised 
market (Samiee and Waiters, 1990; Kumcu, 1995). 
The academic research on firms’ exporting can be divided into two groups: 
international business studies and economics studies. Several researchers have 
explored firms’ exporting behaviour from the perspectives of international business 
and international management (for example, Albaum and Peterson, 1984; Yeoh and 
Jeong, 1995; Zou and Stan, 1998; Robertson and Chetty, 2000; Leonidou et al., 2002; 
Moen, 1999; Peng et al., 2008; Liu, 2010; Wei et al., 2014). They consider exporting 
as a challenging but promising area for firms’ development and an important strategy 
for firms to internationalise. The internationalised market environment provides many 
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crucial opportunities for economic development, states independence, profitability 
growth, and business firms’ survival. Firms are therefore likely to enter international 
markets to take advantage of these opportunities.  
Economics researchers focus on the role of external institutions and infrastructure 
investment on international trade (for example, Kandori, 1992; Greif, 1993, 1994; 
Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Dixit, 2003; Li, 2003; Costinot, 2004; Anderson and 
Young, 2006; Ranjan and Lee, 2007; Nunn, 2007; Méon and Sekkat, 2008; Albarran 
et al., 2013). These scholars argue that trade expansion requires well-developed 
support from the institutions, such as property rights institutions, contracting 
institutions and financing institutions, and undeveloped economic institutions, which 
sit in an imperfect contract enforcement system and causes insecurity of property 
rights protection, corruption, and transport costs. These imperfections in turn, can 
dramatically reduce international trade.  
Another group of economics researchers attempts to analyse the relationship between 
firm heterogeneity and exporting behaviour (for instance, Hirsch and Adar, 1974; 
Aitken et al., 1997; Melitz, 2003; Greenaway et al., 2007; Lu, 2011; Chaney, 2013; 
Lawless, 2009; Van Biesebroeck, 2005; Das et al., 2007; Greenaway and Kneller, 
2008; Sinani and Hobdari, 2010; Alessandria and Choi, 2007; Bernard and Jensen, 
2004; Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Bernard and Wagner, 2001; Manez et al., 2008; 
Manova, 2013). They point out that the firm size, productivity, capital intensity, and 
financial considerations can also affect the enterprises’ entry into export markets. 
Particularly, they also point out that the existence of sunk costs is another crucial 
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determinant of firms’ exporting behaviour. As new exporters always have to deal with 
huge start-up costs, they need to collect information on foreign markets, explore 
marketing resources, changing and adjusting the products to cater to the needs of 
international customers, and deal with the new governmental procedures. 
However, one feature of the existing studies is that the majority have ignored the 
effects of firms’ political connections on exporting activities. As an important 
development strategy, having political connections is crucial to firms, especially in 
developing countries. Several researchers point out that political connections can 
provide better protection and more prerogatives to the politically connected firms (see, 
for example, Brandt and Li, 2003; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Faccio, 2006; Leuz and 
Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Goldman et al., 2010; Faccio, 2010).  
These favourable treatments include better reputation and prestige, more opportunities 
to access critical and diversified resources which are larger in quantity and higher in 
quality, preferential policies, assistance in land purchase, favourable access to 
government contracts and bank loans, reduction in the tax burden, more opportunities 
in undertaking mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in heavily regulated industries (such 
as finance, media, aerospace, and natural resources mining) which are not open to the 
private sector. These favourable assistances all lead to improvements in operating 
performance. Moreover, politically connected firms may face lower sunk costs 
because these firms suffer from soft budget constraints. Given the fact that political 
connections improve firm performance and facilitate sunk costs, ignoring the effects 
of political connections will bias the estimation of firms exporting behaviour.  
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Therefore, this study attempts to contribute to the literature in the following four 
important ways. First, we use a very large dataset, provided by the National Bureau 
of Statistics of China (NBS) over the period 2000 and 2007. This dataset is made up 
of comprehensive economic information of firms coming from 31 provinces or 
province-equivalent municipal cities (except Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) all over 
China. This dataset includes a large proportion of small and young firms, which can 
represent the population of Chinese firms better than listed firms. It provides us with 
a unique opportunity to carry out much sharper tests for the exporting activities 
hypotheses than those typically performed in the literature, which is mostly based on 
listed firms. Moreover, this dataset not only contains detailed information regarding 
firms’ exporting activities, but also the information about their political connection, 
so that we are able to examine the relationship between firms’ exporting behaviour 
and political connections. Our final panel covers 111,460 mainly unlisted firms, which 
corresponds to 502,196 firm-year observations. To the best of our knowledge, the 
relationship between political connections and exporting activities hypotheses has 
never been tested for unlisted firms using such a comprehensive dataset. Furthermore, 
we not only focus on the probability of exporting, but also on the intensity of exporting.  
 
Second, since the opening-up of China in the 1980s, China has swiftly risen as a global 
trading power and its status as one of the most important countries in the world has 
been greeted with a curious mixture of both admiration and fear. In particular, in 2009, 
China has become the largest merchandise exporting country with a total value of 
around 1.20 trillion US dollars (accounting for 43.63% of its total GDP), compared 
with the 1.05 trillion US dollars in the US (accounting for 18.46% of its total GDP) 
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(the World Trade Organization; the World Bank). Some research studies the exporting 
behaviour of Chinese firms (for example, Du and Girma, 2007; Lu and Tao, 2007; 
Yang and Malick, 2010; Lu et al., 2010; Xu et al., 2011; Sun and Hong, 2011; Yi and 
Wang, 2012; Dai and Yu, 2013). However, these studies mainly focus on exporting 
behaviour without exploring the effects of political connections. At the same time, 
political connections are always considered as an important instrument for private 
enterprises, especially unlisted firms, to develop themselves in the market 
environment with Chinese characteristics (Child, 1994; Peng et al., 2004; Li, 2004; 
Tan et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2011a, 2011b; Feng et al., 2011). In China, the art of 
using connections (guan xi) to subvert or take the advantages of the formal system 
exists commonly in the Chinese administration. Therefore, China is a comprehensive 
laboratory to study as to how political connections affect firms’ exporting activities. 
 
Third, political connections have attracted worldwide academic interest. The existing 
literature on political connections has been conducted in other countries, such as the 
United States, Malaysia and Thailand (for example, Roberts, 1990; Johnson and 
Mitton, 2003; Goldman et al., 2009). However, the definition of political connections 
and their influences on enterprises are different between China and the other countries 
around the world due to the different political regimes. China has a unique type of 
political connections, named the lishu relationship. Lishu is a Chinese word which 
means “belonging to”, “subordinate to”, or “directly controlled by”. Through this 
relationship, the governments can maintain administrative power to control various 
aspects of the firm both directly and legally (Tan et al., 2007; Li, 2004). Specifically, 
a lishu relationship implies that the government controls firm structures, directors and 
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senior manager appointments, business plans, major projects, and operational 
decisions. As an institutional variation during the economic transition in China, the 
unique lishu relationship makes the research of Chinese enterprises distinctive. Our 
research will therefore focus, for the first time, on the unlisted firms’ exporting 
behaviour through the perspective of the lishu relationship. 
 
Finally, it is generally acknowledged that exporting activities are associated with huge 
sunk costs (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Clerides et al., 1998; Melitz, 2003; Campa, 
2004; Bernard and Jensen, 1999, 2004; Greenaway and Kneller, 2007; Manova, 2013). 
These sunk costs include collecting information about markets, meeting legal 
requirements and foreign market tastes, and establishing distribution networks. 
Researchers widely use lagged exporting status as one of the explanatory variables in 
the regression to capture the sunk costs. However, in the studies of exporting 
behaviour, the initial conditions problem is common when the start of the sample is 
not the same as the start of the firms’ exporting process. In this case, the initial 
exporting decision may relate to the unobserved firm heterogeneity, which may take 
an important part in explaining firms’ decisions during the observed sample period. 
Therefore, ignoring the initial observations or assuming they are exogenous could 
cause overestimation of the size of the sunk entry costs of exporting. Only few studies 
have considered this problem (for example, Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Campa, 2004; 
Manez et al., 2008; Lawless, 2009; Albarran et al., 2013). However, these papers do 
not take into account the effects of political connections on firms’ exporting behaviour. 
In this study, we address the initial conditions problem by adopting the Wooldridge 
(2005) technique.  
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Our main finding in this chapter is that firms with political affiliation are less likely 
to export and export less. Being consistent with the existing studies, we also find that 
sunk entry costs exist in Chinese firms. By controlling for the initial conditions 
properly, the overestimation of sunk entry costs can be mitigated. We also find that 
firm size, total factor productivity, financial factors, types of ownership, and location 
are significant determinants to firms’ exporting activities.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the background 
of Chinese exporting. Section 5.3 endeavours to provide a comprehensive review of 
the existing literature on firms’ exporting behaviour and political connections. Our 
hypotheses are demonstrated in section 5.4. Specification and estimation methodology 
are presented in section 5.5. Data sample and summary statistics are described in 
section 5.6. In section 5.7, the empirical results are presented. Section 5.8 shows 
further tests. Section 5.9 concludes this chapter.  
 
5.2 Background  
 
5.2.1 Chinese institutional environment 
 
It is generally acknowledged that better legal protection and better institutions lead to 
better outcomes of the financial system, and in turn, lead to rapid and constant 
development in exporting. For example, an entrepreneur, who aims to expand his/her 
business in an unfamiliar global market, needs to consider how to prevent his/her legal 
properties from being expropriated by local governments, how to make sure the 
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contracts can be well implemented by his/her distant clients, and how to obtain 
sufficient funds from banks in the global financial market to support the expansion. 
Therefore, well-developed legal and financial systems can encourage the entrepreneur 
to participate in the international market by providing support for the development of 
exporting.  
 
Meantime, since its transformation from a centrally planned economic system to a 
socialist market economic system, the Chinese economy is characterised by a unique 
market environment where the private sector and public sector coexist. Despite 
economic reforms provide favourable support for private investment and grant private 
business preferential access to capital, technology, and markets, SOEs are still 
powerful and dominate the major industries and resources in China. 
 
Allen et al. (2005) examine the financial system in China at the aggregate level, 
including both the financial markets and the banking system. They compare China’s 
financial system with that in 49 countries. They show that the overhead cost of the 
banking system in China is much higher, while its profitability is the lowest, indicating 
that it is not an efficient system. Moreover, according to Morck et al. (2000) and Allen 
et al. (2005), stock prices are more synchronous in China, indicating that the stock 
markets are inefficient. They attribute this phenomenon to the weak protection for the 
investors. For example, because of poor and uncertain protection of private property 
rights, political events and rumours may have a significant influence on the market-
wide stock prices. In addition, problems such as intercorporate income shifting would 
reduce firm-specific stock price variation, increasing stock return synchronicity. To 
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summarise, the financial system in China is influenced significantly by this powerful 
but insufficient banking system, in which the state-owned banks play the dominating 
role.1 
 
As to the Chinese legal system, it is still evolving and characterised by a fragmentation 
of regulatory authorities. For example, as the Chinese commercial law system is an 
instrument to enforce the economic policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 
the central government chooses pilot areas (shi dian) and implements special rules 
within those areas to test the effects of a law or regulation before introducing the rules 
national widely. In this case, the central government may delegate authority and 
flexibility to local officials so that they can exercise these laws and regulations in 
accordance with the local circumstances, which in turn may make laws uncertain (Ho, 
1994). Moreover, the legal system in China is also characterised by ambiguity in legal 
drafting. For instance, according to Law and Chen (2004), Chinese economic laws 
often draw a broad picture, without specifying the concrete and detailed rules. This 
situation can be attributed to the fact that the Chinese government may not have 
enough time to consider every aspect of the legislation due to the rapid development 
of the legal and economic environment; but at the same time, there may be urgent 
need for some regulations to be carried out in the market. The government therefore 
has to enact some laws or regulations hastily without containing enough details.  
 
Allen et al. (2005) compare the legal system in China to those of other emerging 
countries, including India, Pakistan, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. 
                                               
1  They are Bank of China (BOC), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China 
Construction Bank (CCB), and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC). 
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They show that the corruption index in China is the worst among the seven developing 
countries, while its creditor and shareholder protection are only better than that of 
India and Mexico. This indicates that the development of China’s legal system is 
behind that of the other major emerging countries. Furthermore, one of the most 
important and necessary factors to have an effective law enforcement system is that a 
country must have an independent and efficient judicial system with a sufficient 
supply of qualified legal professionals. However, according to Allen et al. (2005), 
only 20% of all lawyers in China have law degrees, and even a lower percentage of 
judges have formally received legal education at universities or colleges. Moreover, 
only four percent of the five million business enterprises in China currently have 
regular legal advisers. In a word, the law and legal institutions in China, as well as the 
investor protection systems, are significantly underdeveloped.  
 
Given such underdeveloped external institutional environment, the extraordinary 
development of exporting in China is always considered as a miracle.  
 
5.2.2 The economic and exporting development in China 
 
The opening-up of China in the 1980s has brought momentous change to the life of 
its people. The sustained rapid rate of economic growth compares favourably with the 
experience of other transitional economies. China’s sudden rise as a global trading 
power and its status as one of the most important countries in the world have been 
greeted with a curious mixture of both admiration and fear. At the end of July 2014, 
the population of China was approximately 1.36 billion people, ranking it the largest 
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country in the world (The World Factbook). In current US dollars (billion), the GDP 
in China has occupied the second place in the world since 2010 (See Table 5.1). If 
PPP is used to adjust GDPs,1 China’s economy is still the second largest following 
the United States, and became the largest in 2014 (See Table 5.2). Moreover, the GDP 
annual growth rate for the United States in 2012 was 2.30%, while the Chinese 
economic growth rate was 7.80% (The World Bank) (See Figure 5.1). Assuming that 
both countries continue to grow at the same rate separately, it will take only around 
13 years before China overtakes the US to become the largest economy in the world.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 Using PPP-adjusted figures to measure GDP is more appropriate. For example, the exchange rate 
between the RMB yuan and the U.S. dollar changed from 1 U.S. dollar = 4.25 RMB yuan to 1 U.S. 
dollar = 8.28 RMB yuan in 1992, which introduced a significant downward bias for China’s GDP figure 
in 1992.  
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Table 5.1 Top 11 Gross Domestic Product ranking from 2010 to 2014 
 
Country 
GDP in 2010 GDP in 2011 GDP in 2012 GDP in 2013 GDP in 2014 
Rank GDP Rank GDP Rank GDP Rank GDP Rank GDP 
United 
States 
1 14,958 1 15,534 1 16,425 1 16,427 1 17,348 
China 2 5,930 2 7,322 2 8,227 2 8,939 2 10,357 
Japan 3 5,495 3 5,896 3 5,960 3 5,007 3 4,602 
Germany 4 3,311 4 3,631 4 3,430 4 3,593 4 3,874 
France 5 2,570 5 2,785 5 2,614 5 2,739 6 2,834 
United 
Kingdom 
6 2,297 7 2,465 6 2,477 6 2,490 5 2,950 
Brazil 7 2,143 6 2,475 7 2,253 7 2,190 7 2,347 
Italy 8 2,059 8 2,196 9 2,014 9 2,068 8 2,148 
India 9 1,711 10 1,873 10 1,842 11 1,758 9 2,051 
Canada 10 1,614 11 1,779 11 1,821 10 1,825 11 1,785 
Russia 11 1,525 9 1,899 8 2,030 8 2,118 10 1,861 
Note: The GDP is expressed in billion US dollars.  
Data Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 Top 11 Gross Domestic Product based on PPP valuation ranking from 
2010 to 2014 
 
Country 
GDP in 2010 
using PPP 
GDP in 2011 
using PPP 
GDP in 2012 
using PPP 
GDP in 2013 
using PPP 
GDP in 2014 
using PPP 
Rank GDP Rank GDP Rank GDP Rank GDP Rank GDP 
United 
States 
1 14,958 1 15,534 1 16,425 1 16,427 2 17,348 
China 2 10,040 2 11,189 2 12,621 2 13,374 1 18,088 
Japan 3 4,351 4 4,411 4 4,576 4 4,729 4 4,767 
India 4 4,141 3 4,489 3 4,716 3 4,962 3 7,411 
Germany 5 2,926 5 3,085 5 3,167 5 3,227 5 3,748 
Russia 6 2,222 6 2,363 6 2,486 6 2,558 6 3,577 
United 
Kingdom 
7 2,201 8 2,269 8 2,313 8 2,378 10 2,569 
Brazil 8 2,167 7 2,270 7 2,330 7 2,422 7 3,276 
France 9 2,114 9 2,199 9 2,238 9 2,273 9 2,591 
Italy 10 1,783 10 1,825 10 1,813 11 1,805 12 2,135 
Mexico 11 1,609 11 1,706 11 1,798 10 1,845 11 2,149 
Data Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2015 
Notes: The GDP is expressed in billion US dollars. The purchasing power parity (PPP) between two 
countries, A and B, is the ratio of the number of units of country A’s currency needed to purchase in 
country A the same quantity of a specific good or service as one unit of country B’s currency will 
purchase in country B. PPPs can be expressed in the currency of either of the countries. In practice, they 
are usually computed among large numbers of countries and expressed in terms of a single currency, 
with the U.S. dollar (US$) most commonly used as the base or “numeraire” currency" (Global 
Purchasing Power Parities and Real Expenditures. 2005 International Comparison Program. The World 
Bank.). 
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Figure 5.1 GDP growth from 2005 to 2014 (annual %） 
 
 
Data Source: The World Bank indicators 
Notes: This is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. GDP is 
the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated 
without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources (The World Bank).
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It may be more useful to compare China’s GDP and economic growth with that of 
the other major emerging economies rather than the most developed countries, since 
China’s rapid economic growth only started in 1979.1 Table 5.3 compares China 
with the ten largest emerging economies in the world. In 2014, China’s GDP was 
more than four times the size of Brazil’s, which is the second largest developing 
economy in the world (see Table 5.3). In terms of PPP-adjusted GDP figures in 
2014 (See Table 5.4), China is more than twice the size of India, the second largest 
emerging economy in the world. As to the annual growth rate of GDP in 2012, 
China has been growing faster (7.8%) than Thailand (6.5%), which has the second 
highest growth rate in this group (The World Bank) (See Figure 5.2). Moreover, 
China has the largest annual GDP per capita growth rate among the group of the 
emerging economies over the period of 2005 and 2014 (See Figure 5.3). With its 
rapid development, China is positioned to play an increasingly significant role in 
the world economy.  
 
                                               
1 Measured in current US dollars, China’s GDP in 1978 was 148.18 billion US dollars, while in 
1979 it reached 176.63 billion US dollars.  
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Table 5.3 Comparison of China and other major emerging economies from 
2010 to 2014 
 
Country 
GDP in 2010 GDP in 2011 GDP in 2012 GDP in 2013 GDP in 2014 
Rank GDP Rank GDP Rank GDP Rank GDP Rank GDP 
China 2 5,930 2 7,322 2 8,227 2 8,939 2 10,357 
Brazil 7 2,143 6 2,475 7 2,253 7 2,190 7 2,347 
India 9 1,711 10 1,873 10 1,842 11 1,758 9 2,051 
Russia 11 1,525 9 1,899 8 2,030 8 2,118 10 1,861 
Mexico 14 1,047 14 1,161 14 1,177 14 1,327 15 1,291 
Indonesia 18 710 16 846 16 879 16 867 16 889 
Argentina 28 368 27 445 26 475 26 485 24 543 
South 
Africa 
29 363 29 402 29 384 33 354 33 350 
Thailand 30 319 31 346 33 366 28 401 30 405 
Malaysia 35 238 36 289 35 305 35 312 35 338 
Pakistan 47 177 48 214 45 226 45 237 44 247 
Note: The GDP is expressed in billion US dollars.  
Data Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.4 Comparison of China and other major emerging economies based 
on PPP valuation from 2010 to 2014 
 
Country 
GDP in 2010 
using PPP 
GDP in 2011 
using PPP 
GDP in 2012 
using PPP 
GDP in 2013 
using PPP 
GDP in 2014 
using PPP 
Rank GDP Rank GDP Rank GDP Rank GDP Rank GDP 
China 2 10,040 2 11,189 2 12,261 2 13,374 1 18,088 
India 4 4,141 3 4,489 3 4,716 3 4,962 3 7,411 
Russia 6 2,222 6 2,363 6 2,486 6 2,558 6 3,577 
Brazil 8 2,167 7 2,270 7 2,330 7 2,422 7 3,276 
Mexico 11 1,609 11 1,706 11 1,798 10 1,845 11 2,149 
Indonesia 15 1,026 15 1,114 15 1,204 15 1,285 8 2,686 
Argentina 23 639 22 709 22 735 22 771 24 951 
Thailand 24 584 24 595 24 645 24 674 21 1,070 
South Africa 25 523 25 552 25 576 25 596 29 707 
Pakistan 27 487 26 515 26 547 26 574 26 884 
Malaysia 29 429 29 460 29 495 28 525 28 769 
Note: The GDP is expressed in billion US dollars.  
Data Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2015 
Notes: The purchasing power parity (PPP) between two countries, A and B, is the ratio of the number of units of 
country A’s currency needed to purchase in country A the same quantity of a specific good or service as one unit of 
country B’s currency will purchase in country B. PPPs can be expressed in the currency of either of the countries. In 
practice, they are usually computed among large numbers of countries and expressed in terms of a single currency, 
with the U.S. dollar (US$) most commonly used as the base or “numeraire” currency". (Global Purchasing Power 
Parities and Real Expenditures. 2005 International Comparison Program. The World Bank.) 
 
145  
 
Figure 5.2 GDP growth in China and other major emerging economies from 2005 to 2014 (annual %) 
 
 
Data Source: The World Bank indicators 
Notes: This is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. GDP is 
the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated 
without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources (The World Bank). 
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Figure 5.3 GDP per capital growth in China and other major emerging economies from 2005 to 2014 (annual %) 
 
 
Data Source: The World Bank indicators 
Notes: This figure is the annual growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. GDP per capita is 
gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. Please refer to footnote 2 for details on the calculation of GDP. 
-10.00
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
China Brazil India Russia Mexico Indonesia Argentina South Africa Thailand Malaysia Pakistan
(%) 
(Year) 
147  
 
In light of the miraculous development of the Chinese economy in the past decades, 
understanding the exporting behaviour of Chinese firms is important. Since the 
economic reform initiated in the 1970s, China has not only experienced a dramatic 
economic growth, but also actively engaged in international markets and encouraged 
exports by establishing the Special Economic Zones1 and the duty drawback system.2 
 
During the earlier years of the establishment of the new China since 1949, the export 
value was only around 0.55 billion US dollars (WTO databases). Through the 
development in the next two decades, the export value amounted to 2.31 billion US 
dollars in 1970, but only taking up 2.61% of the total GDP (See Table 5.5). Along 
with the deepening of China’s economic reform and the opening-up policy in the next 
thirty years, the total value of exports experienced a steady and rapid growth reaching 
266.10 billion US dollars in 2001, and the ratio of export to GDP increased to 22.60%.  
                                               
1 As a part of the economic reform, the Special Economic Zones were considered as bridges linking 
home and abroad. On the one hand, these regions enjoy considerable autonomy, preferential tax 
treatment, and high levels of resources. They are the front line of the opening-up policy and closely 
connected with the international markets, having easier access to market information, foreign capital, 
modern technology, and management experience. These zones can absorb and utilise foreign capital 
and introduce developed technology and management experience for the construction of the socialist 
modernisation. On the other hand, through these zones, firms in the inland areas have more 
opportunities to develop economical and technological cooperation with the outside world. Currently, 
China has six Special Economic Zones, including Shenzhen in Guangdong Province (authorised in 
May 1980), Zhuhai in Guangdong Province (authorised in August 1980), Xiamen in Fujian Province 
(authorised in October 1980), Shantou in Guangdong Province (authorised in November 1984), Hainan 
(authorised in April 1988), and Kashi in Xinjiang Province (authorised in May 2010).  
2 Duty drawback schemes, which typically involve a combination of import duty drawbacks and value-
added tax (VAT) rebates and exemptions on imports that are used for the production of exports in China. 
For imported inputs, the VAT levy is in addition to the import duty. Finished final goods are also subject 
to VAT. However, previously paid VAT on its inputs is deducted from the VAT payment on its final 
goods. When the final goods are exported, the previously paid VAT on imported inputs is rebated to the 
export processor (see China’s Ministry of Finance: www.mof.gov.cn and Ministry of Commerce: 
www.mofcom.gov.cn). Therefore, duty drawbacks and VAT rebates respectively reduce the tariffs and 
domestic taxes on imported inputs for export processing. For example, a 17% tariff was imposed on 
the imports of electronic equipment and an additional 17% domestic tax was levied on its value-added 
in production in 1998. Both taxes are rebated when the electronic equipment is used for export 
processing. Moreover, the rebate rates were increased and many products enjoyed zero value-added tax 
rates in 1999 (see China’s Ministry of Finance: www.mof.gov.cn). These policies provide great 
incentives for firms to sell products abroad as they discriminate against imported inputs used in goods 
sold in domestic markets.  
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The WTO membership provided more opportunities for China to participate in the 
global market. Since China has become a member of the WTO, more enterprises 
engaged in exporting activities. Especially in recent years, a growing number of firms 
all around the world have looked beyond their traditional domestic markets, and 
focused on high-growth export markets. The merchandise exports (measured in 
current US dollars) have enlarged 207.47% from 0.76 trillion to 2.34 trillion between 
2005 and 2014, except for a decline in 2009 due to the global financial crisis (See 
Figure 5.4). Figure 5.4 also shows that the contribution of the total value of 
merchandise exports to the GDP remained above 40% over the period 2005-2014. 
Specifically, the ratio reached 64.49% in 2006, indicating that exporting has become 
one of the most important and fastest growing economic activities in economic 
development.  
Figure 5.4 Merchandise exports (trillion US dollars) and merchandise trade to 
GDP ratio (annual %) from 2005 to 2014 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, the World Bank. International Trade Statistics 2001-2014, the 
World Trade Organization. 
Notes: “Merchandise exports show the F.O.B. (free on board) value of goods provided to the rest of the 
world valued in current U.S. dollars.” “Merchandise trade as a share of GDP is the sum of merchandise 
exports and imports divided by the value of GDP, all in current U.S. dollars.” (The World Bank, 
available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator) 
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Table 5.5 Export and export to GDP ratio in China from 1970 to 2014 
 
Year 
Value 
(Billion US dollars) 
Export to GDP 
(Percentage) 
1970 2.31 2.61 
1975 7.69 4.59 
1980 18.10 10.65 
1985 27.35 9.21 
1990 62.09 16.07 
1991 71.91 17.37 
1992 84.94 18.65 
1993 91.74 19.65 
1994 121.01 21.27 
1995 148.78 20.23 
1996 151.05 20.05 
1997 182.79 21.75 
1998 183.71 20.35 
1999 194.93 20.17 
2000 249.20 23.33 
2001 266.10 22.60 
2002 325.60 25.13 
2003 438.23 29.56 
2004 593.33 33.95 
2005 761.95 37.08 
2006 968.98 39.13 
2007 1,220.46 38.41 
2008 1,430.69 34.98 
2009 1,201.61 26.71 
2010 1,577.75 29.40 
2011 1,898.38 28.54 
2012 2,048.71 27.33 
2013 2,213.30 23.32 
2014 2,342.54 22.61 
Data Source: The WTO databases and the World Factbook 
(Year) 
(
Y
e
a
r
) 
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5.3 Literature review 
 
We hereby survey the literature on the determinants of firms’ exporting decisions, the 
relationship between firm performance and political connections, and the relationship 
between political connections and firms’ exports.  
 
5.3.1 Determinants of firms’ exporting behaviour 
 
There are a growing number of empirical studies on the determinants of firms’ 
exporting decisions. The existing literature focuses on the four aspects including the 
sunk entry costs, the relationship between firms’ characteristics and exporting 
behaviour, the connection between financial factors and exporting behaviour, and the 
impact of innovation on firms’ exporting activities.  
 
5.3.1.1 The sunk entry costs 
 
Before starting exporting, new potential exporters must gather information from 
foreign markets, decide whether or not exporting is feasible and potentially profitable, 
and identify the target market(s). Once exporting decisions are made, a firm has to 
learn the foreign regulations and new bureaucratic procedures, adapt their products 
and packages to foreign market standards and tastes, develop new distribution 
channels and export department, comply with all the shipping regulations specified 
by the foreign customs agency, and face transportation and insurance costs and tariffs.  
 
Das et al. (2007) calculate the sunk costs participating in foreign markets in currency 
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units for Colombian manufacturing firms and find that in 1999 US dollars, the sunk 
costs of entering exporting market range from $730,000 to $1.6 million based on firm 
size. Kasahara and Lapham (2013) estimate the magnitude of the sunk costs of 
exporting for Chilean manufacturing firms and find that the sunk costs of exporting 
are $363,000 1990 on average for wood products to $998,000 1990 for food products.  
 
A growing literature studies the hysteresis in the exporting market due to the sunk 
entry costs. Roberts and Tybout (1997) test a sample of 650 Columbian firms and find 
that among firms that did not export in year t, more than 85 percent of them did not 
export in year t+1. Similarly, for firms that initially export, the proportion of 
manufacturing firms that remain in the export market from one year to the next is 
between 83% and 91% from 1983 to 1989. This indicates that there is substantial 
persistence in firm-level patterns of entry into the export market. More specifically, 
participation in the previous year can increase the probability of exporting in the 
current years by as much as 0.63 percent, suggesting that export history affects firms’ 
exporting decision-making due to the existence of sunk costs. Furthermore, the 
authors demonstrate that the re-entry costs for firms that have departed from the 
foreign market for two years are not significantly different from the costs for new 
exporters, suggesting that the start-up costs cannot be avoided.  
 
Similar findings have been found in other countries. Bernard and Wagner (2001) find 
substantial sunk costs of 6,400 Germany firms. Bugamelli and Infante (2003) show 
that being a current exporter increases the probability of exporting in the next year by 
70% larger than that of non-exporters in Italy. Significant sunk entry costs have also 
been observed in the United States by Bernard and Jensen (2004), in the United 
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Kingdom by Greenaway and Kneller (2004), in Ireland by Lawless (2009), and in 
Spain by Campa (2004).  
 
5.3.1.2 Firm characteristics and exporting behaviour 
 
It appears that good firms become exporters. However, some researchers may argue 
that firms become good because they are exporters and the substantial differences 
between exporters and non-exporters do not indicate any direction of causality. In this 
case, the direction of causality between firm characteristics and export behaviour is 
vague, i.e. it is not clear whether good firms become exporters or exporters become 
good firms. In this case, apart from the sunk entry costs, a number of empirical works 
have estimated the relationship between firms’ characteristics and exporting activities 
from the perspective of firm size, productivity, foreign ownership, age, location, and 
labour costs and industries.  
 
A. Firm size 
 
A large numbers of international business studies examine the relationship between 
firm size and export performance from a theoretical perspective. It is pointed out that 
the size of the firm can be used as a substitute indicator of resource availability (Calof, 
1994; Katsikeas et al., 1996; Prasad et al., 2001). These resources can influence the 
firm’s decision on marketing strategy and performance (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2003). 
Katsikeas et al. (1996, p.56) maintain that “there is a consensus in the international 
business literature that larger companies possess more financial and human resources 
as well as production capacity, attain higher levels of economies of scale, and tend to 
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perceive lower levels of risk about overseas markets and operations”. Bonaccorsi 
(1992) states that these size-related properties can facilitate the exporting activity.  
 
Some studies look at the relationship between firms’ size and exporting by employing 
the empirical analysis. By using firm-level data from the Census Bureau’s Annual 
Survey of Manufactures (ASM) over the period 1976-1987, Bernard and Jensen (1995) 
show that compared with non-exporters, exporters in the US manufacturing industry 
perform better. The authors find that the difference in size between exporters and non-
exporters is remarkable. Exporters are substantially larger than non-exporters. On 
average, exporters are more than four times larger than non-exporters regarding the 
total employment and more than six times larger in term of the value of shipments. 
 
Similar results have been found by other scholars. Roberts and Tybout (1997) use 
annual firm-level data of Colombian manufacturing plants from 1981 to 1989 and 
show that the increase in firm size, measured by the firm’s capital stock, improves the 
propensity of exporting. Aitken et al. (1997) use annual data on 2,104 Mexican 
manufacturing firms over the period 1986-1990 and find that firms’ size is positively 
associated with the probability of exporting. In a given industry, larger firms generally 
produce more compared with smaller firms. Therefore, the fixed entry costs for 
entering international markets can be spread over more production for larger firms. In 
this case, the costs of foreign distribution per unit decline with the increase of the 
firm’s size.  
 
Bernard and Jensen (1999) use the US firms’ data from the Longitudinal Research 
Database (LRD) of the Bureau of the Census, including all the manufacturing firms 
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in both the Census of Manufactures (CM) from 1987 to 1992 and the ASM for inter-
census years from 1984 to 1992. They test the relationship between the export status 
of the firm today and the subsequent performance, finding that from 1984 to 1987, 
firm size grew substantially faster for firms that became exporters in 1988 when 
compared with the non-exporters. It is thus suggested that being a good firm increases 
the probability of exporting.   
 
Some studies of the determinants of exporting behaviour have been made in China. 
For instance, using data from The Data of the Third National Industrial Census of the 
People’s Republic of China (DTNICPRC) conducted by the China State Statistic 
Bureau (SSB) (now called National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS)) in 1995, Liu 
and Shu (2003) explore the relationship between firm size and exporting behaviour 
from the perspective of sunk costs and find that larger firms are more capable of 
bearing sunk costs, and are therefore more likely to export. Similar results have been 
found by Lu et al. (2008), who use a sample of 779 manufacturing firms listed on 
Chinese stock markets between 2002 and 2005, and Xu et al. (2011), who use a larger 
dataset drawn from the China Industrial Firms Database from 2001 to 2007.  
 
These studies find that compared with domestic sales, exporting involves extra costs, 
such as collecting market information, establishing overseas sales promotion 
campaigns, adapting products to foreign markets, transporting, and communicating. 
Moreover, due to the uncertainties in international markets and the different economic 
environments in trading partner countries, exporting firms face more risks than in the 
domestic market. Such costs and problems can be extremely severe for small firms. 
By contrast, larger firms are more capable of expanding abroad because they have 
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more resources to enter the foreign market.  
 
To summarise the existing literature, the fact that small and medium-sized firms 
export less than large firms can be attributed to three factors. Firstly, large firms have 
the cost advantage in export activities, in terms of the start-up costs and trading costs 
(Wagner, 1995, 2001). Only large firms can afford the sunk entry costs. In addition, 
because of the scale economy, large firms can reduce trading costs through bulk 
shipping and extensive overseas network. Secondly, large firms export more than 
small and medium-sized firms through the effect of productivity. Large firms are 
considered as firms with higher productivity, which is one of the driving forces of 
exporting (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Bernard and Jensen, 1995; Bernard et al., 2007; 
Baldwin and Gu, 2003; Bernard et al., 2003; Melitz, 2003; Greenaway and Kneller, 
2007). Finally, large firms face less financial constraints in financing exporting 
activities because the information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers of these 
firms is less severe (Amiti and Weinstein, 2011; Manova, 2013).  
 
However, some scholars find there is no significant relationship between firm size and 
export performance (Contractor et al., 2005; Moen, 1999; Wolff and Pett, 2000). 
Therefore, the relationship between firm size and export performance is still 
controversial (Brouthers and Nakos, 2005; Kaynak and Kuan, 1993). These mixed 
results may be explained by the fact that various studies have used different samples, 
including firms from many different industrial sectors, or by the fact that they used 
different measures to evaluate firm size. Additionally, small, medium and large firms 
are defined differently from one country to another, indicating that the connections 
between firm size and export performance may be different depending on the criterion 
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and measurement scales used (Contractor et al., 2005; Baldauf et al., 2000; Hoang, 
1998).  
 
B. Productivity  
 
Good firms can be interpreted as firms with a high level of productivity. Exporters 
have been found to be more capital intensive, more innovative, and more productive 
than non-exporters (Tybout, 2001; Baldwin and Hanel, 2003). Bernard and Jensen 
(1995) document that labour productivity, whether measured by shipments or value-
added per employee, is around a third greater for exporters than non-exporters in both 
large and small firms.  
 
On the other hand, participation in export markets may improve production efficiency. 
The current literature provides two mechanisms to explain the positive correlation 
between exporting and productivity. 
 
The first mechanism argues that exporting improves productivity. That is, the 
improvement in productivity can be attributed to the fact that exporters have to 
increase their efficiency because they are forced by more competitive markets. Some 
scholars argue that exporters gain access to new knowledge, technical expertise from 
their international contracts or global buyers in the exporting market, and hence learn 
both new product designs and production methods, to which their domestic 
counterparts do not have access. This “learning and developing by exporting” effect 
may be particularly relevant to the developing countries in East Asia (for example, 
Evenson and Westphal, 1995; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Rhee et al., 1984; World 
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Bank, 1993).  
 
The second mechanism states a reverse causality. That is, the productivity difference 
between exporters and non-exporters may reflect the self-selection hypothesis. That 
is, only the more productive firms can self-select and survive in the highly competitive 
international markets. Considering that the sunk costs are higher in the foreign 
markets than in the domestic markets, only firms with high efficiency will find it 
profitable to enter the export market. Furthermore, exporters who experience a 
reduced productivity will be forced to exit from the international market. According 
to Melitz (2003), the “New-New Trade Theory” states that the firms’ characteristics 
such as the productivity, determine the exporting participation in the international 
market. Beyond a certain amount of productivity, firms can profitably export as the 
value of their sales on the foreign markets exceeds the level of fixed costs.  
 
These two mechanisms have been tested in different countries. For instance, Clerides 
et al. (1998) make use of microdata of manufacturing firms in Columbia, Mexico, and 
Morocco; Bernard and Jensen (1995, 2004) and Bernard et al. (2007) look at the US 
data; Baldwin and Gu (2003) examine data for Canadian manufacturing firms; 
Delgado et al. (2002) explore the data of Spanish firms; Bernard and Wagner (2001) 
look at the German firms; Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) estimate several European 
countries, including Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Norway, and the UK; 
Hallward-Driemeier et al.(2002) focus on the East Asia countries, including Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippine, and Thailand; Aw et al. (2000) use manufacturing data 
from the Republic of Korea and Taiwan (China); and Xu et al. (2011) focus on the 
Chinese firms. All of these authors find that self-selection in export markets is 
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important. They document that an increase in labour productivity will improve the 
percentage of firms’ exporting dramatically, confirming that more productive firms 
are more likely to enter foreign markets. Moreover, this effect is much stronger for 
foreign-owned firms (including foreign firms with funds from Hong Kong, Macao 
and Taiwan) than for domestically-controlled firms, and more sizeable for younger 
enterprises than for older ones. However, the productivity growth is slower for 
exporters than non-exporters, indicating that, although exporting provides expanded 
market opportunities and more potential jobs, it does not show evidence of boosting 
firm productivity (Bernard and Jensen, 2004).  
 
C. Foreign ownership  
 
A few studies have estimated the relationship between foreign ownership and the 
probability of exporting. For example, Aitken et al. (1997) find that firms with foreign 
ownership are more likely to export than domestic firms do in Mexico. They suggest 
that foreign firms have the natural advantages in gathering information regarding the 
foreign markets and technology. These firms can also improve the export prospects 
for domestic local firms through directly or indirectly sharing information and 
providing distribution services for domestic firms to distribute their products. Bernard 
and Jensen (2004) use all firms in the ASM from 1984 to 1992 and find that the 
ownership of a US multinational firm increases the probability of exporting.  
 
Xu et al. (2011) also find similar results in Chinese firms. They divide firms by 
ownership into three categories, including domestic firms, foreign-owned firms, and 
firms with funds from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. Foreign-funded firms and 
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firms with funds from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are more likely to export than 
domestic firms. More specifically, in both the foreign-funded firms and firms with 
funds from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, the percentage of exporting firms is about 
70%, while in domestic firms, the number stays around 25%.  
 
Raff and Wagner (2014) examined around 7,000 manufacturing firms in German in 
2009 and find that foreign firms export more goods to more countries. Based on 
14,585 firms from 30 countries and 14 industries collected by the World Bank between 
2002 and 2006, Boddin et al. (2015) show a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between foreign ownership and the propensity of exporting. Specifically, 
they find that foreign-owned firms are 17.60% more likely to engage in exporting. 
This effect is more obvious for low-income countries: foreign ownership increases the 
propensity of exporting by 25%. The authors point out that firms in less developed 
countries face more severe constraints, such as the technology, marketing know-how, 
and financing opportunities, which can be alleviated through foreign ownership.  
 
Raff and Wagner (2014) also document several reasons for such effect. Firstly, 
foreign-owned firms can benefit from the established international networks to 
connect customers in more countries and with more goods. These firms enjoy an 
integrated international supply chain and support from a multinational group, which 
in turn can lower transaction costs. Secondly, foreign-owned firms can obtain 
financial support from their parent companies to reduce credit constraints. Thirdly, 
firms with foreign ownership are prone to invest more in R&D and therefore are more 
innovative. The decision on the participation in the export market positively relates to 
both innovative products and improved production processes.  
160  
 
D. Firm age 
 
Several researchers have looked at the linkage between firm age and exporting 
decisions from an empirical perspective. Roberts and Tybout (1997) find that older 
firms are more likely to export because of the cost differences among producers. The 
older the firms are, the more efficient and competitive they are in world markets 
because of cost advantages that cannot be copied by their competitors. By contrast, 
young firms would observe smaller returns to enter the export market because they 
are less likely to survive. Becchetti and Rossi (2000) use data on Italian firms and 
conclude that firm age, which is defined as the firm’s foundation year, has a positive 
relationship with export intensity and export participation. This finding is consistent 
with the studies by Roberts and Tybout (1997). Moreover, using data from the 
Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE) of the Spanish Ministry of Industry 
and Energy (MINER) and the Fundacion Empresa Publica (FUNEP, Madrid) over the 
period 1990-1998, Barrios et al. (2003) also find that older firms are more likely to be 
efficient and to have higher exporting activity than other firms.  
 
E. Location  
 
The location is also a determinant of exporting behaviour. According to Roberts and 
Tybout (1997), firms located in less mountainous areas and closer to the coast are 
more likely to export. A similar result has been found by Xu et al. (2011) in China. 
That is, firms in the eastern region of China are more likely to export and to export 
more than firms in central or western regions. More specifically, in the eastern 
provinces, more than 50% of firms in Guangdong Province choose to export, while 
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the largest proportion of firms that export in the central region is around 24% (in 
Henan Province) and that proportion in the western region is about 19% (in Guangxi 
Province).  
 
F. Labour costs and industries 
 
Aitken et al. (1997) point out that export production is relatively skill-intensive and 
high wages can reflect high levels of individual-specific human capital. They find that 
increases in the average wage in a given region are related to a higher probability of 
exporting. Similarly, Bernard and Jensen (2004) consider high average wages and the 
white collar employment share as indicators of labour quality and find that average 
wages and white collar employment shares are positively related to the probability of 
exporting. 
 
However, Liu and Shu (2003) point out that a negative relationship exists between 
labour costs and exports in China. Labour costs can be defined as the ratio of total 
wages to the total number of employees. According to the traditional factor 
endowment theory, an industry should import goods which are produced using 
relatively scarce resources of the home country, while export goods are using the 
relatively abundant resources of the country. China is well known to have wage rates 
which are relatively low compared with other countries. Therefore, its manufacturing 
industries have an international competitiveness in labour costs. In this case, the lower 
the labour costs are, the more a country exports. According to the The Data of the 
Third National Industrial Census of the People’s Republic of China (DTNICPRC), 
conducted by the SSB in 1995, the leading exporting industries are cotton textiles, 
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clothing manufacturing, leather products, daily electronic apparatus and electronic 
components, which all produce labour intensive products. The authors further 
demonstrate that a 1% decrease in labour costs would increase exports by 1.88% in a 
sector. Xu et al. (2011) also indicate that Chinese firms operating in labour-intensive 
sectors and high-tech sectors are more likely to export.  
 
5.3.1.3 Financial factors and exporting behaviour 
 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), with perfect capital and credit markets, 
the financing decisions of a firm are irrelevant to its investment behaviour. Therefore, 
if the Modigliani-Miller assumption is satisfied, firms’ investment decisions are 
motivated by the maximisation of shareholders’ benefits, but are independent of the 
financial factors, such as internal liquidity, leverage, or dividend payments. However, 
in the real world, which is characterised by imperfect markets, financing constraints 
will affect firms’ investment decisions. Substantial research has estimated the 
relationship between financial constraints and firm investment, employment, and 
R&D decisions. A high sensitivity of investment (or other firm activities) to cash flow 
is considered as an indicator of financial constraints. In this case, financially 
constrained firms only invest when they have sufficient internal funds, and will invest 
more when they have higher cash flow (for example, Degryse and Jong, 2006; 
Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Hubbard et al., 1993; Fazzari et al., 1988; Whited, 
1992). 
 
A number of researchers have examined the models of fixed investment, inventory, 
and R&D investment as the functions of financial factors in countries across the world, 
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such as the United Kingdom (Blundell et al., 1992; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Guariglia, 
1999, 2000; Bond et al., 2003; Benito, 2005) and some developing countries (for 
instance, Jaramillo et al., 1996; Harrison and McMillan, 2003).  
 
By looking at manufacturing firms in the US over the period 1969-1984, Fazzari et al. 
(1988) point out that because of asymmetric information and capital market 
imperfections, a firm’s opportunity cost of external finance is substantially higher than 
its costs of internal funds. Therefore, when compared with the non-financially 
constrained firms, the investment of constrained firms is more sensitive to fluctuations 
in their cash flow. In addition, liquidity has a greater effect on investment among the 
constrained firms than the non-constrained firms.  
 
Additionally, Whited (1992) focuses on US manufacturing firms from 1972 to 1986 
and concludes that asymmetric information in debt markets can affect financially 
constrained firms’ ability to obtain outside finance, and therefore, the opportunity cost 
of investment is higher. According to Kashyap et al. (1994) and Carpenter et al. (1994, 
1998), financial factors have influence on inventory movements. More specifically, 
the inventory investment of firms without access to public debt markets is 
significantly liquidity-constrained.  
 
Recently, several scholars have considered exporting as a type of investment. 
According to Melitz (2003), there is a large pool of prospective entrants into the export 
markets. Before entering into the foreign market, all firms are identical. Compared 
with the economic activities in the domestic market, entering into the exporting 
markets involves huge sunk costs, which can be considered as a form of investment. 
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That is, in order to enter into the global markets, firms must firstly make an initial 
investment. Furthermore, most entry costs must be paid up in advance, thus only firms 
with abundant liquidity are able to afford the costs. These features make the financial 
markets crucial to the firms’ exporting activities.  
 
A. Does financial health improve exporting? 
 
This is a common argument that exporting relates to the additional upfront 
expenditures that make production for foreign markets more costly than 
manufacturing in the home country. Sunk and fixed costs of international trade include 
understanding the potential profitability in the global exporting market, making 
market-specific investments in capacity, product customisation and regulatory 
compliance, and establishing and maintaining foreign distribution networks. Variable 
trade costs involve shipping, duties, and freight insurance. Compared with domestic 
operations, most of these expenses have to be paid off before export revenues are 
realised. Moreover, international shipping and delivery usually take one to three 
months to complete, when compared with domestic orders (Djankov et al., 2010). In 
these circumstances, the liquidity needs relating to set-up costs are especially large for 
exporting. 
 
Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) extend the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model by introducing 
a financial sector and forecast that the export of goods, that depend more on external 
financing, will have a comparative advantage in a country with a well-developed 
financial sector. Chaney (2013) builds a model of international trade with liquidity 
constraints and shows that only those firms that have sufficient liquidity are able to 
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export, because firms must pay entry costs in order to access foreign markets. Firms 
with liquidity constraints tend to be non-exporters. In addition, a set of firms which 
can profitably export may be prevented from doing so if they lack sufficient liquidity 
to finance these entry costs. Moreover, whether a firm is financially constrained or not 
can impact on the firm’s decision to sell abroad and the volume of its foreign sales. In 
line with these studies, firms’ export decisions are likely to be affected by financial 
variables.  
 
Berman and Héricourt (2010) analyse a sample of 5,000 firms in 9 developing and 
emerging economies and state that the correlation between the productivity and the 
selection of firms in the export market is imperfect because of the existence of 
financial constraints. As standard international trade models assume that the financial 
markets are perfect, if the firm does not have enough liquidity ex-ante, the firm can 
always borrow enough funds to pay the fixed costs and enter the export market if it is 
profitable for them to do so. However, under the imperfect financial markets, only 
firms that have sufficient liquidity or access to external finance will be able to enter 
the exporting market. Their results suggest that better financial health promotes the 
entry into the export market, but has no impact on the volume of foreign sales. More 
specifically, a 10% increase in the ratio of total debt over total assets and the ratio of 
cash flow over total assets can increase the probability of exporting respectively 
between 0.5% and 1%. Similar results are found by Muûls (2008), who argue that 
Belgian firms with more credit constraints are less likely to export, and if they do 
export, they sell fewer types of products to fewer destinations overseas. 
 
Manova (2013) focuses on 107 countries across 27 industrial sectors over the period 
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1985-1995, and estimates the relationship between financial market imperfections and 
firms’ international trade. Her results suggest that companies that face binding 
constraints in the financing of their fixed export costs may not be able to serve a 
foreign market. Similarly, binding constraints in the financing of their variable export 
costs may affect the size of foreign shipments. In this case, strong financial institutions 
lead to firms’ exporting in more destinations, to an increase in the variety of the export 
products, and to a rise in aggregate trade volumes. Between 1985 and 1995, financial 
development alone explains 22% of the observed growth in trade. Moreover, as 
exporters rely more on external financing than domestic producers to mitigate the 
additional costs to trade, greater transaction risks, and the higher working capital 
requirements because of the longer shipping times, the financial frictions reduce 
foreign exports disproportionately.  
 
By analysing a dataset which matches exporting firms with the main banks that 
provide them trade finance in Japan over the period 1990-2010, Amiti and Weinstein 
(2011) show that exports declined much faster than domestic sales during financial 
crises. They attribute this phenomenon to the fact that the health of financial 
institutions is a crucial determinant to firm-level exports during financial crises. 
Specifically, a decline in bank health destroys firms’ exports 7 times more than their 
domestic sales. In particular, the greater the credit default risks are and the longer time 
lags the international trade has, the more dependence on financing are required by the 
exporters. The authors also demonstrate that the drops in exports due to financial 
factors made up at least 20% of the total drop in exports in financial crises. As the 
evidence suggests that exporters in many countries highly depend on trade finance, 
these results indicate that financial shocks are more likely to play important roles on 
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the decrease of export in other countries.  
 
Focusing on 170,000 firm-year observations from an unbalanced panel of over 25,000 
French manufacturing enterprises over the period 1993-2005, Bellone et al. (2010) 
use the liquidity ratio and the leverage ratio to measure financial constraints and 
analyse the link between financial factors and firm exporting behaviour. They point 
out that while liquidity is generally regarded as a sign of financial health, firms may 
be forced to withhold cash because they are unable to access external funds. The 
authors find strong evidence that firms with less credit-constraints are more likely to 
self-select in the exporting markets. Similar results are reported by Minetti and Zhu 
(2011), who use survey data on firms’ credit rationing in Italy at the beginning of 2001 
and conclude that firms with a higher liquidity ratio are more likely to export, as a 
high liquidity ratio can be interpreted as a sign of good financial health.  
 
Some studies have been conducted in the context of China. Using detailed customs 
data on China international trade transactions in 2005 from the Chinese Customs 
Office, Manova et al. (2011) demonstrate that credit frictions hinder firms’ trade flows 
and also affect the number of export destinations. Furthermore, they point out that 
foreign firms can overcome such frictions by obtaining additional funding from their 
parent companies. Using data from the Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise 
Statistics compiled by the SSB from 1999 to 2002, Du and Girma (2007) indicate that 
access to formal financial channels (i.e. bank loans) increases the export intensity of 
private firms in China. Li and Yu (2009) use firm-level data made up of more than 
160,000 manufacturing firms per year for the period 2000-2007. They measure credit 
constraints using a firm’s interest expenditure (cost of servicing debt), which is a 
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proxy for the firm’s capability to obtain external financing. Therefore, firms with 
larger interest expenditures are assumed to have less severe credit constraints. Their 
result indicates that a positive linkage exists between interest expenditure and firm’s 
export. In other words, firms with easier access to external finance or the alternative 
sources of funds face less severe credit constraints, and consequently, such firms are 
more likely to export and are able to export more. 
 
B. Does exporting enhance financial health? 
 
Some studies indicate that the direction of causality goes from exporting to better 
financial health, i.e. exporting exerts a positive effect on firms’ financial health. 
Campa and Shaver (2002) study the Spanish manufacturing sector from 1990 to 1998. 
They find that firms are more financially constrained when they do not participate in 
the global market. Therefore, they conclude that exporting can help firms reduce their 
financial constraints.  
 
Greenaway et al. (2007) use a panel dataset of 9,292 UK manufacturing firms 
collected by the Bureau Van Dijk in the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) 
database from 1993 to 2003 and explore the relationship between firms’ financial 
health and their export market engagement decisions. Their results suggest that 
exporters enjoy better financial health than non-exporters. However, this result seems 
to be mainly attributed to the fact that financial health is improved by participating in 
exporting activities, indicating that financial health is not a determinant to the entry 
into the exporting markets, but rather an outcome of entry. In other words, the authors 
find no evidence that less constrained firms are more likely to initiate export activities, 
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but they find strong evidence that the participation in export markets improves firms’ 
financial health. In particular, they find little difference in leverage ratios and liquidity 
ratios between the new exporters and non-exporters, suggesting that firms that just 
started to export are not considerably different from non-exporters in terms of 
financial health. On the other hand, when comparing the continuous exporters and the 
new exporters, they find that the former enjoy a better average financial health over 
the sample period.  
 
Bridges and Guariglia (2008) focus on 61,496 UK firms over the period 1997 to 2002, 
and study the impact of financial factors on firm survival, differentiating firms into 
globally engaged firms and purely domestic firms. More specifically, they estimate a 
model of the likelihood of firm failure with financial variables, which are interacted 
with dummies indicating whether firms are globally engaged or purely domestic. They 
consider two dimensions of global engagement: exporting and being foreign-owned. 
Their results show that higher leverage and lower collateral cause higher failure 
probabilities only among the purely domestic firms. Therefore, they conclude that 
international activities affect firms’ survival probabilities by shielding firms from 
financial constraints.  
 
5.3.1.4 Innovation, technology spillovers and exporting behaviour 
 
The current literature recognises the importance of innovation on the probability of 
exporting, especially in developing countries. According to Lall (1992) and Westphal 
(2002), innovation at the firm-level in developing countries is considered as the 
acquisition, application, modification, improvement, and creation of technology. 
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More specifically, innovation refers to the acquisition of technological capabilities. 
That is, the skills and information needed to use the imported technologies efficiently. 
However, firms in developing countries lack domestic capabilities and depend on a 
series of mechanisms to import technology from foreign investors. For example, 
multinational corporations (MNCs) can transfer technology to firms in developing 
countries by setting up industries which can provide advanced technology and 
educated and trained labour. Foreign buyers can also transfer the product technology 
in the form of market feedback regarding the product blueprints, models, patterns, 
design, styling, and packaging.  
 
A few studies have tested the relationship between innovation, learning, and exporting 
in developing countries, suggesting that the technology factor is a crucial determinant 
for manufacturing exports in less developed countries. For example, Bhaduri and Ray 
(2004) use 1994-1995 cross-sectional data for two R&D intensive industries in India, 
i.e. pharmaceutical industry and electronics/electrical industry. They categorise 
technological capability into know-how- and know-why-oriented. The former group 
focuses on production engineering and the reduction of the marginal costs by 
improving production efficiency, while the latter group aims at improving new 
processes and designs. The authors find that the know-how-oriented capabilities 
enhance exports of both sectors, while the know-why-oriented capabilities are 
particularly important for pharmaceutical exports only.  
 
Similar results have been found in electronic exports in Malaysia and Thailand by 
Rasiah (2003), in garment exports in Mauritius by Wignaraja (2002), and in clothing 
firms in Sri Lanka by Wignaraja (2008a, 2008b). These studies reveal that technology 
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capabilities and skills drive exports because the improvement of technological 
capabilities demands experience, skills development and information collecting.  
 
The relationship between innovation and exporting has also been analysed in the 
developed countries, such as the UK. Roper and Love (2002) use firm-level data of 
around 1,700 UK manufacturing firms and 1,300 German firms over the period 1991-
1994, finding that product innovation has a strong effect on the probability (i.e. the 
likelihood of becoming an exporter) and intensity (i.e. the proportion of a firm’s sales, 
which are exported) of exporting in both countries. Wakelin (1998) examines a 
microeconomic dataset of 320 UK firms’ propensity to export over the period 1988-
1992, which covers half of the total UK manufacturing output over the five years. She 
examines the role of innovation in determining exporting activities in both innovating 
and non-innovating firms. Her results show sizeable differences in the innovating and 
non-innovating firms both in terms of the probability of exporting and the level of 
exports, indicating that the capacity to innovate fundamentally changes the exporting 
behaviours of firms.  
 
Some scholars focus on the Chinese exporting market, and find a similar positive link 
between technology and exporting performance. Guan and Ma (2003) analyse survey 
data from 213 industrial firms in China and explore the relationship between 
innovation capability and export performance by adopting a resource-based 
perspective at the firm-level. They propose seven innovation capability dimensions, 
namely learning, research and development (R&D), manufacturing, marketing, 
organisational, resource allocating, and strategy planning. Furthermore, they divide 
these seven dimensions into two groups, namely the core innovation assets and the 
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supplementary innovation assets. The core innovation assets are defined as the ability 
of a firm to translate innovation concepts through R&D, manufacturing and marketing 
processes, while the supplementary innovation assets are defined as the ability of a 
firm to support and harmonise core innovation capability to play the role effectively. 
This includes the other four dimensions (i.e. learning, organisational, resource, and 
strategic). Their results show that, except for manufacturing capability, export growth 
is significantly and positively related to the other six innovation capability dimensions. 
More specifically, their findings suggest that the core innovation assets alone cannot 
lead to significant export growth. On the other hand, the supplementary innovation 
assets not only provide a possibility for core innovation assets to form and operate 
effectively, but also become dominant in determining the export performance of 
Chinese firms by enabling these firms to obtain sustainable international 
competitiveness.  
 
Using a dataset of Chinese firms drawn from the World Bank’s Investment Climate 
Survey (now called Enterprise Surveys) undertaken in 2003, Wignaraja (2012) 
analyses China’s extraordinary success in the export of automobiles and electronics 
since starting an open-door to foreign direct investment (FDI) policy in 1978. The 
author attributes such success to the technology transfer from multinationals to local 
firms in the automobile and electronics industries. The technology spillovers have 
been well documented. Previous studies (for example, Javorcik, 2004; Blalock and 
Gertler, 2004) suggest that multinationals can benefit local firms by increasing the 
demand for components made by local firms. In particular, in order to improve the 
quality of the required components, multinationals provide employee training and 
technical support. For example, Tianjin FAW Toyota Motor Co., Ltd received more 
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than 150 engineers from its international partners in order to introduce the Toyota 
production system. In addition, the capability of technology is a crucial source of 
competitive advantage in the exporting market. Benefitting from enormous 
technology transfer and significant access to market networks of MNCs, China’s share 
of world automobile exports increased from 0.6% to 2.8% between 2001 and 2009, 
while its share of world electronics increased from 5.8% to 9.7% (Wignaraja, 2012).  
 
5.3.2 Political connections and firm performance  
 
Although exporting behaviour is one of the most important parts of firm performance, 
the existing literature focuses on the relationship between political connections and 
firm performance, for example, the ability to obtain profitable government contracts, 
equity value, stock returns, and market share, instead of exporting. The current studies 
can be categorised into four groups: research in the United States, cross-country 
analysis, developing countries other than China, and in the context of China.  
 
5.3.2.1 Research in the United States 
 
According to Roberts (1990), the accidental death of a senator decreases the stock 
prices of enterprises connected with this senator, while the prices of enterprises related 
to the senator’s successor experience an increase, suggesting that the existing political 
connections impose a positive influence on stock prices and enterprise value. 
Goldman et al. (2009) analyse S&P 500 companies from 1996 to 2000 and conclude 
that companies with politically connected board members enjoy a positive abnormal 
stock return after the nomination announcement of an individual. Specifically, 
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companies connected to the Republican Party saw a growth in stock price and 
enterprise value in 2000 when the Republicans won the presidential election, whilst 
companies connected to the Democratic Party experienced a decline in stock price and 
enterprise value. By using data from the S&P 500 companies between 1990 and 2004, 
especially during the years of the 1994 midterm election and the 2000 presidential 
election, Goldman et al. (2010) find that the firms connecting to the winning (losing) 
party are more likely to experience an increase (decrease) in procurement contracts.  
 
5.3.2.2 Cross-country analysis 
 
Focusing on 541 companies with political connections in 47 countries in 1997, Faccio 
(2007, 2010) finds that firms with political connections enjoy a considerably higher 
market share than firms without such connections (18.04% versus 9.48% separately), 
especially when the connection is established through a stronger political connection. 
The author points out that political connection is stronger when companies are 
connected through owners rather than directors, or when such a connection is linked 
with a minister rather than with a member of the parliament, or when the connection 
occurs in countries with high levels of corruption. In addition, connected firms have 
a lower tax rate (29.67%) than their non-connected peers (32.70%).  
 
5.3.2.3 Research in developing countries other than China 
 
Politically connected firms tend, in fact to receive preferential treatment from 
governments. Johnson and Mitton (2003) point out that one of the forms of political 
favouritism in Malaysia is the official status awarded to firms run by ethnic Malays 
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(known as Bumiputeras). Bumiputeras have the priority for government contracts, 
opportunities to buy privatised assets, increased access to other subsidies from the 
government. In Indonesia, the family of B.J. Habibie, the third President, controlled 
several crucial industries, such as chemicals, construction, real estate, transport, and 
communications. Thanks to such connections, many of these businesses had made 
considerable profits from government contracts and state-granted monopolies (Leuz 
and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). Moreover, political ties can lead to easier approval of 
crucial licences for the politically connected enterprises. According to Leuz and 
Oberholzer-Gee (2006), with a very close association with President Suharto, the 
Salim Group in Indonesia obtained franchises in industries where huge profits could 
be produced, such as banking, flour milling, and telecommunications.  
 
Some scholars point out that the enterprises with political connections pay lower taxes. 
Using the listed firms’ annual reports in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) 
over the period 1990 and 1999, Adhikari et al. (2006) show that politically connected 
firms pay tax at significantly lower effective rates than other firms in Malaysia. This 
result suggests that the relationship with governments can influence the effective tax 
rates in a relationship-based economy.  
 
The equity value of firms can also be significantly affected by political activities. 
Fisman (2001) examines the role of the announcement about the health condition of 
the former President Suharto on stock prices in Indonesia, and finds that share prices 
of companies with close ties to the Suharto family experienced an abnormal decrease 
after the news regarding the president’s deteriorating health was announced.  
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However, investments in political relationships could lose their value overnight 
because of regime changes (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). Therefore, investing in 
political relationships could be extremely risky, and political connections may 
therefore not always be valuable for enterprises’ long-term development. According 
to Bernheim and Whinston (1986), there is a way to lower the negative effects of 
government change. The authors believe that politicians are prone to provide support 
for firms which have the strongest willingness to pay for political patronage. In this 
case, well-connected managers can easily re-establish the relationships with the new 
government once a political regime has changed; therefore, government changes only 
have little influence on long-term firm performance.  
 
5.3.2.4 Research in China 
 
Several studies have examined the performance of firms with political connections in 
the context of China. From the angle of ownership, SOEs are congenital with a variety 
of state’s valuable resources and are able to receive more favourable support than 
other groups in China (Child, 1994; Steinfeld, 1998). Peng et al. (2004) point out that 
unlike PEs, SOEs receive more opportunities to access critical resources which are 
larger in quantity and higher in quality. Zhang and Huang (2009) conduct a research 
on listed SOEs and PEs in China and find that SOEs have easier access to more 
diversified and crucial resources. 
 
Chen et al. (2011a) indicate that private firms are more likely to hire executives with 
political connections to change their weaker positions or enhance their competitive 
positions. By using a survey data from 150 small- and medium-sized Chinese 
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enterprises, Chen et al. (2011b) find that firms with political connections receive 
favourable treatment from government authorities, in terms of the preferential policies, 
the assistance in land purchase, and the easier access to governmental contracts, 
especially when the entrepreneurs are governmental advisers or members in high level 
legislative organisations.   
 
Looking at privately controlled listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange between 1993 and 2009, Feng et al. (2011) shed light on the benefits of 
political connections for private enterprises in China from a relatively comprehensive 
perspective. They find that the firms controlled by private entrepreneurs who begin to 
participate in politics enjoy an increase in cumulative abnormal market-adjusted stock 
returns (7.5% over 12 months and 18.9% over 24 months), indicating that political 
relationships can benefit the connected firm over a long period of time. In addition, 
they document a significantly positive improvement in operating performance (assets, 
sales, earnings, return on sales, return on assets, and return on earnings) for firms 
controlled by private entrepreneurs who begin to participate in politics. They also find 
that political participation benefits the firms through reducing their tax burden. The 
authors also point out that compared with the firms without political participation, 
firms with such connections are more likely to obtain beneficial corporate deals 
through mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in heavily regulated industries which are 
not open to the private sector, including finance, media, aerospace, and natural 
resources mining (14% and 24% separately).  
 
By analysing manufacturing firms from the China Database of Industrial Firms 
developed by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) from 1994 to 1996, 
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Tan et al. (2007) evaluate the relationship between the lishu at different governmental 
levels and firms’ performance. The authors state that firms with a lishu relationship 
have many advantages, including the enhanced legitimacy, better reputation and 
prestige, greater access to superior resources, and governmental supports and 
subsidies. The higher level governments possess more monopolised resources and 
have greater capacity and authority to provide privileges to firms they control. In turn, 
firms affiliated with higher levels of government have more resource, which can 
improve their performance. Similarly, using the dataset including approximately 
900,000 observations between 1994 and 1996 drawn from China’s Database of 
Industrial Firms (DIF), Li (2004) illustrates that the relationship between the lishu and 
firm performance, in terms of labour productivity, is U-shaped and that firms linked 
to the central government and the lowest level of government outperform firms 
affiliated with intermediate governments. 
 
Lu (2011) employs survey data of Chinese private firms in 2004 and studies the impact 
of political connections on trade expansion among different regions in China. Political 
connections are defined as an entrepreneur being a member of the Chinese People’s 
Congress (PC), which is divided into four administrative levels, namely the town-
level, the county-level, the prefecture-level and the region-level or above. Their 
results show that political connections have a positive influence on the firms’ degrees 
of trade expansion. Being a member of the PC significantly reduces the firm’s sales 
within the local county, but has a statistically significant and positive effect on trade 
expansion in other counties and other regions. The author finds that the trade 
expansion into other administrative areas requires the firm to have a high hierarchical 
level of political connections, i.e. the entrepreneur should be a member of the PC at 
179  
 
the corresponding administrative level or above. For example, sales within the county 
can only be affected by the political connection at the county-level or above; the 
expansion into other areas in the same region can only be affected by political 
connection at the prefectural-level or above; and the expansion into other regions can 
only be affected by the political connection at the region-level or above.  
 
However, politically connected firms do not always benefit from their connections 
with the governments. Fan et al. (2007) provide a different view of political 
connections’ effects on firm performance by analysing CEO and board data from the 
IPO prospectuses of newly listed A-share enterprises on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange during the period 1993-2001. Their evidence shows that, based on 
three-year post-IPO stock returns, firms run by politically connected CEOs have an 
18% poorer performance compared with the non-connected counterparts. They also 
have lower three-year post-IPO earning growth, sales growth, and change in returns 
on sales. Such negative effects appear shortly after the initial trading day. One of the 
reasons for these findings is that firms with politically connected CEOs are more 
likely to appoint other current or previous government officials to the board. These 
officials tend to be less professional and lack of experience in running a business. Xia 
et al. (2009) collect a sample of COEs in Chinese manufacturing industries from the 
National Industrial Census (NIC) and track changes of ownership between 2000 and 
2005. They find that transformed (privatised and corporatised) COEs achieved better 
performance in productivity, sales growth, and profitability than the untransformed 
COEs.  
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By analysing non-financial A-share firms in China from 2001 to 2006, Chen et al. 
(2011a) show that the sensitivity of investment expenditure to growth opportunities 
for SOEs is 62.5% lower than that for non-SOEs, suggesting that SOEs are less 
efficient than non-SOEs. Furthermore, they point out that political connections have 
a significant negative influence on investment efficiency in SOEs, while no such 
evidence is found in the non-SOEs. They attribute such poor performance of SOEs to 
distortions in firms’ investment behaviour caused by governmental intervention. 
Moreover, Liu et al. (2010) point out that SOEs and COEs tend to employ too many 
people and are therefore characterised by lower employee efficiency.   
 
In summary, political connections are linked to firm performance. As firms with better 
performance are usually considered as the potential exporting candidates, it is now 
interesting to investigate the relationship between political connections and exporting 
behaviour of firms.  
 
5.3.3 Political connections and exports 
 
Although there is a growing literature investigating the determinants of firms’ export 
decisions and the value of political connections, studies on the relationship between 
political connections and the probability of exporting are much scarcer. A few studies 
focus on the political connections only in terms of state-ownership.  
 
Because of the connections with government, SOEs also enjoy several political and 
financial advantages, such as soft budget constraints, more secure property rights, 
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better public provision, greater access to monopoly industries and industries subsidise 
by the government, and less competition than non-SOEs (Sun and Tong, 2003; Yi and 
Wang, 2012; Connelly et al., 2010). However, the negative relation between state 
ownership and firm performance has been documented worldwide.  
 
For example, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) use a 1,369 firm-year sample reported 
in Fortune magazine around the world, and find that the profits of government-owned 
firms are significantly less than that of private firms. Meggionson et al. (1994) point 
out that privatised state-owned firms have improvement in real sales, profits, capital 
investment spending, operating efficiency, and work forces by exploring 61 
enterprises from 18 countries and 32 industries.  
 
According to Dixon et al. (2015), Yi (2014), Yi and Wang (2012), Connelly et al. 
(2010), Sun and Tong (2003), Wei et al. (2005), and Bai and Xu (2005), there are 
several reasons explaining such an inverse relationship: lack of motivation for top 
management team, redundant employees and excessive wages, appointing politically 
connected people as top managers without considering their experience and expertise, 
burdening with political and social goals, suffering from higher transaction costs and 
serve agency problem, poor innovation and financial performance, low productivity, 
and increased corruption. These problems are particularly predominant in China.  
 
In line with these studies, a few scholars find a negative relationship between 
exporting and state ownership in China. Yi and Wang (2012) and Yi (2014) analyse 
30,333 firms in Zhejiang Province across mining, manufacturing, electricity, gas, and 
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water industries from 2001 to 2003, demonstrating that state ownership is negatively 
associated with the exporting participation. They further point out that firms with state 
ownership are lack of capabilities to internationalise, and that these disadvantages of 
SOEs make them less competitive in the global market.  
 
Using a dataset covering 1,240 listed companies drawn from the China Stock Market 
Accounting Database (CSMAR) and Sino-fin over the period 2004-2010, Dixon et al. 
(2015) find state ownership negatively relates to the export intensity, while they do 
not document such relationship between export probability and state ownership. Todo 
et al. (2014) focus on the privatisation of Chinese SOEs and estimate whether the 
privatisation improves the probability of exporting in China by using 13,991 firm-
year observations from 2000 to 2007. The results suggest that Chinese firms are more 
likely to export after privatisation.  
 
Lee (2009) provides an alternative explanation for this negative link between state 
ownership and exporting participation from the perspective of the industry. The author 
points out that the state controls for strategic and energy industries, such as petroleum, 
nuclear fuel, raw chemical material, mining, supply of electric and heat power, gas, 
and water, which are less export-oriented industries in China.  
 
There is another study estimating the linkage between firms’ exporting behaviour and 
political connections, in terms of political affiliation to some level of government. Du 
and Girma (2007) analyse whether politically affiliated firms make less efficient use 
of external finance when compared with their unconnected counterparts regarding the 
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growth of export. They use 28,400 Chinese firms over the period 1999 to 2002 and 
divide the firms into two sub-samples, i.e. purely private and politically connected 
firms. 
 
The authors conclude that politically affiliated Chinese firms enjoy softer financing 
constraints as the relevant state organisations are prone to provide financial assistance 
(bailout) to the connected firms when they default on their loans. In general, more 
finance support more exports. As for private firms, they were only allowed to export 
through state-owned trading companies and did not have the right to reserve foreign 
exchange earnings obtained from their exports before the 1990s. Although such 
discrimination no longer exists, private firms still suffer from financial suppression, 
especially those without political connections. However, the authors find that private 
firms with no political affiliation utilise bank loans more efficiently in promoting the 
export growth. Moreover, firms with political affiliation in capital-intensive industries 
do not exhibit a significant export-promoting effect of bank loans. The authors 
attribute this phenomenon to the resource misallocation by the banking sector caused 
by political bias. Compared with their study, which mainly focus on the export 
intensity using private firms over four years sample periods, our study explores a more 
comprehensive dataset with state ownership, private ownership, foreign ownership, 
and collective ownership and estimate both export probability and intensity.  
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5.4 Hypotheses 
 
Although the effects of political connections on firms’ behaviour on the one hand, and 
the determinants of firms’ export decisions on the other hand have been studied 
separately in the existing literature, to the best of our knowledge, there are only a few 
papers examining the link between political connections in terms of state ownership 
and export. Furthermore, only one paper estimates how the political connections in 
the form of political affiliation with certain levels of government affect the export 
intensity.  
 
According to Chen et al. (2012), Jiang (2007) and Wei et al. (2004), firms without the 
political connections in China may choose to export in order to obtain benefits from 
the global market. Yet, in this case, they have to take risks associated with venturing 
overseas. In contrast, firms with a lishu relationship are able to obtain the benefits 
such as financing, markets and resources without exporting, thanks to their political 
connections. Firms with a lishu relationship may therefore not need to venture 
overseas, as they can benefit from financing, resources and so on domestically. 
 
Following this line of research, we estimate the relation between political connections, 
defined as the lishu relationship, and the propensity of entering into foreign markets. 
It is expected that a firm’s lishu relationship has a negative impact on the likelihood 
of becoming an exporter, and that the lishu relationship can reduce the export intensity. 
We therefore posit the following two hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 1 (H1): Having a lishu relationship is negatively related to the probability 
of becoming an exporter, ceteris paribus. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Having a lishu relationship reduces the export intensity, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
5.5 Specification and estimation methodology 
 
5.5.1 Baseline specification 
 
In order to estimate the probability of exports, we employ a model when the dependent 
variable (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡)  is qualitative, and assumes the value of 1 if enterprise 𝑖  is an 
exporter at time 𝑡, and 0 otherwise. The equation is: 
 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽2𝑃𝐴𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽4𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                          (1) 
 
where the subscript i indexes firms, while t refers to time, where t = 2000-2007. 𝑃𝐴 
is the political affiliation status of the firm, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if the firm has a lishu relationship and 0 otherwise, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is defined as the firms’ total 
real assets, 𝑇𝐹𝑃 refers to total factor productivity calculating using the Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003) technique,1 𝐶𝐹𝐾  is defined as the ratio of cash flow over the 
                                               
1 This method has been widely used in Greenaway et al. (2007, 2014), Ding et al. (2012), and Chen 
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tangible fixed assets, and 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 is calculated as the ratio of current liabilities 
plus non-current liabilities to total assets of the firm. We also control for the Chinese 
characteristics by adding  𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠,  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠, and 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 into the model. According to our first hypothesis, we expect 
the 𝛽2 to show a negative sign.  
 
In order to estimate the intensity of exporting, we use the following equation: 
 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽2𝑃𝐴𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽4𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                          (2) 
 
where 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 is defined as the ratio of exports to total real sales. According to the 
second hypothesis, we expect a negative relationship between 𝑃𝐴 and 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜. 
 
Lagged dependent variable 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖(𝑡−1)  and 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖(𝑡−1)  are included in both 
equations, respectively, to account for sunk entry costs. Starting with Roberts and 
Tybout (1997), a line of empirical research has investigated the firms’ dynamic export 
status and sunk fixed costs (Bernard and Jensen, 2004; Buono and Fadinger, 2012). 
The main conclusion of these papers is that firms’ export status is very persistent and 
that previous export status is an important indicator of current export status, which 
                                               
and Guariglia (2013). The TFP estimates based on the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method can be 
obtained in Stata by using the –levpet- command. We also applied it separately to different industrial 
groups.  
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provides evidence of the sunk-cost model. That is, the coefficient on the lagged export 
status can be regarded as a measure of the extent of these costs if sunk costs are 
significant. Alternatively, if current exporting does not rely on previous exporting 
experience, then there are no sunk costs.  
 
We also control for the firms’ characteristics in both equations. Moreover, in order to 
mitigate problems stemming from reverse causality (for example, the causality is from 
exporting to changes in firms’ characteristics, such as size and productivity), I follow 
the previous studies (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Bernard and Jensen, 2004; 
Greenaway et al., 2007; Yi and Wang, 2012) and make all time-varying variables pre-
determined and lagged by one period.    
 
In order to control for time-invariant factors common to firms across regions and 
industries, we also include region and industry dummies in both equations. Region 
dummies are dummy variables for firm location: Coastal = 1 if the firm is located in 
the coastal region, and 0 otherwise; Central = 1 if the firm is located in the central 
region, and 0 otherwise; Western = 1 if the firm is located in the western region, and 
0 otherwise. 1 Industry dummies define firms to be located in one of the following ten 
industrial sectors: metal and metal products; non-metal products and petroleum 
processing; chemicals and plastic; machinery and equipment; electrical equipment; 
transport equipment; food and tobacco; textile; leather, timber and furniture; and 
mining and logging. Year dummies are also included to account for business cycle 
                                               
1 In order to avoid the dummy variable trap and multicollinearity problem, we only include the Coastal 
dummy and Western dummy in doing the regression analysis. And we expect that firms located in the 
coastal region are more likely to export, while firms located in the western region are less likely to 
export. 
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effects and firm-invariant market factors, such as changes in exchange rates or 
government policy.  
 
We expect that firm’s previous export experience, size, TFP, and financial health can 
improve the export participation and intensity for Chinese unlisted firms. Due to the 
sunk entry costs happened in exporting, previous exporters are more likely to export 
in the current period as they do not have to pay for the sunk entry costs again. Larger 
and more productive firms are more prone to be involved in exporting activities as 
they are able to afford the huge sunk costs. In terms of ownership, we expect that 
foreign ownership helps firms’ exporting as they can obtain well-established 
distribution network, foreign market information, and financing assistance from their 
parent companies. As for the state-ownership, we expect a negative relationship.  
 
As the dependent variable in Eq. (1) is dichotomous, linear multiple regression is not 
appropriate for estimating the model. We therefore use a pooled Probit estimator 
instead. As for the estimation of Eq. (2), there are many observations that have zero 
values in their export intensity (i.e. a firm either exports with  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 > 0 or it 
does not with  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 = 0 ). Therefore, OLS estimation may not be an 
appropriate method as it can deliver inconsistent parameter estimates due to the fact 
that the sample is not representative of the whole population. We therefore start with 
the pooled Tobit model (Tobin, 1958), which is estimated by a maximum likelihood 
method and yields consistent estimates of the model parameters.1  
                                               
1 It is important to note that we cluster observations by firms’ ID in our pooled Tobit and pooled Probit 
regressions. This means that we relax the usual requirement that the observations be independent, and 
allow observations to be independent across groups (clusters) but not necessarily with in groups 
(clusters).Clustering correct heteroskedastic standard errors but not affecting the coefficients estimates.  
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5.5.2 Unobserved firm heterogeneity  
 
In Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), we control for a set of observed firm characteristics that may 
affect firms’ export participation and intensity. However, it is likely to have some 
unobserved firms’ characteristics that are not included in the regression, but are able 
to influence the firms’ exporting (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Bernard and Jensen, 2004; 
Greenaway et al., 2007; Yi and Wang, 2012). Such unobserved firm heterogeneity 
includes managerial ability, product characteristics, technology, and foreign 
experience and networks. As these unobserved characteristics are potentially serial 
correlated and permanent over time, they will cause persistence in exporting 
behaviour. In this case, ignoring them will give rise to an overestimation of the effects 
of sunk entry costs and the previous export experience because the lagged export 
variable could act as the only determinant of the current exporting. For instance, for a 
firm with a management strategy of internationalisation, the exporting decision of this 
firm in an initial period and in the future may be made out of this unobserved 
heterogeneity. Therefore, it is inappropriate to assume that exporting experience in the 
past gives rise to the current exporting decision by applying the standard econometric 
techniques. Heckman (1981) terms the conditional relationship between previous and 
future experience caused by improper treatment of unobserved firm characteristics as 
spurious state dependence. Himmelberg et al. (1999) find a spurious relation between 
ownership and performance, which caused by unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
Following Bernard and Jensen (2004) and Yi and Wang (2012), we assume the error 
term 𝜀𝑖𝑡  in both equations consists of two components: the permanent unobserved 
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firm-specific time-invariant component, 𝑘𝑖 , and an exogenous random disturbance 
component, 𝜇𝑖𝑡 . That is: 
 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘𝑖 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡                                         (3) 
 
where 𝑘𝑖 is independently and identically distributed normal, and 𝜇𝑖𝑡  is 
independently and identically distributed normal for each firm and year.  
 
There are several proposed estimation techniques that can be used to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity, including a Probit model with random effects (RE) or fixed 
effects (FE), conditional Logit, and linear probability models with random or fixed 
effects. The disadvantages of the conditional Logit model are that this estimation 
drops all the time-invariant variables and all the firms with a dependent variable which 
equals either always 0 or 1, and reduces the accuracy of those variables with negligible 
variance across time (Greenaway et al., 2007). However, as for the linear probability 
models, Yi and Wang (2012) and Greenaway et al. (2007) point out that the 
probabilities indicated by estimated coefficients could lie outside the unit interval [0, 
1] and that the assumption of constant variance in the OLS estimation could be 
violated by the heterogeneous error term. Therefore, the Probit model with FE or RE 
can model the unobserved heterogeneity of the firm better. The FE framework treats 
the unobserved effect 𝑘𝑖 as a parameter to be estimated, while the RE framework 
treats it as a random variable. Most fixed-effects model leads to biased and 
inconsistent parameter estimates, especially of the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variables (Wooldridge, 2010).  
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The random-effects Probit model requires the firm-specific unobserved effects to be 
uncorrelated with the regressors, which could cause bias (Bernard and Jensen, 2004; 
Greenaway et al., 2007). Especially if the heterogeneity of the unobserved firm-
specific effects is large, the RE Probit estimate of the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable could be overestimated (Heckman, 1981). However, as our 
objective with dynamic specifications is not to obtain a precise estimate of the lagged 
dependent variable coefficient, this problem is unlikely to affect out main conclusions. 
Additionally, according to Wooldridge (2010, p.286), “With a large number of random 
draws…, it almost always makes sense to treat the unobserved effects…as random 
draws... This approach is certainly appropriate from an omitted variables or neglected 
heterogeneity perspective”. Therefore, I follow Heckman (1981) and Roberts and 
Tybout (1997) and employ a random-effects Probit model for the estimation of Eq. 
(1). And a random-effects Tobit model is applied to estimate the Eq. (2).1  
 
As discussed above, the RE Probit model has a strong assumption that the unobserved 
heterogeneity is uncorrelated with all the other explanatory variables, which is hard 
to hold in reality. Therefore, I follow Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984) and 
allow for possible correlation between the unobserved firm heterogeneity and the 
regressors by: 
 
                                               
1 Our results are robust to using pooled Probit and Tobit estimators. Therefore, we prefer the pooled 
Probit and Tobit models with cluster-robust standard errors to the random-effects estimators due to their 
computational advantages. For a large sample, computational time is in fact an issue for random-effects 
Probit and Tobit models, because they use “full ‘random effects’ with lots of covariates” Wooldridge 
(2009, p.18). Therefore, we only report the results by using pooled Probit and Tobit models in the 
empirical analysis. The results for the two main hypotheses obtained from random-effects Probit and 
Tobit models are presented in Appendix.  
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𝑘𝑖 = 𝛿1PAi̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝛿2Sizei̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝛿3TFPi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝛿4CFKi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝛿5Leveragei
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜖𝑖                  (4) 
 
where PAi̅̅ ̅̅  , Sizei̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  , TFPi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  , CFKi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  , and Leveragei
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  refer to the means, and 
𝜖𝑖~𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜖
2) , independent of all the regressors and 𝜇𝑖𝑡 for all firm and year. 
Incorporating Eq. (4) into Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) respectively, we obtain: 
 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽2𝑃𝐴𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽4𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛿1PAi̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝛿2Sizei̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝛿3TFPi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
+ 𝛿4CFKi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝛿5Leveragei
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝜖𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                                                                                              (5)   
 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽2𝑃𝐴𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽4𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛿1PAi̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝛿2Sizei̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝛿3TFPi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
+ 𝛿4CFKi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝛿5Leveragei
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝜖𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                                                                                             (6) 
 
5.5.3 The initial conditions problem 
 
It is generally acknowledged that the treatment of the initial observations in a dynamic 
panel data model with unobserved effects is important both theoretically and 
practically. The estimation of Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) is based on an assumption on the 
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relationship between the initial export participation,  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖1  / 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖1 and the 
error term 𝜖𝑖. In the existing studies of a dynamic binary discrete-choice model, the 
initial conditions are assumed to be pre-determined or exogenous using a standard 
random-effects Probit model (Hackman, 1981b; Bernard and Jensen, 2004). That is, 
the initial observation values are independent of the unobserved firm-specific effects. 
If the observation period for each firm initiates from the very beginning of the 
exporting, the initial conditions should be exogenous. However, most micro-
econometric studies with panel datasets, including ours, the start of the sample is not 
the same as the start of the exporting behaviour. In this case, the unobserved time-
invariant firm heterogeneity that can influence current exporting activities can also 
affect the exporting activities in the initial period. Therefore, it is improper to assume 
that the initial conditions are exogenous. Overlooking the endogeneity of the initial 
conditions will therefore cause an upward biased estimation of the lagged dependent 
variable. That is, the impact of previous exporting experience of the current export 
activities would indicate that the sunk entry costs are overestimated.  
 
Wooldridge (2005) suggests a conditional maximum likelihood estimator, which is 
simpler and more practical in empirical research than the solution proposed by 
Heckman (1981b). This estimator suggests a model that the distribution of the 
unobserved heterogeneity effect is conditional on the initial value and other 
exogenous explanatory variables. The model is shown as: 
 
𝜖𝑖 = 𝜌0 + 𝜌1𝑌𝑖1 + 𝛿?̅?𝑖
′ + 𝜔𝑖                                                                   (7) 
 
where 𝜔 is uncorrelated with the initial observation 𝑌1. Incorporating Eq. (7) into Eq. 
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(5) and Eq. (6) respectively, we obtain: 
 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜌1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖1 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽2𝑃𝐴𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽4𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛿1PAi̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝛿2Sizei̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝛿3TFPi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
+ 𝛿4CFKi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝛿5Leveragei
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                                                                                      (8) 
 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜌1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖1 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽2𝑃𝐴𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽4𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛿1PAi̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝛿2Sizei̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
+ 𝛿3TFPi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝛿4CFKi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝛿5Leveragei
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                                                                                      (9) 
 
As the simple likelihood function proposed by Wooldridge (2005) has the same 
structure with a standard random-effects Probit model, we use the RE Probit model 
for our estimation for the first hypothesis. Similarly, we employ the RE Tobit model 
for estimating the second hypothesis.1  
 
 
                                               
1 Similar to the unobserved firm heterogeneity analysis, we only report the results by using pooled 
Probit and Tobit models in the empirical analysis. The results for the two main hypotheses obtained 
from random-effects Probit and Tobit models are presented in Appendix. 
I have also analysed the probability and intensity of exporting for baseline equation, equation 
considering unobserved firm heterogeneity, and equation considering initial conditions using two-
period lagged variables and obtained the robust results, which are available on request.  
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5.6 Data and summary statistics 
 
5.6.1 Data 
 
In this chapter, we use a firm-level dataset which includes both state-owned and non-
state-owned firms from 31 provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities (except 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) all over China. This dataset is from the annual 
accounting reports, maintained and complied by the NBS. In order to strengthen the 
reliability of our analysis, we first drop observations which make little sense, such as 
those with negative real assets, negative export, negative age, and negative leverage 
ratio. Second, we eliminate firms without complete records on our main regression 
variables. Finally, in order to control for the potential effect of extreme values, we 
drop outliers, which are the observations beyond the 1st and the 99th percent tails for 
each continuous main regression variables.1 After the above adjustments, our final 
panel dataset includes 502,196 firm-level observations, covering 111,460 mainly 
unlisted firms over the period 2001-2007.2 The sample has an unbalanced structure,3 
with the number of observations ranging from a minimum of 43,187 in 2001 to a 
maximum of 85,698 in 2004. 
 
We classify firms into exporters and non-exporters and present the distribution of the 
                                               
1 It is quite common in the literature (see Greenaway et al., 2007; Guariglia, 2008; Carpenter and 
Guariglia, 2008; Yan, 2012) to eliminate extreme values in this way.  
2 It should be noted that our dataset include a very small proportion of listed firms for two reasons. 
Frist of all, according to Liu and Xiao (2004), when firms become listed, their legal identification 
numbers are changed; it is therefore hard to track these firms. The second reason is that there is no 
separate identification of Chinese publicly listed firms in the NBS dataset. However, they only 
comprise a very small portion of the whole sample. Over the whole considered period, only 
approximately 1000 listed firms in the manufacturing and mining sectors, accounting for less than 0.3% 
of the total number of firms in the sample.  
3 See Appendix for details about the structure of the panel. 
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full sample, exporters, and non-exporters by year and industry in Table 5.6. We 
observe that on average, only around 31.04% of our firm-year observations are 
involved in exporting activities. This can be explained by the fact that exporting 
activities always involve huge sunk entry costs, such as collecting information, 
establishing distribution network, and adjusting the products and packages for foreign 
markets. Focusing on the industry groups, we find that the number of observations for 
exporters only exceeds that for non-exporters in the textile industry (51.32% vs. 
48.68%), while firms in other industries are less likely to export. This can be attributed 
to the fact that Chinese textile industry is characterised by huge comparative 
advantages, such as abundant raw material and low human labour costs. Therefore, 
the textile industry has been playing an important part in the foreign trade ever since 
the opening-up policy was adopted in China. This is also consistent with the existing 
literature that firms in labour intensive industries are more likely to export in China 
(Liu and Shu, 2003).  
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Table 5.6 Distribution of the number of observations by year and industry 
 
Year 
Full Sample Exporters Non-exporters 
Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct. 
2001 43,187 8.60 13,153 30.46 30,034 69.54 
2002 58,005 11.55 17,198 29.65 40,807 70.35 
2003 71,108 14.16 20,932 29.44 50,176 70.56 
2004 85,698 17.06 28,273 32.99 57,425 67.01 
2005 84,953 16.92 27,335 32.18 57,618 67.82 
2006 82,355 16.40 26,265 31.89 56,090 68.11 
2007 76,890 15.31 23,601 30.69 53,289 69.31 
Average             31.04           68.96 
       
Industry       
Metal & Metal products 45,031 8.97 12,380 27.49 32,651 72.51 
Nonmetal products & 
Petroleum processing 
47,635 9.49 7,088 14.88 40,547 85.12 
Chemicals & Plastic 85,930 17.11 24,568 28.59 61,362 71.41 
Machinery & Equipment 59,959 11.94 17,140 28.59 42,819 71.41 
Electrical equipment 62,228 12.39 28,807 46.29 33,421 53.71 
Transport equipment 23,972 4.77 5,979 24.94 17,993 75.06 
Food & Tobacco 18,789 3.74 4,082 21.73 14,707 78.27 
Textile 73,707 14.68 37,827 51.32 35,880 48.68 
Leather & Timber & 
Furniture 
46,761 9.31 12,866 27.51 33,895 72.49 
Mining & Logging 38,184 7.60 6,020 15.77 32,164 84.23 
Total 502,196 100.00 156,757 31.21 345,439 68.79 
Notes: Obs. stands for the number of observations. Pct. is the percentage. 
 
Table 5.7 reports the distribution of the number of observations by year and industry 
only for firms with a lishu relationship. We find that the percentage of exporters in 
our firm-year observations that have a lishu relationship (24.25%) is lower than that 
of non-exporters, indicating that firms with a lishu relationship are less likely to export. 
We further observe that the number of observations for non-exporters is larger than 
exporters across all industrial sectors. Even in the textile industry, firms with a lishu 
relationship are less likely to enter into the export market.  
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Table 5.7 Distribution of the number of observations for firms with the lishu 
relationship 
 
Year 
Lishu Sub-
sample 
Exporters Non-exporters 
Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct. 
2001 30,020 14.45 7,640 25.45 22,380 74.55 
2002 35,872 17.26 9,307 25.95 26,565 74.05 
2003 39,958 19.23 10,277 25.72 29,681 74.28 
2004 26,968 12.98 6,178 22.91 20,790 77.09 
2005 27,987 13.47 6,958 24.86 21,029 75.14 
2006 24,876 11.97 5,785 23.26 19,091 76.74 
2007 22,121 10.65 4,780 21.61 17,341 78.39 
Average   24.25 75.75 
       
Industry       
Metal & Metal products 17,458 8.40 4,035 23.11 13,423 76.89 
Nonmetal products & 
Petroleum processing 
22,948 11.04 2,492 10.86 20,456 89.14 
Chemicals & Plastic 37,662 18.12 9,306 24.71 28,356 75.29 
Machinery & Equipment 26,216 12.62 6,541 24.95 19,675 75.05 
Electrical equipment 22,643 10.90 8,290 36.61 14,353 63.39 
Transport equipment 10,849 5.22 2,132 19.65 8,717 80.35 
Food & Tobacco 9,450 4.55 1,698 17.97 7,752 82.03 
Textile 21,727 10.46 10,483 48.25 11,244 51.75 
Leather & Timber & 
Furniture 
18,390 8.85 3,617 19.67 14,773 80.33 
Mining & Logging 20,459 9.85 2,331 11.39 18,128 88.61 
Total 207,802 100.00 50,925 24.51 156,877 75.49 
Notes: Obs. stands for the number of observations. Pct. is the percentage. 
 
Looking at the distribution of exporters by four ownership types in Table 5.8, I find 
that on average, firms with foreign ownership are more prone to export (68.95%), 
followed by the private enterprises (25.21%), while the SOEs and collectively-owned 
firms are more likely to focus on the domestic market. This may result from the 
advantages that foreign firms have in entering export market, such as the established 
network and support from their parent companies, while the domestic market is 
mainly occupied by state-owned firms and large private firms. I also find that SOEs 
in important industries, such as Chemicals and Plastic, Machinery and Equipment, 
and Electrical equipment, export the most (17.48%, 20.52%, and 13.40%, 
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respectively). These exports can be explained by the political considerations or 
national strategic plans. For PEs, FEs, and COEs, firms in textile industry export the 
most.  
 
Table 5.8 Distribution of the number of observations for exporters by year, 
industry, and ownership 
 
Year 
SOEs PEs FEs COEs 
Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct. 
2001 603 13.27 5,505 24.08 5,506 68.45 776 14.78 
2002 648 13.22 8,414 24.42 6,390 66.45 890 14.27 
2003 675 13.01 10,850 24.31 7,547 66.39 899 13.09 
2004 655 13.41 15,170 26.83 10,463 74.31 898 12.69 
2005 663 15.40 14,969 26.22 9,719 68.92 960 14.81 
2006 558 14.35 14,615 26.03 9,324 69.06 802 13.36 
2007 437 13.64 13,041 24.59 8,764 69.09 529 9.85 
Average  13.75  25.21  68.95  13.26 
         
Industry         
Metal & Metal 
products 
266 6.28 6,908 8.37 4,187 7.25 551 9.58 
Nonmetal products & 
Petroleum processing 
244 5.76 4,189 5.07 1,938 3.36 351 6.1 
Chemicals & Plastic 741 17.48 12,579 15.24 9,068 15.71 1,071 18.61 
Machinery & 
Equipment 
870 20.52 10,332 12.51 4,758 8.24 579 10.06 
Electrical equipment 568 13.40 13,223 16.02 13,338 23.11 658 11.44 
Transport equipment 369 8.70 3,263 3.95 1,955 3.39 124 2.16 
Food & Tobacco 253 5.97 1,932 2.34 1,479 2.56 154 2.68 
Textile 454 10.71 20,854 25.26 13,605 23.57 1,326 23.04 
Leather & Timber & 
Furniture 
192 4.53 5,851 7.09 5,839 10.12 522 9.07 
Mining & Logging 282 6.65 3,433 4.16 1,546 2.68 418 7.26 
Total 4,239 100.00 82,564 100.00 57,713 100.00 5,754 100.00 
Notes: Obs. stands for the number of observations. Pct. is the percentage. The ownership classification is based 
on the majority average ownership shares (at least 50%). SOEs, PEs, FEs, and COEs refer to state-owned 
enterprises, private enterprises, foreign enterprises, and collectively-owned enterprises. 
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Table 5.9 shows the distribution of exporters by three different regions, i.e. the coastal 
region, the central region, and the western region. Not surprisingly, we observe that 
coastal region exhibits the largest number of firm-year observations that involved in 
exporting activates (37.09%), followed by the central region (14.12%), and the 
western region (11.31%). Exporting in the textile industry in the coastal region 
remains the highest compared with other industries. As for the central and western 
regions, we find that firms in Chemicals and Plastic industry export more than other 
industries.  
 
Table 5.9 Distribution of the number of observations for exporters by year, 
industry, and region 
 
Year 
Coastal Central     West 
Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct. 
2001 12,114 37.67 535 9.09 504 9.80 
2002 15,699 35.98 807 10.25 692 10.65 
2003 18,976 35.63 1,061 10.55 895 11.48 
2004 25,493 39.66 1,601 12.99 1,179 12.97 
2005 23,437 36.74 2,890 23.51 1,008 11.36 
2006 22,764 36.96 2,521 20.78 980 11.36 
2007 21,381 37.01 1,305 11.66 915 11.55 
Average          37.09     14.12       11.31 
       
Industry       
Metal & Metal products 11,013 7.87 765 7.14 602 9.75 
Nonmetal products & 
Petroleum processing 
5,447 3.89 1,307 12.19 334 5.41 
Chemicals & Plastic 21,207 15.16 1,995 18.61 1,366 22.13 
Machinery & Equipment 15,000 10.72 1,344 12.54 796 12.89 
Electrical equipment 26,992 19.30 1,080 10.07 735 11.91 
Transport equipment 4,944 3.53 405 3.78 630 10.21 
Food & Tobacco 3,193 2.28 469 4.38 420 6.80 
Textile 35,755 25.56 1,382 12.89 690 11.18 
Leather & Timber & 
Furniture 
11,719 8.38 921 8.59 226 3.66 
Mining & Logging 4,594 3.28 1,052 9.81 374 6.06 
Total 139,864 100.00 10,720 100.00 6,173 100.00 
Notes: Obs. stands for the number of observations. Pct. is the percentage. 
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5.6.2 Descriptive statistics  
 
We start with looking at some summary statistics (sample mean, medians, and 
standard deviations). 1  Table 5.10 presents these descriptive statistics for the full 
sample, exporters, and non-exporters. We find in the full sample, that most of our 
firms are less likely to export, and the average export/total sales ratio is only 17.20%. 
Exporters are larger than non-exporters, in terms of the real assets (661.48 thousands 
of yuan vs. 415.67 thousand of yuan), and the number of employees (325 people vs. 
205 people). Besides, exporters are less likely to have political affiliations than non-
exporters. Table 5.10 also shows that exporters generally locate in the east of China 
and more productive than their counterpart, and cash flow/capital ratio is slight but 
significantly larger in exporters than that in non-exporters, suggesting that financial 
health improves the participation of exporting.   
 
However, we find that the leverage ratio is slight but significantly lower in exporters: 
54.76% compared to 57.78% for non-exporters, and exporters are younger than non-
exporters (10.45 years vs. 11.89 years). As we expect that the older firms with high 
leverage ratio are more likely to export, this finding goes against our expectation, but 
in line with the stylised facts documented in the existing literature: Chinese exporters 
appear to be younger and less leveraged than non-exporters. According to the last 
column in Table 5.10, all these variables are significantly different across the exporters 
group and non-exporters group.   
                                               
1 See Appendix for detailed definitions of the variables used in this chapter. The correlation matrix is 
also presented in Appendix. 
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Table 5.10 Descriptive statistics (sample mean, median, and S.D.) 
 
Variables 
Full sample Exporters Non-exporters 
Diff 
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. 
Exp 0.312 0.000 0.463 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Expratio 17.195 0.000 32.773 55.088 58.659 36.789 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
lishu 3.129 1.000 2.900 2.690 1.000 2.742 3.328 1.000 2.947 0.000*** 
Real Assets 492.401 206.252 778.802 661.483 285.112 955.362 415.673 181.645 669.873 0.000*** 
Employee 242.791 147.000 270.518 325.983 208.000 324.251 205.039 125.000 232.619 0.000*** 
Age 11.392 8.000 9.940 10.450 9.000 8.299 11.885 8.000 10.665 0.000*** 
TFP 44.299 35.809 31.676 46.872 39.293 30.818 43.126 34.172 31.991 0.000*** 
Leverage 56.835 58.409 24.930 54.759 56.272 24.212 57.777 59.416 25.193 0.000*** 
CFK 33.732 20.570 42.446 34.946 22.500 41.535 33.181 19.636 42.842 0.000*** 
Region 1.358 1.000 0.667 1.147 1.000 0.452 1.453 1.000 0.724 0.000*** 
Observations 502,196 156,757 345,439  
Notes: Exp is a dummy variable which takes the value of one for exporters, and zero otherwise. Expratio is the intensity of exports. Real Assets are expressed in thousands 
of yuan. TFP, Leverage, and CFK are expressed in percentage terms. S.D. stands for standard deviations. The last column (Diff) presents p-values from an independent 
samples mean-equality test between exporters group and non-exporters group. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and1% level, respectively. See Appendix for 
complete definitions of all variables. 
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Table 5.11 provides a comparison of the main variables across firm-ownership types. 
Foreign firms normally exhibit the highest probability of exporting (0.692 vs. 0.254 
in PEs, 0.137 in SOEs, and 0.133 in COEs) and intensity of exporting (45.56% vs. 
12.74% in PEs, 3.88% in SOEs, and 5.84% in COEs). As for the political affiliation, 
foreign firms have the lowest level of lishu relationship (2.28), followed by the PEs 
(2.67) and COEs (4.22), while the SOEs have the highest level of lishu relationship 
(7.66). SOEs and foreign firms enjoy the largest asset base (723.41 thousands of yuan 
and 741.90 thousand of yuan, respectively). SOEs and FEs hire more employees (369 
people in SOEs and 301 people in FEs) than PEs and COEs (216 people and 222 
people, respectively).  
 
Table 5.11 also shows that SOEs and COEs are much older than PEs, while the FEs 
are the youngest one as most of the foreign firms entered China after the 1990s. This 
finding is consistent with the fact that younger firms may be established as global 
firms; therefore, they are more likely to participate in exporting from China. Foreign 
firms also enjoy the highest productivity (50.78%), followed by PEs (43.85%), COEs 
(42.57%), and SOEs (32.47%), suggesting that FEs are the most efficient firms in 
China but SOEs perform non-efficiently. This may be associated with the reason that 
FEs have advanced management experience and technology, while SOEs take too 
much the political and social responsibilities. As for financial variables, SOEs show 
the highest leverage ratio (64.33%), while that for the foreign firms is the lowest 
(46.15%), suggesting that SOEs suffer from the soft budget constraints due to the 
favourable support from the state banks. Interestingly, we observe that the cash 
flow/capital ratio is larger for FEs and COEs than PEs and SOEs. Finally, we find that 
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FEs prefer to set up their firms in the coastal region, while SOEs are more likely to 
locate their businesses in the central region, where is closer to China’s capital, Beijing, 
the heart of political and economic development.  
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Table 5.11 Descriptive statistics for ownership (sample mean, median, and S.D.) 
 
Variables 
SOEs PEs FEs COEs 
Diff1 Diff2 Diff3 
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. 
Exp 0.137 0.000 0.344 0.254 0.000 0.435 0.692 1.000 0.462 0.133 0.000 0.339 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Expratio 3.877 0.000 14.699 12.742 0.000 28.513 45.558 39.916 42.071 5.836 0.000 19.675 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
lishu 7.658 8.000 1.960 2.671 1.000 2.639 2.280 1.000 2.488 4.221 4.000 2.444 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Real 
Assets 
723.410 332.687 979.872 421.170 176.599 696.037 741.901 358.335 991.308 327.558 167.538 500.722 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.000*** 
Employee 369.093 230.000 370.529 216.735 131.000 242.984 301.263 187.000 313.468 222.875 140.000 241.354 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Age 26.495 28.000 15.802 9.948 7.000 8.884 8.810 9.000 3.706 16.887 14.000 11.064 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
TFP 32.471 24.365 27.441 43.853 35.608 30.815 50.779 42.086 34.146 42.569 33.640 32.017 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Leverage 64.329 65.463 26.296 58.661 60.651 24.122 46.145 45.949 24.253 58.413 59.770 25.451 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
CFK 15.247 7.794 29.520 33.608 20.833 40.968 38.255 24.272 46.010 38.642 22.438 48.506 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Region 1.811 2.000 0.825 1.375 1.000 0.678 1.085 1.000 0.359 1.417 1.000 0.678 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Obs. 30,912 324,757 83,394 43,291  
Notes: Exp is a dummy variable which takes the value of one for exporters, and zero otherwise. Expratio is the intensity of exports. Real Assets are expressed in thousands 
of yuan. TFP, Leverage, and CFK are expressed in percentage terms. S.D. stands for standard deviations. The ownership classification is based on the majority average 
ownership shares (at least 50%). SOEs, PEs, FEs, and COEs refer to state-owned enterprises, private enterprises, foreign enterprises, and collectively-owned enterprises. 
The last three columns present p-values from an independent samples mean-equality test between the SOEs group and the PEs group (Diff1), between SOEs group and the 
FEs group (Diff2), and between PEs group and FEs group (Diff3). *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and1% level, respectively. See Appendix for complete 
definitions of all variables. 
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Focusing on the different regions of China shown in Table 5.12, we observe that firms 
in the east of China have higher probability and intensity of exporting (0.37 and 
21.46%), followed by firms in the central (0.15 and 4.99%) and west of China (0.11 
and 3.66%). Firms located in the western and central regions exhibit the higher 
political affiliation levels (4.64 and 3.94, respectively) than that of coastal firms (2.76). 
In addition, firms in the west of China have the largest size, in terms of real assets 
(549.92 thousands of yuan) and the number of employees (286 employees), and are 
older (14.55 years) than firms in the centre (436.14 thousands of yuan, 268 employees, 
and 13.07 years old) and east of China (494.88 thousands of yuan, 231 employees, 
and 10.71 years old).  
 
As for the productivity and financial variables, firms in the East enjoy the highest TFP 
(45.82%) and cash flow-to-capital ratio (36.09%), indicating they are more effective 
compared with firms in the central region (with 41.57% TFP and 28.91% cash flow 
ratio) and those in the West (37.24% TFP and 23.70% cash flow ratio). Furthermore, 
we observe that firms in the western region enjoy the highest leverage ratio (59.43%), 
followed by firms in the central area (56.59%) and those in the coastal area (56.51%). 
The lowest leverage ratio for coastal firms may suggest that coastal firms depend more 
on their internal funds and foreign financing, instead of debt. 
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Table 5.12 Descriptive statistics for region (sample mean, median, and S.D.) 
 
Variables 
Costal Central West 
Diff1 Diff2 
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. 
Exp 0.372 0.000 0.483 0.149 0.000 0.356 0.114 0.000 0.318 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Expratio 21.462 0.000 35.613 4.994 0.000 17.719 3.655 0.000 14.868 0.000*** 0.000*** 
lishu 2.758 1.000 2.699 3.943 2.000 3.062 4.636 5.000 3.290 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Real Assets 494.883 207.843 784.056 436.141 178.687 707.965 549.922 236.669 825.700 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Employee 231.615 138.000 261.796 268.927 164.000 289.368 286.016 180.000 296.471 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Age 10.706 8.000 8.852 13.069 8.000 12.268 14.549 9.000 13.205 0.000*** 0.000*** 
TFP 45.816 37.555 31.460 41.571 31.027 33.895 37.244 29.226 28.801 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Leverage 56.509 58.298 24.636 56.592 57.443 26.535 59.432 60.211 24.610 0.000*** 0.000*** 
CFK 36.085 22.653 43.345 28.913 15.189 40.979 23.704 13.626 35.440 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Obs. 376,482 71,763 53,951   
Notes: Exp is a dummy variable which takes the value of one for exporters, and zero otherwise. Expratio is the intensity of exports. Real Assets are expressed in thousands 
of yuan. TFP, Leverage, and CFK are expressed in percentage terms. S.D. stands for standard deviations. The last two columns present p-values from an independent samples 
mean-equality test between the coastal region group and the central region group (Diff1), and between the coastal region group and the western region group (Diff2). *, **, 
*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and1% level, respectively. See Appendix for complete definitions of all variables. 
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5.7 Empirical results 
 
5.7.1 The lishu relationship and the propensity of exporting  
 
Table 5.13 provides the regression results of applying pooled Probit 1  clustering 
observations by firms ID in Eqs. (1), (5), and (8). Both coefficients and marginal 
effects are presented in Table 5.13.2 Column (1) presents results for the baseline 
equation (Eq. (1)). Column (2) reports results by considering unobserved firm 
heterogeneity (Eq. (5)). Results that take account of initial conditions problem (Eq. 
(8)) are reported in column (3). 
 
Focusing on column (1) in Table 5.13, we find that the lagged export experience is 
positive and significant at 1% level. Besides, the marginal effects suggest that being 
an exporter in the previous period is 3.50% more likely to export in the current period 
than those that did not. Being consistent with the existing literature, we find that sunk 
entry costs of exporting exist in Chinese manufacturing firms.  
 
Looking at the lishu variable in column (1), we find a significant negative relationship 
between political affiliation and the probability of exporting. Specifically, being a 
politically affiliated firm is associated with a 0.13% lower probability of exporting. 
This finding supports our first hypothesis, which suggests that firms with a lishu 
relationship are less likely to export.  
                                               
1 Out results are robust by using the random-effects Probit model. The results obtained from random-
effects Probit model are presented in Appendix.  
2 Because of the non-linear model, the coefficient estimates are not informative about the magnitude 
of the effects of the outcome variables. 
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Other firm characteristics, such as firm size, productivity, leverage ratio, cash 
flow/capital ratio, types of ownership, and regional factors are found to be significant 
determinants of export participation decisions. Larger firms with high productivity are 
more likely to export. A 0.1 or 10 percentage points increase in firm size, in terms of 
real assets, is linked with an increase in the likelihood of exporting by 0.11 percentage 
points. Similarly, a 10 percentage points rise in total factor productivity is associated 
with a 0.13 percentage points increase in the probability of exporting.  
 
However, firm cash flow/capital ratio and leverage ratio are negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that firms with financial health are less likely to 
export. Although this result contradicts some previous studies (Du and Girma, 2007; 
Li and Yu, 2009; Bellone et al., 2010; Chaney, 2013), some scholars have provided 
explanations for these special relationships. According to Carey et al. (1998), firms 
with a higher lagged leverage ratio are considered as high-risk borrowers in the current 
period from the view of the bank. Therefore, the higher its leverage ratio was, the 
harder it is for the firm to obtain sufficient external financing now to support their 
exports. Minetti and Zhu (2011) also document a negative relationship between cash 
flow and the probability of exporting. The authors attribute this relationship to the size 
effect because cash flow is normalised by the firm’s capital and larger firms are more 
likely to export.  
 
Focusing on the types of ownership in column (1) Table 5.13, we find that state 
ownership has a negative effect on firms participate in the export market, while 
foreign firms are more likely to export. Particularly, being a state-owned firm (foreign 
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firm) is related to a 0.24% (0.58%) lower (higher) likelihood of exporting. 
Furthermore, firms locate in the coastal region are prone to export compared with 
firms in the western region. Specifically, being a coastal firm (western firm) is 
associated with a 0.13% (0.26%) higher (lower) propensity of exporting. 
 
As discussed in section 5.5.2, we include that the vector of means of time-varying 
observable factors to take firm unobserved heterogeneity into account, and report the 
results in column (2) in Table 5.13. The lagged export status is still significant at a 1% 
level and remains the same marginal effects. This finding also supports the sunk entry 
costs statement. The leverage ratio is still a negative and significant determinant of 
export participation. However, political affiliation, TFP, and cash flow are no longer 
significant determinants, while the coefficient of firm size becomes negative and 
significant. We then look at the estimates for the means of time-varying factors. All 
means of the variables have significant signs, suggesting that the connection exists 
between firm unobserved heterogeneity and the observed characteristics.  
 
We find that although the lagged cash flow/capital ratio is insignificantly negative, the 
coefficient of its mean value becomes significant and negative at 1% level due to the 
size effects. Furthermore, we observe the opposite signs of lagged lishu status 
(positive) and its mean value (negative), of lagged size (negative) and its mean value 
(positive), of lagged TFP (negative) and its mean value (positive), and of lagged 
leverage ratio (negative) and its mean value (positive).  
 
A few studies have also documented such findings. For example, using Austrian firms’ 
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exporting activities over the period 1996-2002, Egger and Url (2006) find opposite 
signs of the coefficients on the current value and the average value of partner country’s 
log population size in estimating the Austrian log export. Steward (2007) discovers 
opposite signs for lags of education and marriage status with their means in estimating 
the dynamics of unemployment in the UK from 1991 to 1996. Drakos and 
Konstantinou (2013) investigate the effects of real oil prices and their uncertainty on 
investment decisions among Greek manufacturing firms over the period 1994-2005, 
and find opposite signs for coefficients on lags of employment and lead to value-added 
with their means. In estimating the market access and survival of exports of Peruvian 
firms from 2002 to 2008, Fugazza and McLaren (2014) also include means of time-
varying dependent variables in a random-effects Probit model. The authors find a 
positive relationship between the current log value of sectoral imports and the 
likelihood of exporting, but a negative relationship between its average value and the 
probability of exporting. They point out that the coefficients on the current values 
reflect the immediate effect of the variables, while those on the average value reflect 
the gradual or over time effect.    
 
In line with these studies, we interpret the opposite signs for firm size as that a 10 
percentage point increase in the real assets in the previous period decreases the 
probability of exporting in the current period by 0.07%. However, an average increase 
in the real assets by 10 percentage points over the sample period is associated with an 
increase in the probability of exporting by 0.19%. One explanation could be that the 
firm costs a lot to expand its size in previous years; therefore, it does not hold 
sufficient funds to invest in export markets in the current period. However, always 
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being a larger firm during the sample period has a positive and significant influence 
on participating in export markets as larger firms can afford the costs involved in 
exporting.    
 
Compared with the positive but insignificant coefficient on lagged lishu status in 
column (2) Table 5.13, the coefficient on its mean value has a significant and negative 
impact on the export decisions, indicating that over time firms with political affiliation 
are less likely to enter export markets. Being a politically affiliated firm is 0.21% less 
likely to export. This result supports our first hypothesis.  
 
As for the leverage, the lagged value has a negative effect on firms’ export decisions 
while its mean value has a positive effect. This finding is consistent with the existing 
literature, suggesting that firms with a high leverage ratio in the previous period are 
considered as high-risk borrowers; hence, these firms may lack sufficient funds in the 
current period and may postpone their exporting activities for the future. However, 
over time, firms with high leverage ratio can accumulate more funds to invest in 
exporting. Although the coefficient on lagged TFP is negative and insignificant, its 
mean value has a positive effect on the firms’ propensity of exporting at 1% significant 
level, suggesting that over time the firms with higher productivity are more likely to 
export. Specifically, a 10% increase in productivity is related to an increase in the 
probability of exporting by 0.23%.  
 
By taking into account of the unobserved firm heterogeneity, our results on types of 
ownership and regional factors do not change. State ownership has a negative impact 
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on the propensity of exporting, while foreign ownership has a positive effect. 
Compared with firms located in the coastal region, these located in the west of China 
are less likely to export.  
 
In column (3), I address the initial conditions problem by Wooldridge’s (2005) method 
and include the initial values of export status in the regressions. Similar results with 
slight changes in the magnitudes of marginal effects are obtained. Over time, smaller 
firms with a lishu relationship are less likely to export. Firms with high productivity 
and leverage ratio are more likely to export. The negative coefficient on cash flow is 
still affected by size effects. State ownership (foreign ownership) is negatively 
(positively) related to the probability of exporting. Furthermore, firms in the coastal 
area are more likely to export. As for the exporting status in the initial period, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖1, 
it is positive and significant at a 1% level. Firms that exported in the first period of 
the sample are 0.95% more likely to export in the current period. As for the previous 
exporting experience, we find a decrease from 3.50% to 2.81%, confirming that 
without proper control of the initial conditions, the size of sunk entry costs of 
exporting is overestimated.  
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Table 5.13 The propensity of exporting 
 
  Variables  (1)      (2)         (3) 
 Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 2.571*** 0.350*** 2.573*** 0.350*** 2.148*** 0.281*** 
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒊𝟏     0.728*** 0.095*** 
     (0.008) (0.001) 
𝑷𝑨𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.097*** -0.013*** 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.079*** 0.011*** -0.050*** -0.007*** -0.038*** -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) 
𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.095*** 0.013*** -0.005 -0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.036*** -0.005*** -0.094*** -0.013*** -0.091*** -0.012*** 
 (0.011) (0.001) (0.022) (0.003) (0.022) (0.003) 
𝐂𝐅𝐊𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.083*** -0.011*** -0.013 -0.002 -0.019 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.012) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) 
State Ownership -0.179*** -0.024*** -0.138*** -0.019*** -0.158*** -0.021*** 
 (0.013) (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) 
Foreign 
Ownership 0.426*** 0.058*** 0.417*** 0.057*** 0.321*** 0.042*** 
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) 
Coastal Region 0.099*** 0.013*** 0.084*** 0.011*** 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) 
Western Region -0.188*** -0.026*** -0.186*** -0.025*** -0.225*** -0.029*** 
 (0.012) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) 
PAi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   -0.154*** -0.021*** -0.180*** -0.024*** 
   (0.012) (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) 
Sizei̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    0.140*** 0.019*** 0.129*** 0.017*** 
   (0.008) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) 
TFPi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   0.167*** 0.023*** 0.160*** 0.021*** 
   (0.011) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) 
Leveragei
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    0.113*** 0.015*** 0.076*** 0.010*** 
   (0.025) (0.003) (0.027) (0.003) 
CFKi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   -0.114*** -0.016*** -0.092*** -0.012*** 
   (0.016) (0.002) (0.017) (0.002) 
Obs. 502,196 502,196 502,196 502,196 502,196 502,196 
Log likelihood -127,769  -127,622  -122,784  
Note: The dependent variable 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡  is a binary variable which equals to one if the firm exports, and zero 
otherwise. Column (1) presents results for the baseline equation. Column (2) reports results by considering 
unobserved firm heterogeneity. Results that take account of initial conditions problem are reported in column 
(3). All equations are estimated by pooled Probit models clustering observations by firms’ ID. Coefficients 
(Coeff.) and marginal effects (ME) are presented for each equation. Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. Ownership dummies, regional dummies, industry dummies, and year dummies are included in 
all estimations. Obs. stands for the number of observations. Log likelihood is the log likelihood of the fitted 
model. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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5.7.2 The lishu relationship and the intensity of exporting 
 
The regression results obtained by the pooled Tobit model 1  with clustering 
observations by firms ID in Eqs. (2), (6), and (9) are presented in Table 5.14. Both 
coefficients and marginal effects are presented in Table 5.14. Column (1) presents 
results for the baseline equation (Eq. (2)). Column (2) reports results by considering 
unobserved firm heterogeneity (Eq. (6)). Results that take account of initial conditions 
problem (Eq. (9)) are reported in column (3). Only 156,757 observations are 
uncensored, indicating a relatively low level of exporting of Chinese manufacturing 
firms. A total of 345,439 observations are left-censored, which suggests that these 
firms do not export during our sample period.  
 
Focusing on column (1), we find that lagged export ratio is positive and significant 
related to the current export ratio. The marginal effects suggest that a 10% increase in 
the previous export ratio is associated with an increase in the export intensity by 4.05 
percentage points in the current period. Firms with political affiliations export less 
than their counterparts, indicating that having a lishu relationship reduces the export 
intensity. Being a politically affiliated firm is associated with a 7.94% less exporting. 
This finding is consistent with existing studies and our Hypothesis 2.  
 
From column (1) Table 5.14, we also find that larger firms with higher productivity 
export more than smaller firms with lower productivity. Specifically, a 10% increase 
in the firms’ size (TFP) would yield an increase of 11.69 (10.46) percentage points in 
                                               
1 Out results are robust by using the random-effects Tobit model. The results obtained from random-
effects Tobit model are presented in Appendix.  
Using the GMM technique, we find that the main result that political connections have a negative 
impact on exporting intensity is still holding.  
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export ratio. These results suggest that once firms become exporters, the magnitudes 
of firm size and productivity are significant in improving the export intensity. As for 
the financial variables, we observe negative relationships between leverage ratio and 
export intensity, and between cash flow/capital ratio and export ratio. A 10% decrease 
in the leverage ratio (cash flow/capital ratio) increases the export intensity by 0.10 
(7.07) percentage points. Similar to our results in section 5.7.1, the negative 
coefficient on cash flow-to-capital ratio could be related to the size effects. And the 
negative leverage ratio can be explained by the fact that exporters can obtain global 
financing from their exporting activities, which provides a motivation for firms with 
low leverage ratio in the previous period to export more in the global market in the 
current period.  
 
As for the ownership and regional factors, we find that firms with state (foreign) 
ownership export less (more). Specifically, being a state-owned (foreign) firm is 
associated with a 17.67% (32.60%) lower (higher) export ratio. Firms located in the 
coastal region export more, while the firms in the west of China export less. Being a 
coastal (western) firm is associated with a 17.59% (19.97%) more (less) exporting. 
This can be attributed to the fact that firms locate in the east of China have geographic 
advantages in terms of accessing to foreign markets and reducing transportation costs.  
 
Unobserved firm heterogeneity is considered by adding a vector of means of time-
varying observable factors in the regressions. Results are reported in column (2) Table 
5.14. The lagged export ratio maintain a positive and significant impact on the current 
export ratio, indicating that a 0.1 increase in the previous export ratio is related to an 
increase in the export intensity by 4.05 percentage points in the current period. 
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Similar to our results in section 5.7.1, we also observe opposite signs between lagged 
lishu status and its mean value, and between lagged leverage ratio and its mean value. 
These results suggest that over time, political affiliated firms export less (i.e. being a 
political affiliated firm is associated with a 12.37% less exporting.) and firms with 
high leverage ratio export more (i.e. a 10% increase in leverage ratio is related to an 
increases in the export intensity by 13.04 percentage points). This result indicates that 
over time, a firm with good financial status can improve its export intensity.   
 
By considering the unobserved firm characteristics, the results on types of ownership 
and regional factors only change slightly in terms of the magnetite of marginal effects. 
Being a state-owned (foreign) firm is related to a 14.26% (32.00%) less (more) 
exporting. Moreover, being a coastal (western) firm is associated with a 16.35% 
(19.75%) more (less) exporting. 
 
Column (3) in Table 5.14 presents the regression results that address the initial 
conditions problem. We obtain similar results with slight changes in the magnitude of 
marginal effects. The reduced marginal effects on the lagged export ratio indicate that 
a 10% increase in export ratio in the previous period improves the export intensity in 
the current period by 3.39 percentage points. As for the export intensity in the initial 
period, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖1, the positive and significant effect suggests that having positive a 
export ratio in the first period of the sample increases the export ratio in current period 
by 0.84 percentage points. Over time, larger firms with high productivity and leverage 
ratio export more. Firms with the lishu relationship and locating in the west of China 
export less. The negative coefficient on cash flow is still affected by size effects. State 
ownership (foreign ownership) is negatively (positively) related to the intensity of 
exporting. 
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Table 5.14 The intensity of exporting 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 1.229*** 0.405*** 1.229*** 0.405*** 1.025*** 0.339*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝟏     0.254*** 0.084*** 
     (0.004) (0.001) 
𝑷𝑨𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -2.406*** -0.794*** 0.042 0.014 0.041 0.014 
 (0.164) (0.054) (0.217) (0.071) (0.208) (0.069) 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 3.544*** 1.169*** 0.085 0.028 0.357* 0.118* 
 (0.068) (0.022) (0.200) (0.066) (0.195) (0.065) 
𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 3.170*** 1.046*** 0.533*** 0.176*** 0.686*** 0.227*** 
 (0.149) (0.049) (0.197) (0.065) (0.189) (0.062) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.029*** -0.010*** -2.328*** -0.768*** -2.040*** -0.674*** 
 (0.316) (0.104) (0.530) (0.175) (0.509) (0.168) 
𝐂𝐅𝐊𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -2.144*** -0.707*** -0.152 -0.050 -0.249 -0.082 
 (0.214) (0.071) (0.280) (0.093) (0.269) (0.089) 
State Ownership -5.356*** -1.767*** -4.324*** -1.426*** -4.203*** -1.389*** 
 (0.480) (0.158) (0.487) (0.160) (0.486) (0.161) 
Foreign 
Ownership 9.883*** 3.260*** 9.703*** 3.200*** 7.730*** 2.555*** 
 (0.197) (0.064) (0.201) (0.065) (0.218) (0.072) 
Coastal Region 5.333*** 1.759*** 4.957*** 1.635*** 4.103*** 1.356*** 
 (0.287) (0.095) (0.288) (0.095) (0.294) (0.097) 
Western Region -6.053*** -1.997*** -5.989*** -1.975*** -6.033*** -1.994*** 
 (0.449) (0.148) (0.449) (0.148) (0.451) (0.149) 
PAi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   -3.752*** -1.237*** -3.839*** -1.269*** 
   (0.309) (0.102) (0.312) (0.103) 
Sizei̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    3.707*** 1.223*** 3.518*** 1.163*** 
   (0.214) (0.071) (0.212) (0.070) 
TFPi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   4.370*** 1.441*** 4.036*** 1.334*** 
   (0.283) (0.093) (0.286) (0.094) 
Leveragei
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    3.953*** 1.304*** 3.174*** 1.049*** 
   (0.663) (0.219) (0.664) (0.219) 
CFKi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   -3.267*** -1.078*** -2.765*** -0.914*** 
   (0.409) (0.135) (0.417) (0.138) 
       
Obs. 502,196 502,196 502,196 502,196 502,196 502,196 
Log likelihood -872,485  -872,024  -867,564  
Uncensored 156,757  156,757  156,757  
Left-censored 345,439  345,439  345,439  
Right-censored 0  0  0  
Note: The dependent variable 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡  (exports/total sales) is a censored variable which takes its 
real value if the firm has positive exports with no larger than total sales (uncensored observations), zero 
if the firm does not export (left-censored), and 100 for the upper limits (right-censored). Column (1) 
presents results for the baseline equation. Column (2) reports results by considering unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. Results that take account of initial conditions problem are reported in column (3). All 
equations are estimated by pooled Tobit models clustering observations by firms’ ID. Coefficients 
(Coeff.) and marginal effects (ME) are presented for each equation. Robust standard errors are shown 
in parentheses. Ownership dummies, regional dummies, industry dummies, and year dummies are 
included in all estimations. Obs. stands for the number of observations. Log likelihood is the log 
likelihood of the fitted model. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
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5.8 Further tests 
 
5.8.1 Different levels of the lishu relationship and exporting behaviour 
 
In this section, we aim to test whether the different levels of lishu relationship have 
the same effect on firms’ exporting behaviour. To this end, we further divide the 
political affiliation of firms into four groups, i.e. firms with a low level of lishu 
relationship (including the firms affiliated with the rest levels of governments), firms 
with a medium level of lishu relationship (including the firms affiliated with the city 
and prefecture, and county governments), and firms with a high level of lishu 
relationship (including the firms affiliated with the central and provincial 
governments). 
 
We start with the first column in Table 5.15. We find that the lagged export status 
remains positive and significant with the same magnitude of marginal effects as that 
in Table 5.13, suggesting that firms export in the previous period are more likely to 
remain their export status in the current period. The coefficients on three levels of 
lishu relationship are all negative and significant at a 1% level. Being a firm affiliated 
with the low/medium/high level of government is associated with a 0.12/0.14/0.13 
lower probability of exporting. As for the other factors that can affect the firms’ 
exporting decisions, we find the similar results as in section 5.7.1 with slight change 
in the magnitude of marginal effects.  
 
Column (2) in Table 5.15 takes into account the unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
Looking at the three levels of lishu relationship, we find, over time, firms with a lishu 
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relationship, no matter which level it is, are less likely to export. Interestingly, this 
negative effect is significant for firms affiliated with a low or medium level of 
government, but insignificant for the firms with a high level of lishu relationship. In 
China, the major participants in the governmental external communications (with 
foreign countries and cities) are dominated by the central and the provincial 
governments. Economic communication and transnational trade are the two 
predominant types of governmental external communications (Yang, 2015). These 
governments prefer to grant their affiliated firms with exporting opportunities through 
sharing information and bridging the cooperation. In this case, the negative effects of 
the lishu relationship on firms’ exporting can be mitigate somehow. Additionally, all 
the other results are similar to our previous findings.  
 
Column (3) in Table 5.15 addresses the initial conditions problem. Focusing on our 
three main coefficients on different levels of lishu relationship, we find similar results. 
The low or medium level of political affiliation have a significant and negative 
influence on firms’ exporting propensity, while this negative effect becomes only 
significant at a 10% level for firms with a high level of lishu relationship due to the 
scarce exporting opportunities the high level government can obtain through their 
external communication with other foreign countries. The results for other variables 
remain robust.  
 
Table 5.16 estimates the effects of different levels of the lishu relationship on export 
intensity. Similar results have been found. That is, without controlling for the 
unobserved firm heterogeneity and initial conditions problem, affiliation with all the 
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three levels of government have a negative and significant relationship with firms’ 
export intensity. Focusing on columns (2) and (3), we find that over time, this negative 
effect becomes insignificant for firms affiliated with high levels of government, but 
remains significant for firms affiliated with low/medium level of government. As for 
other variables, the results are robust. By controlling the initial conditions problem 
appropriately, the overestimation of sunk costs can be reduced.  
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Table 5.15 The propensity of exporting (different levels of the lishu relationship) 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Coeff.    ME        Coeff.      ME   Coeff.   ME 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 2.571*** 0.350*** 2.573*** 0.350*** 2.148*** 0.281*** 
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒊𝟏     0.727*** 0.095*** 
     (0.008) (0.001) 
𝑷𝑨𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.091*** -0.012*** -0.013 -0.002 -0.015 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.011) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) 
𝑷𝑨𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒖𝒎𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.106*** -0.014*** -0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.014) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) 
𝑷𝑨𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.097*** -0.013*** -0.075** -0.010** -0.072** -0.009** 
 (0.014) (0.002) (0.034) (0.005) (0.035) (0.005) 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.080*** 0.011*** -0.049*** -0.007*** -0.037*** -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) 
𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.094*** 0.013*** -0.005 -0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.035*** -0.005*** -0.093*** -0.013*** -0.091*** -0.012*** 
 (0.011) (0.001) (0.022) (0.003) (0.022) (0.003) 
𝐂𝐅𝐊𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.083*** -0.011*** -0.013 -0.002 -0.019 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.012) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) 
State Ownership -0.175*** -0.024*** -0.146*** -0.020*** -0.158*** -0.021*** 
 (0.014) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.016) (0.002) 
Foreign 
Ownership 0.426*** 0.058*** 0.417*** 0.057*** 0.322*** 0.042*** 
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) 
Coastal Region 0.097*** 0.013*** 0.084*** 0.011*** 0.003* 0.001* 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) 
Western Region -0.187*** -0.025*** -0.187*** -0.025*** -0.224*** -0.029*** 
 (0.012) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) 
PAlowi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   -0.168*** -0.023*** -0.181*** -0.024*** 
   (0.014) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) 
PAmediumi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   -0.148*** -0.020*** -0.188*** -0.025*** 
   (0.017) (0.002) (0.018) (0.002) 
PAhighi
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    -0.049 -0.007 -0.083* -0.011* 
   (0.037) (0.005) (0.038) (0.005) 
Sizei̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    0.139*** 0.019*** 0.129*** 0.017*** 
   (0.008) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) 
TFPi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   0.167*** 0.023*** 0.158*** 0.021*** 
   (0.011) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) 
Leveragei
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    0.114*** 0.016*** 0.077*** 0.010*** 
   (0.025) (0.003) (0.027) (0.003) 
CFKi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   -0.114*** -0.015*** -0.093*** -0.012*** 
   (0.016) (0.002) (0.017) (0.002) 
Obs. 502,196 502,196 502,196 502,196 502,196 502,196 
Log likelihood -127,997  -127,617  -122,924  
Note: The dependent variable 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡  is a binary variable which equals to one if the firm exports, and zero 
otherwise. Column (1) presents results for the baseline equation. Column (2) reports results by considering 
unobserved firm heterogeneity. Results that take account of initial conditions problem are reported in 
column (3). All equations are estimated by pooled Probit models clustering observations by firms’ ID. 
Coefficients (Coeff.) and marginal effects (ME) are presented for each equation. Robust standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. Ownership dummies, regional dummies, industry dummies, and year dummies 
are included in all estimations. Obs. stands for the number of observations. Log likelihood is the log 
likelihood of the fitted model. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 5.16 The intensity of exporting (different levels of the lishu relationship) 
 
    Variables (1)      (2)         (3) 
   Coeff.      ME        Coeff.   ME Coeff.        ME      
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 1.229*** 0.406*** 1.229*** 0.405*** 1.026*** 0.339*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝟏     0.254*** 0.084*** 
     (0.004) (0.001) 
𝑷𝑨𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -2.891*** -0.954*** -0.342 -0.113 -0.314 -0.104 
 (0.198) (0.065) (0.271) (0.089) (0.260) (0.086) 
𝑷𝑨𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒖𝒎𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -2.044*** -0.674*** -0.306 -0.101 -0.260 -0.086 
 (0.226) (0.074) (0.303) (0.100) (0.291) (0.096) 
𝑷𝑨𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.916** -0.302** -0.839 -0.277 -0.806 -0.266 
 (0.411) (0.135) (0.675) (0.223) (0.656) (0.217) 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 3.477*** 1.147*** 0.095 0.031 0.366* 0.121* 
 (0.069) (0.023) (0.200) (0.066) (0.196) (0.065) 
𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 3.173*** 1.047*** 0.537*** 0.177*** 0.690*** 0.228*** 
 (0.149) (0.049) (0.197) (0.065) (0.189) (0.062) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.009 0.003 -2.322*** -0.766*** -2.034*** -0.672*** 
 (0.316) (0.104) (0.530) (0.175) (0.509) (0.168) 
𝐂𝐅𝐊𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -2.129*** -0.702*** -0.157 -0.052 -0.255 -0.084 
 (0.214) (0.071) (0.281) (0.093) (0.269) (0.089) 
State Ownership -6.001*** -1.980*** -5.424*** -1.789*** -5.345*** -1.767*** 
 (0.500) (0.165) (0.512) (0.169) (0.512) (0.169) 
Foreign 
Ownership 9.887*** 3.261*** 9.694*** 3.197*** 7.720*** 2.551*** 
 (0.197) (0.064) (0.201) (0.065) (0.218) (0.072) 
Coastal Region 5.375*** 1.773*** 5.045*** 1.664*** 4.189*** 1.384*** 
 (0.287) (0.095) (0.289) (0.095) (0.295) (0.097) 
Western Region -6.174*** -2.036*** -6.216*** -2.050*** -6.268*** -2.071*** 
 (0.449) (0.148) (0.450) (0.148) (0.452) (0.149) 
PAlowi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   -5.237*** -1.727*** -5.322*** -1.759*** 
   (0.391) (0.129) (0.394) (0.130) 
PAmediumi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   -2.629*** -0.867*** -2.777*** -0.918*** 
   (0.431) (0.142) (0.428) (0.142) 
PAhighi
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    -0.617 -0.203 -0.596 -0.197 
   (0.822) (0.271) (0.812) (0.268) 
Sizei̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    3.577*** 1.180*** 3.386*** 1.119*** 
   (0.215) (0.071) (0.213) (0.070) 
TFPi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   4.403*** 1.452*** 4.066*** 1.344*** 
   (0.283) (0.093) (0.286) (0.094) 
Leveragei
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    4.023*** 1.327*** 3.252*** 1.075*** 
   (0.663) (0.219) (0.664) (0.219) 
CFKi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   -3.190*** -1.052*** -2.686*** -0.888*** 
   (0.409) (0.135) (0.417) (0.138) 
       
Obs. 502,196 502,196 502,196 502,196 502,196 502,196 
Log likelihood -872,467  -871,976  -867,510  
Uncensored 156,757  156,757  156,757  
Left-censored 345,439  345,439  345,439  
Right-censored 0  0  0  
Note: The dependent variable 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡  (exports/total sales) is a censored variable which takes its real value if the 
firm has positive exports with no larger than total sales (uncensored observations), zero if the firm does not export 
(left-censored), and 100 for the upper limits (right-censored). Column (1) presents results for the baseline equation. 
Column (2) reports results by considering unobserved firm heterogeneity. Results that take account of initial conditions 
problem are reported in column (3). All equations are estimated by pooled Tobit models clustering observations by 
firms’ ID. Coefficients (Coeff.) and marginal effects (ME) are presented for each equation. Robust standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. Ownership dummies, regional dummies, industry dummies, and year dummies are included in 
all estimations. Obs. stands for the number of observations. Log likelihood is the log likelihood of the fitted model. *, 
**, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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5.8.2 The propensity and intensity of exporting by ownership  
 
We then estimate the decision to export and export intensity by ownership types.1 We 
report the marginal effects of the regression results for the probability of exporting in 
Table 5.17 and for export intensity in Table 5.18. The coefficient estimates are 
provided in Table 5A.4 and Table 5A.5 in the Appendix. As we find that around 94% 
of state-owned firms and 84% of collectively-owned firms are politically affiliated, 
we only report the results for private firms (in column (1)), which accounts for more 
than 60% of our full sample, and foreign firms (in column (2)), which are most 
effective and active sector in China. 
 
Focusing on the main regressor, lishu status variable, we find that the lishu 
relationship negatively affects the propensity of exporting. Once these firms export, 
their export intensity is less for politically affiliated firms. Such negative relationship 
is more significant in foreign firms than that in private firms. All the other estimation 
results are robust as found in the previous sections.  
 
 
                                               
1 I also have estimated the regressions for ten different industries available in our dataset, i.e. Metal and metal 
products industry, Non-metal products and petroleum processing industry, Chemicals and plastic industry, 
Machinery and Equipment industry, Electrical equipment industry, Transport equipment industry, Food and 
Tobacco industry, Textile industry, Leather, Timber and Furniture industry, and Mining and Logging industry. And 
the main results are robust, indicating that during our sample period, political connections have a negative impact 
on export probability and intensity in these sub-samples. Results are available on request.  
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Table 5.17 The propensity of exporting by ownership (Private firms vs. Foreign 
firms): marginal effects 
 
Variables (1)            (2) 
 I II III I  II  III  
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.355*** 0.354*** 0.288*** 0.409*** 0.409*** 0.328*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒊𝟏   0.094***   0.112*** 
   (0.001)   (0.003) 
𝑷𝑨𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.010*** 0.002 0.002 -0.016*** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.011*** -0.007*** -0.005*** 0.005*** -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.014*** 0.004** 0.002 0.011*** 0.006** 0.006** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.003* -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.012*** -0.011 -0.012 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) 
𝐂𝐅𝐊𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.011*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.014*** -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Coastal Region 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.043*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Western Region -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
PAi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  -0.013*** -0.016***  -0.027*** -0.028*** 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.005) (0.005) 
Sizei̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   0.020*** 0.018***  0.010*** 0.011*** 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.004) 
TFPi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  0.031*** 0.028***  0.009** 0.011** 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.004) 
Leveragei
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   0.030*** 0.021***  0.029*** 0.026** 
  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.010) (0.010) 
CFKi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  -0.016*** -0.013***  -0.016*** -0.013** 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.005) (0.006) 
       
Obs. 324,757 324,757 324,757 83,394 83,394 83,394 
Note: The dependent variable 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡  is a binary variable which equals to one if the firm exports, and 
zero otherwise. Column (1) and Column (2) present results for PEs sub-group and FEs sub-group, 
respectively. PEs and FEs refer to private enterprises and foreign enterprises. For each column, cell I 
presents results for the baseline equation, cell II reports results by considering unobserved firm 
heterogeneity, and results that take account of initial conditions problem are reported in cell III. All 
equations are estimated by pooled Probit models clustering observations by firms’ ID. Robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. Regional dummies, industry dummies, and year dummies are included 
in all estimations. Obs. stands for the number of observations. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 5.18 The intensity of exporting by ownership (Private firms vs. Foreign 
firms): marginal effects 
 
Variables (1)            (2) 
 I II III I  II  III  
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.379*** 0.379*** 0.318*** 0.639*** 0.638*** 0.532*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝟏   0.076***   0.139*** 
   (0.002)   (0.004) 
𝑷𝑨𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.455*** 0.096 0.091 -1.431*** 0.147 0.126 
 (0.064) (0.082) (0.080) (0.177) (0.249) (0.240) 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 1.248*** 0.050 0.163** 0.260*** 0.269 0.264 
 (0.026) (0.074) (0.073) (0.072) (0.256) (0.248) 
𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 1.090*** 0.077 0.141* 0.620*** 0.449** 0.482** 
 (0.062) (0.080) (0.077) (0.155) (0.215) (0.207) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.135 -1.293*** -1.138*** -0.940*** -1.468** -1.524** 
 (0.128) (0.203) (0.195) (0.325) (0.661) (0.638) 
𝐂𝐅𝐊𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.742*** -0.061 -0.087 -0.725*** -0.013 -0.076 
 (0.090) (0.114) (0.110) (0.207) (0.295) (0.284) 
Coastal Region 1.112*** 0.988*** 0.777*** 6.470*** 6.452*** 5.434*** 
 (0.100) (0.101) (0.104) (0.618) (0.619) (0.643) 
Western Region -2.312*** -2.303*** -2.316*** -0.706 -0.530 -0.575 
 (0.160) (0.160) (0.162) (0.962) (0.963) (0.995) 
PAi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  -0.529*** -0.588***  -2.212*** -2.117*** 
  (0.121) (0.122)  (0.347) (0.353) 
Sizei̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   1.285*** 1.205***  0.549** 0.635** 
  (0.080) (0.080)  (0.282) (0.280) 
TFPi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  1.738*** 1.571***  0.316*** 0.382*** 
  (0.116) (0.117)  (0.301) (0.309) 
Leveragei
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   1.953*** 1.426***  3.150*** 2.703*** 
  (0.261) (0.262)  (0.771) (0.776) 
CFKi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  -1.178*** -1.070***  -1.211*** -0.888** 
  (0.172) (0.176)  (0.397) (0.408) 
       
Obs. 324,757 324,757 324,757 83,394 83,394 83,394 
Note: The dependent variable 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡  (exports/total sales) is a censored variable which takes its 
real value if the firm has positive exports with no larger than total sales (uncensored observations), zero 
if the firm does not export (left-censored), and 100 for the upper limits (right-censored). Column (1) 
and Column (2) present results for PEs sub-group and FEs sub-group, respectively. PEs and FEs refer 
to private enterprises and foreign enterprises. For each column, cell I presents results for the baseline 
equation, cell II reports results by considering unobserved firm heterogeneity, and results that take 
account of initial conditions problem are reported in cell III. All equations are estimated by pooled 
Tobit models clustering observations by firms’ ID. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Regional dummies, industry dummies, and year dummies are included in all estimations. Obs. stands 
for the number of observations. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
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5.8.3 The propensity and intensity of exporting by region  
 
In this section, we estimate the decision to export and export intensity by regions. We 
report the marginal effects of the regression results for the probability of exporting by 
regions in Table 5.19 and for export intensity in Table 5.20. The coefficients estimates 
are provided in Table 5A.6 and Table 5A.7 in the Appendix. In each table, column (1) 
reports the results for firms located in coastal region, column (2) presents the results 
for firms in the central region, and column (3) shows the results for firms in the 
western region.   
 
In all three regressions, for the firms in the east of China, the lishu relationship has a 
significant negative effect on the propensity and intensity of exporting. As for other 
factors, we find the similar results with the analysis in the previous sections. 
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Table 5.19 The propensity of exporting by region: marginal effects 
 
    Variables  (1)  (2)        (3) 
 I II III I  II  III  I  II  III  
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.376*** 0.375*** 0.303*** 0.302*** 0.301*** 0.242*** 0.209*** 0.208*** 0.169*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒊𝟏   0.096***   0.105***   0.058*** 
   (0.001)   (0.003)   (0.003) 
𝑷𝑨𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.017*** 0.002 0.002 -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.011*** -0.006*** -0.004*** 0.008*** -0.012*** -0.010*** 0.010*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.015*** 0.001 0.001 0.007*** 0.005* 0.003 0.004*** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.004** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.009** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.000) (0.006) (0.006) 
𝐂𝐅𝐊𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.014*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.009* -0.009** -0.006* -0.013*** -0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
State Ownership -0.031*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.018*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.022*** -0.013*** -0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Foreign Ownership 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.045*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
PAi̅̅ ̅̅̅  -0.028*** -0.031***  -0.003 -0.005  -0.005* -0.006* 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.004) 
Sizei̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   0.019*** 0.016***  0.022*** 0.020***  0.013*** 0.010*** 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
TFPi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  0.025*** 0.024***  0.017*** 0.013***  0.003 0.005 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Leveragei
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   0.018*** 0.011***  0.021** 0.022***  0.004 0.009 
  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.007) (0.007) 
CFKi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  -0.024*** -0.021***  -0.022*** -0.029***  -0.005 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.006) 
          
Obs. 376,482 376,482 376,482 71,763 71,763 71,763 53,951 53,951 53,951 
Note: The dependent variable 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡  is a binary variable which equals to one if the firm exports, and zero otherwise. Column (1), column (2) and Column (3) present 
results for the coastal region sub-group, the central region sub-group and the western region sub-group, respectively. For each column, cell I presents results for the 
baseline equation, cell II reports results by considering unobserved firm heterogeneity, and results that take account of initial conditions problem are reported in cell III. 
All equations are estimated by pooled Probit models clustering observations by firms’ ID. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Ownership dummies, industry 
dummies, and year dummies are included in all estimations. Obs. stands for the number of observations. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.
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Table 5.20 The intensity of exporting by region: marginal effects 
 
Variables (1)             (2)             (3) 
I II III I  II  III  I  II  III  
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.456*** 0.456*** 0.381*** 0.279*** 0.279*** 0.234*** 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.209*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝟏   0.095***   0.060***   0.054*** 
   (0.002)   (0.004)   (0.004) 
𝑷𝑨𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -1.055*** 0.061 0.064 -0.247** -0.314** -0.335** -0.034 0.052 0.083 
 (0.067) (0.090) (0.087) (0.103) (0.135) (0.131) (0.109) (0.138) (0.133) 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 1.243*** 0.143* 0.246*** 0.722*** 0.257* 0.197 1.096*** 0.248* 0.295** 
 (0.028) (0.082) (0.081) (0.044) (0.132) (0.130) (0.046) (0.136) (0.133) 
𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 1.263*** 0.200** 0.256*** 0.471*** 0.032 0.081 0.259*** 0.155 0.168 
 (0.062) (0.083) (0.079) (0.088) (0.117) (0.113) (0.096) (0.123) (0.118) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.139 -0.792*** -0.677*** -0.595*** -1.404*** -1.343*** -0.248 -0.517* -0.506* 
 (0.130) (0.223) (0.214) (0.193) (0.316) (0.307) (0.218) (0.306) (0.294) 
𝐂𝐅𝐊𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.975*** -0.025 -0.016 -0.335** -0.131 -0.153 -0.320* -0.438** -0.418** 
 (0.086) (0.113) (0.109) (0.147) (0.194) (0.186) (0.184) (0.207) (0.201) 
State Ownership -2.447*** -1.970*** -1.882*** -0.802*** -0.728*** -0.739*** -0.551*** -0.509*** -0.503*** 
 (0.241) (0.243) (0.244) (0.192) (0.197) (0.199) (0.175) (0.181) (0.184) 
Foreign Ownership 3.887*** 3.826*** 3.076*** 1.759*** 1.741*** 1.478*** 1.563*** 1.528*** 1.340*** 
 (0.076) (0.077) (0.085) (0.214) (0.217) (0.237) (0.206) (0.208) (0.232) 
PAi̅̅ ̅̅̅  -1.692*** -1.738***  -0.102 -0.150  -0.036 -0.120 
  (0.128) (0.129)  (0.195) (0.196)  (0.207) (0.209) 
Sizei̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   1.169*** 1.108***  1.076*** 1.017***  0.910*** 0.863*** 
  (0.088) (0.088)  (0.141) (0.140)  (0.145) (0.143) 
TFPi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  1.810*** 1.698***  0.642*** 0.519***  0.073 0.048 
  (0.118) (0.120)  (0.168) (0.169)  (0.181) (0.183) 
Leveragei
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   1.553*** 1.260***  1.399*** 1.222***  0.317 0.437 
  (0.276) (0.278)  (0.406) (0.404)  (0.403) (0.407) 
CFKi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  -1.699*** -1.497***  -0.928*** -1.009***  -0.316 -0.284 
  (0.165) (0.169)  (0.277) (0.281)  (0.321) (0.324) 
          
Obs. 376,482 376,482 376,482 71,763 71,763 71,763 53,951 53,951 53,951 
Note: The dependent variable 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡  (exports/total sales) is a censored variable which takes its real value if the firm has positive exports with no larger than total 
sales (uncensored observations), zero if the firm does not export (left-censored), and 100 for the upper limits (right-censored). Column (1), column (2) and Column (3) 
present results for the coastal region sub-group, the central region sub-group and the western region sub-group, respectively. For each column, cell I presents results for 
the baseline equation, cell II reports results by considering unobserved firm heterogeneity, and results that take account of initial conditions problem are reported in cell 
III. All equations are estimated by pooled Tobit models clustering observations by firms’ ID. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Ownership dummies, 
industry dummies, and year dummies are included in all estimations. Obs. stands for the number of observations. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. 
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5.9 Conclusion  
 
On the one hand, extensive studies have been done to estimate firms’ exporting 
activities; on the other hand, political connections and the benefits they can provide 
have attracted worldwide academic attentions. However, only few studies have looked 
at firms’ exporting activities and political connections from the perspective of state 
ownership. Having experienced almost four decades of economic reform since 1978, 
China has risen as a leading power in the global exporting market. Meanwhile, 
government interventions still play an important part in firms’ development. Therefore, 
it is interesting to look at the links between political connections and firms’ exporting 
activities in the context of China.  
 
I investigate the probability of exporting and the intensity of exporting by examining 
how sunk costs, the lishu relationship, firm observed and unobserved heterogeneity, 
and the initial conditions affect the exporting behaviour of Chinese firms. An 
important feature of this chapter is that I take into account firms’ political affiliation, 
in terms of the lishu relationship. Using a large dataset of Chinese manufacturing firms 
between 2001 and 2007, I find that the sunk entry costs exist in exporting, and that 
previous export status and export ratio play an important role in the current export 
participation and intensity. We also find that firms with a lishu relationship in the 
previous year and over the period have a negative impact on both the propensity and 
intensity of exporting in the current period. Such negative effects are more significant 
for foreign firms compared with private firms, and for firms located in the coastal 
region. Interestingly, when we further divide the firms’ lishu relationship into four 
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different levels, we find that this negative effect is only significant for firms affiliated 
with low or medium levels of government, but insignificant for firms affiliated with 
high level government. We attribute this finding to the fact that high level government 
can obtain scarce exporting opportunities through their external relations with foreign 
governments and prefer to transfer these opportunities to the affiliated firms to 
mitigate the negative influence of the lishu relationship.  
 
We also find that firms with larger size and higher productivity are more likely to 
participate in export markets and export more. As for the financial variables, we find 
that although the lagged leverage ratio is negatively related to the propensity and 
intensity of exporting, over time such negative relationship diminishes and a higher 
leverage ratio is associated with high probability and intensity of exporting. The 
negative coefficients on cash flow/capital ratio may attribute to the size-effects 
(Minetti and Zhu, 2011). Moreover, the size of sunk entry costs of exporting is 
overestimated without proper controlling for the initial conditions problem. We 
correct the unobserved firm heterogeneity and the initial conditions problem by 
adding a vector of means of observed firm characteristics and the initial values.  
 
Our results have some implications for the development of Chinese manufacturing 
firms and policy makers. Firstly, not all firms have the appropriate characteristics to 
become exporters. Participating in foreign markets is always involved in huge sunk 
costs. Therefore, policies aiming to help firms overcome the obstacles of exporting 
should be more effective and helpful in promoting more exporting entrant. The 
governments are advised to provide information about the potential foreign markets 
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to reduce parts of the sunk costs for the potential exporters. Secondly, we find that 
state ownership has a negative and significant impact on firms’ exporting activities. It 
may be considered as a result of the SOEs lacking the capabilities to internationalise. 
Therefore, firms with an exporting plan should avoid collaborating with SOEs or 
holding large state stakes in the firms. Last but not least, we find that affiliation with 
low or medium level of government is negatively associated with firms’ exporting 
activities, while this negative effect diminishes for firms affiliated with high level of 
government. Therefore, firms with an international agenda should try to affiliate with 
high level government, while avoiding the affiliation with low or medium level of 
government. Further research can be done by adopting other estimations such as the 
special regressor estimator proposed by Lewbel (2000). 
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Appendix 5A 
 
Table 5A.1 Definition of the variables used 
 
Variable Definition 
Exp 
a dummy variable which equals to one if the firm exports, and zero 
otherwise 
Expratio ratio of exports to total sales 
PA 
a dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm has a lishu relationship 
and 0 otherwise 
PAV 
an ordinal dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm has no lishu 
relationship, 2 if firm has a lishu relationship with the low level of 
government, 3 if firm affiliated with the medium level of 
government, 4 if firm has a lishu relationship with the high level 
of government 
Total  
Assets 
sum of the firm’s fixed and current assets, where fixed assets 
include tangible fixed assets, intangible fixed assets, and other 
fixed assets; and current assets include inventories, accounts 
receivable, and other current assets 
Size natural logarithm of total real assets 
Leverage 
ratio 
ratio of total debt to total assets 
CFK ratio of cash flow to tangible fixed assets 
TFP 
total factor productivity, calculated using the Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) method, applied separately to different industrial groups 
State 
ownership 
a dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is state-owned and 0 
otherwise 
Foreign 
ownership 
a dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is owned by foreign 
investors (including investors from Hong Kong, Macao, and 
Taiwan) and 0 otherwise 
Coastal 
region 
a dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is located in the coastal 
region in china and 0 otherwise 
Central 
region 
a dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is located in the central 
region in china and 0 otherwise 
Western 
region 
a dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm is located in the western 
region in china and 0 otherwise 
Age a firm’s age is calculated since the year the firm was established 
Deflators 
all variables (except tangible fixed assets) are deflated using 
provincial ex-factory producer price indices (pdsales) taken from 
various issues of the china statistical yearbook. tangible fixed 
assets are deflated using a deflator for fixed capital formation 
(pdgoods) 
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Table 5A.2 The correlation matrix of the main variables 
 
Real 
Assets 
PA PAV Age TFP Leverage CFK 
Real Assets 1.000       
PA 0.079 1.000      
PAV 0.156 0.881 1.000     
Age 0.103 0.290 0.359 1.000    
TFP 0.154 -0.073 -0.073 -0.076 1.000   
Leverage 0.003 0.056 0.055 0.108 -0.212 1.000  
CFK -0.026 -0.061 -0.084 -0.095 0.479 -0.158 1.000 
 
Table 5A.3 Structure of the unbalanced panel 
 
Year No. of Observations Percent Cumulative 
2001 43,187 8.60 8.60 
2002 58,005 11.55 20.15 
2003 71,108 14.16 34.31 
2004 85,698 17.06 51.37 
2005 84,953 16.92 68.29 
2006 82,355 16.40 84.69 
2007 76,890 15.31 100.00 
Total 502,196 100.00  
 
No. of Observations per 
firm 
No. of firms Percent Cumulative 
5 31,061 27.87 27.87 
6 22,939 20.58 48.45 
7 24,109 21.63 70.08 
8 33,351 29.92 100.00 
Total 111,460 100.00  
 
No. of Observations per 
firm 
No. of Observations Percent Cumulative 
5 99,212 19.76 19.76 
6 90,330 17.99 37.74 
7 115,819 23.06 60.81 
8 196,835 39.19 100.00 
Total 502,196 100.00  
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Table 5A.4 The propensity of exporting by ownership (Private firms vs. 
Foreign firms): coefficients 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) 
I II III I  II  III  
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 2.596*** 2.597*** 2.189*** 2.361*** 2.361*** 1.964*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒊𝟏   0.717***   0.669*** 
   (0.010)   (0.017) 
𝑷𝑨𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.072*** 0.012 0.011 -0.094*** 0.008 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.014) (0.004) (0.003) 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.083*** -0.053*** -0.037*** 0.030*** -0.023 -0.033 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.020) (0.021) 
𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.104*** 0.026** 0.015 0.065*** 0.036** 0.037** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.025* -0.146*** -0.141*** -0.069*** -0.066 -0.073 
 (0.014) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.050) (0.051) 
𝐂𝐅𝐊𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.081*** -0.013 -0.018 -0.084*** -0.029 -0.033 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.023) (0.024) 
Coastal Region 0.091*** 0.073*** 0.004*** 0.344*** 0.341*** 0.258*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.030) (0.030) (0.034) 
Western Region -0.214*** -0.212*** -0.242*** -0.003 -0.012 -0.003 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.047) (0.047) (0.053) 
PAi̅̅ ̅̅̅  -0.093*** -0.119***  -0.156*** -0.167*** 
  (0.014) (0.016)  (0.027) (0.029) 
Sizei̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   0.148*** 0.135***  0.055*** 0.066*** 
  (0.010) (0.011)  (0.021) (0.022) 
TFPi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  0.226*** 0.212***  0.055** 0.064** 
  (0.013) (0.014)  (0.023) (0.025) 
Leveragei
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   0.220*** 0.158***  0.169*** 0.156** 
  (0.031) (0.033)  (0.058) (0.062) 
CFKi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  -0.117*** -0.098***  -0.095*** -0.080** 
  (0.020) (0.022)  (0.031) (0.034) 
       
Obs. 324,757 324,757 324,757 83,394 83,394 83,394 
Log likelihood -83,154 -82,860 -80,009 -26,544 -26,515 -25,555 
Note: The dependent variable 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡  is a binary variable which equals to one if the firm exports, and 
zero otherwise. Column (1) and Column (2) present results for PEs sub-group and FEs sub-group, 
respectively. PEs and FEs refer to private enterprises and foreign enterprises. For each column, cell I 
presents results for the baseline equation, cell II reports results by considering unobserved firm 
heterogeneity, and results that take account of initial conditions problem are reported in cell III. All 
equations are estimated by pooled Probit models clustering observations by firms’ ID. Robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. Regional dummies, industry dummies, and year dummies are included 
in all estimations. Obs. stands for the number of observations. Log likelihood is the log likelihood of the 
fitted model. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5A.5 The intensity of exporting by ownership (Private firms vs. 
Foreign firms): coefficients 
 
Variables 
(1)           (2) 
I II III I  II  III  
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 1.349*** 1.348*** 1.131*** 0.993*** 0.991*** 0.924*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝟏   0.272***   0.252*** 
   (0.006)   (0.007) 
𝑷𝑨𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -1.617*** 0.341 0.322 -2.223*** 0.229 0.195 
 (0.229) (0.293) (0.283) (0.276) (0.386) (0.371) 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 4.439*** 0.264 0.579** 0.403*** 0.417 0.408 
 (0.093) (0.178) (0.259) (0.112) (0.398) (0.384) 
𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 3.879*** 0.274 0.502* 0.963*** 0.697** 0.747** 
 (0.220) (0.283) (0.272) (0.241) (0.334) (0.321) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.481 -4.601*** -4.046*** -1.460*** -2.280** -2.359** 
 (0.454) (0.721) (0.693) (0.505) (1.027) (0.988) 
𝐂𝐅𝐊𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -2.641*** -0.218 -0.310 -1.126*** -0.021 -0.117 
 (0.320) (0.404) (0.390) (0.321) (0.459) (0.440) 
Coastal Region 3.955*** 3.516*** 2.761*** 10.050*** 10.022*** 8.412*** 
 (0.358) (0.360) (0.371) (0.962) (0.962) (0.996) 
Western Region -8.225*** -8.194*** -8.232*** -1.096 -0.824 -0.890 
 (0.570) (0.571) (0.577) (1.494) (1.495) (1.540) 
PAi̅̅ ̅̅̅  -1.883*** -2.088***  -3.437*** -3.278*** 
  (0.430) (0.435)  (0.539) (0.547) 
Sizei̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   4.573*** 4.282***  0.852** 0.983** 
  (0.284) (0.283)  (0.438) (0.433) 
TFPi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  6.183*** 5.583***  0.491*** 0.592*** 
  (0.413) (0.416)  (0.468) (0.478) 
Leveragei
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   6.951*** 5.069***  4.892*** 4.185*** 
  (0.931) (0.931)  (1.197) (1.201) 
CFKi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  -4.192*** -3.802***  -1.881*** -1.374** 
  (0.614) (0.626)  (0.616) (0.631) 
       
Obs. 324,757 324,757 324,757 83,394 83,394 83,394 
Log likelihood -476,712 -476373 -473941 -295103 -295065 -293634 
Uncensored 82,564 82564 82564 57713 57713 57713 
Left-censored 242,193 242193 242193 25681 25681 25681 
Right-censored 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: The dependent variable 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡  (exports/total sales) is a censored variable which takes its real 
value if the firm has positive exports with no larger than total sales (uncensored observations), zero if the 
firm does not export (left-censored), and 100 for the upper limits (right-censored). . Column (1) and 
Column (2) present results for PEs sub-group and FEs sub-group, respectively. PEs and FEs refer to 
private enterprises and foreign enterprises. For each column, cell I presents results for the baseline 
equation, cell II reports results by considering unobserved firm heterogeneity, and results that take 
account of initial conditions problem are reported in cell III. All equations are estimated by pooled Tobit 
models clustering observations by firms’ ID. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Regional 
dummies, industry dummies, and year dummies are included in all estimations. Obs. stands for the 
number of observations. Log likelihood is the log likelihood of the fitted model. *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 5A.6 The propensity of exporting by region: coefficients 
 
Variables    (1)     (2)     (3) 
 I II III I  II  III  I  II  III  
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 2.616*** 2.615*** 2.191*** 2.374*** 2.371*** 1.988*** 2.789*** 2.783*** 2.343*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.031) (0.031) (0.037) 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒊𝟏   0.698***   0.863***   0.798*** 
   (0.009)   (0.028)   (0.038) 
𝑷𝑨𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.115*** 0.012 0.018 -0.056*** -0.068*** -0.075*** -0.003 0.021 0.020 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.037) (0.037) 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.078*** -0.042*** -0.028*** 0.064*** -0.095*** -0.086*** 0.138*** -0.019 -0.009 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.022) (0.023) (0.009) (0.033) (0.035) 
𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.106*** 0.003 0.008 0.053*** 0.036* 0.024 0.059*** 0.024 0.032 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.032) (0.032) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.029** -0.096*** -0.090*** -0.073** -0.154*** -0.176*** -0.001 -0.034 -0.066 
 (0.013) (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.055) (0.056) (0.000) (0.081) (0.083) 
𝐂𝐅𝐊𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.096*** -0.004 -0.002 -0.018 -0.070* -0.073** -0.003* -0.172*** -0.167*** 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.025) (0.036) (0.036) (0.001) (0.059) (0.060) 
State Ownership -0.214*** -0.162*** -0.176*** -0.138*** -0.121*** -0.130*** -0.291*** -0.171*** -0.238*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.054) (0.034) (0.041) 
Foreign Ownership 0.428*** 0.420*** 0.327*** 0.324*** 0.320*** 0.227*** 0.296*** 0.376*** 0.311*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.033) (0.034) (0.040) (0.060) (0.042) (0.051) 
PAi̅̅ ̅̅̅  -0.193*** -0.227***  -0.022 -0.038  -0.062* -0.082* 
  (0.013) (0.014)  (0.031) (0.033)  (0.046) (0.050) 
Sizei̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   0.130*** 0.119***  0.177*** 0.161***  0.175*** 0.138*** 
  (0.009) (0.010)  (0.023) (0.024)  (0.035) (0.037) 
TFPi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  0.177*** 0.172***  0.132*** 0.106***  0.044 0.063 
  (0.012) (0.013)  (0.027) (0.029)  (0.041) (0.044) 
Leveragei
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   0.122*** 0.079***  0.164** 0.178***  0.052 0.126 
  (0.029) (0.030)  (0.065) (0.068)  (0.096) (0.102) 
CFKi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  -0.170*** -0.152***  -0.173*** -0.235***  -0.063 -0.012 
  (0.017) (0.018)  (0.046) (0.048)  (0.073) (0.081) 
          
Obs. 376,482 376,482 376,482 71,763 71,763 71,763 53,951 53,951 53,951 
Log likelihood -101,028 -100,696 -97,112 -17,010 -16,942 -16,319 -7,815 -7,816 -7,525 
Note: The dependent variable 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 is a binary variable which equals to one if the firm exports, and zero otherwise. Column (1), column (2) and Column (3) present results for the coastal 
region sub-group, the central region sub-group and the western region sub-group, respectively. For each column, cell I presents results for the baseline equation, cell II reports results by 
considering unobserved firm heterogeneity, and results that take account of initial conditions problem are reported in cell III. All equations are estimated by pooled Probit models clustering 
observations by firms’ ID. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Ownership dummies, industry dummies, and year dummies are included in all estimations. Obs. stands for the 
number of observations. Log likelihood is the log likelihood of the fitted model. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5A.7 The intensity of exporting by region: coefficients 
 
Variables    (1)     (2)     (3) 
 I II III I II III I II III 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 1.212*** 1.212*** 1.010*** 1.395*** 1.399*** 1.172*** 1.444*** 1.445*** 1.199*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝟏   0.251***   0.302***   0.309*** 
   (0.004)   (0.019)   (0.025) 
𝑷𝑨𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -2.806*** 0.163 0.170 -1.239** -1.573** -1.679** -0.194 0.297 0.477 
 (0.180) (0.240) (0.231) (0.518) (0.678) (0.657) (0.624) (0.793) (0.762) 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 3.304*** 0.379* 0.652*** 3.617*** 1.287* 0.987 6.281*** 1.423* 1.693** 
 (0.074) (0.219) (0.214) (0.220) (0.664) (0.653) (0.275) (0.781) (0.765) 
𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 3.359*** 0.531** 0.680*** 2.357*** 0.161 0.406 1.483*** 0.889 0.966 
 (0.166) (0.220) (0.211) (0.441) (0.587) (0.568) (0.552) (0.705) (0.677) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.370 -2.107*** -1.797*** -2.982*** -7.043*** -6.733*** -1.424 -2.965* -2.905* 
 (0.346) (0.594) (0.569) (0.966) (1.586) (1.540) (1.252) (1.754) (1.687) 
𝐂𝐅𝐊𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -2.592*** -0.067 -0.041 -1.678** -0.657 -0.769 -1.836* -2.511** -2.400** 
 (0.229) (0.301) (0.289) (0.737) (0.971) (0.933) (1.053) (1.190) (1.155) 
State Ownership -6.507*** -5.239*** -4.993*** -4.016*** -3.652*** -3.706*** -3.156*** -2.917*** -2.888*** 
 (0.641) (0.647) (0.648) (0.965) (0.991) (0.996) (1.007) (1.039) (1.057) 
Foreign Ownership 10.336*** 10.174*** 8.160*** 8.813*** 8.733*** 7.409*** 8.963*** 8.766*** 7.691*** 
 (0.205) (0.209) (0.226) (1.076) (1.090) (1.189) (1.188) (1.197) (1.334) 
PAi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  -4.498*** -4.611***  -0.510 -0.750  -0.209 -0.690 
  (0.340) (0.343)  (0.980) (0.984)  (1.185) (1.202) 
Sizei̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   3.108*** 2.938***  5.396*** 5.100***  5.221*** 4.954*** 
  (0.234) (0.232)  (0.709) (0.702)  (0.836) (0.825) 
TFPi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  4.813*** 4.504***  3.220*** 2.600***  0.418 0.277 
  (0.315) (0.318)  (0.842) (0.847)  (1.036) (1.051) 
Leveragei
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   4.130*** 3.341***  7.014*** 6.128***  1.821 2.507 
  (0.735) (0.737)  (2.040) (2.025)  (2.314) (2.338) 
CFKi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  -4.517*** -3.972***  -4.654*** -5.060***  -1.814 -1.629 
  (0.439) (0.448)  (1.392) (1.410)  (1.844) (1.858) 
          
Obs. 376,482 376,482 376,482 71,763 71,763 71,763 53,951 53,951 53,951 
Log likelihood -768,016 -767,615 -763,624 -65,806 -65,736 -65,429 -36,477 -36,452 -36,211 
Uncensored 139,864 139,864 139,864 10,720 10,720 10,720 6,173 6,173 6,173 
Left-censored 236,618 236,618 236,618 61,043 61,043 61,043 47,778 47,778 47,778 
Right-censored 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: The dependent variable 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡  (exports/total sales) is a censored variable which takes its real value if the firm has positive exports with no larger than total sales 
(uncensored observations), zero if the firm does not export (left-censored), and 100 for the upper limits (right-censored). Column (1), column (2) and Column (3) present 
results for the coastal region sub-group, the central region sub-group and the western region sub-group, respectively. For each column, cell I presents results for the baseline 
equation, cell II reports results by considering unobserved firm heterogeneity, and results that take account of initial conditions problem are reported in cell III. All equations 
are estimated by pooled Tobit models clustering observations by firms’ ID. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Ownership dummies, industry dummies, and 
year dummies are included in all estimations. Obs. stands for the number of observations. Log likelihood is the log likelihood of the fitted model. *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5A.8 The propensity of exporting (random-effects Probit model) 
 
Variables  (1)  (2) (3) 
 Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 2.571*** 0.350*** 2.573*** 0.350*** 1.507*** 0.138*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒊𝟏     1.965*** 0.179*** 
     (0.023) (0.000) 
𝑷𝑨𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.097*** -0.013*** 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.079*** 0.011*** -0.050*** -0.007*** -0.060*** -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.010) (0.003) 
𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.095*** 0.013*** -0.005 -0.001 0.042*** 0.004*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.036*** -0.005*** -0.094*** -0.013*** -0.091*** -0.008*** 
 (0.012) (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.027) (0.000) 
𝐂𝐅𝐊𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.083*** -0.011*** -0.013 -0.002*** -0.047*** -0.004*** 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) 
State Ownership -0.179*** -0.024*** -0.138*** -0.019*** -0.274*** -0.025*** 
 (0.014) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) 
Foreign Ownership 0.426*** 0.058*** 0.417*** 0.057*** 0.572*** 0.052*** 
 (0.007) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) 
Coastal Region 0.099*** 0.013*** 0.084*** 0.011*** 0.036** 0.003*** 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) 
Western Region -0.188*** -0.026*** -0.186*** -0.025*** -0.429*** -0.039*** 
 (0.013) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) 
PAi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   -0.154*** -0.021*** -0.281*** -0.026*** 
   (0.012) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) 
Sizei̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    0.140*** 0.019*** 0.090*** 0.008*** 
   (0.009) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) 
TFPi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   0.167*** 0.023*** 0.194*** 0.018*** 
   (0.011) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) 
Leveragei
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    0.113*** 0.015*** 0.077** 0.007*** 
   (0.026) (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) 
CFKi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   -0.114*** -0.016*** -0.094*** -0.009*** 
   (0.016) (0.000) (0.024) (0.000) 
Obs. 502,196 502,196 502,196 502,196 502,196 502,196 
Log likelihood -127,999  -127,622  -120,143  
Note: The dependent variable 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡  is a binary variable which equals to one if the firm exports, and 
zero otherwise. Column (1) presents results for the baseline equation. Column (2) reports results by 
considering unobserved firm heterogeneity. Results that take account of initial conditions problem are 
reported in column (3). All equations are estimated by random-effects Probit models. Coefficients 
(Coeff.) and marginal effects (ME) are presented for each equation. Robust standard errors are shown 
in parentheses. Ownership dummies, regional dummies, industry dummies, and year dummies are 
included in all estimations. Obs. stands for the number of observations. Log likelihood is the log 
likelihood of the fitted model. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
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Table 5A.9 The intensity of exporting (random-effects Tobit model) 
 
Variables  (1)  (2) (3) 
 Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 0.786*** 0.238*** 0.785*** 0.238*** 0.394*** 0.121*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝟏     0.855*** 0.263*** 
     (0.005) (0.001) 
𝑷𝑨𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -2.259*** -0.684*** 0.112 0.034 0.102 0.031 
 (0.187) (0.057) (0.218) (0.066) (0.201) (0.062) 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 2.794*** 0.846*** 1.233*** 0.374*** 2.189*** 0.673*** 
 (0.101) (0.031) (0.196) (0.060) (0.181) (0.056) 
𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 2.291*** 0.694*** 1.051*** 0.319*** 1.409*** 0.433*** 
 (0.164) (0.050) (0.188) (0.057) (0.173) (0.053) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -0.186 -0.056 -1.112** -0.337** -0.334 -0.103 
 (0.388) (0.117) (0.506) (0.153) (0.467) (0.144) 
𝐂𝐅𝐊𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) -1.855*** -0.562*** -0.522** -0.158** -0.757*** -0.233*** 
 (0.232) (0.070) (0.263) (0.080) (0.242) (0.075) 
State Ownership -10.868*** -3.291*** -7.755*** -2.351*** -12.846*** -3.951*** 
 (0.623) (0.189) (0.642) (0.195) (0.892) (0.274) 
Foreign Ownership 30.464*** 9.225*** 29.654*** 8.991*** 10.785*** 3.317*** 
 (0.361) (0.106) (0.369) (0.109) (0.711) (0.219) 
Coastal Region 11.468*** 3.473*** 10.394*** 3.152*** 4.350*** 1.338*** 
 (0.411) (0.124) (0.411) (0.124) (0.409) (0.126) 
Western Region -10.800*** -3.270*** -10.774*** -3.267*** -11.810*** -3.633*** 
 (0.612) (0.185) (0.609) (0.184) (0.608) (0.187) 
PAi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   -8.528*** -2.586*** -4.962*** -1.526*** 
   (0.411) (0.124) (0.426) (0.131) 
Sizei̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    2.275*** 0.690*** 2.377*** 0.731*** 
   (0.231) (0.070) (0.218) (0.067) 
TFPi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   4.323*** 1.311*** 3.167*** 0.974*** 
   (0.361) (0.110) (0.354) (0.109) 
Leveragei
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    4.650*** 1.410*** 1.775** 0.546** 
   (0.802) (0.243) (0.789) (0.243) 
CFKi̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   -4.336*** -1.315*** -1.249** -0.384** 
   (0.522) (0.158) (0.527) (0.162) 
       
Obs. 502,196 502,196 502,196 502,196   502,196 502,196 
Log likelihood -860926  -860543  -840536  
Uncensored 156,757  156,757  156,757  
Left-censored 345,439  345,439  345,439  
Right-censored 0  0  0  
Note: The dependent variable 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡  (exports/total sales) is a censored variable which takes its 
real value if the firm has positive exports with no larger than total sales (uncensored observations), zero 
if the firm does not export (left-censored), and 100 for the upper limits (right-censored). Column (1) 
presents results for the baseline equation. Column (2) reports results by considering unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. Results that take account of initial conditions problem are reported in column (3). All 
equations are estimated by random-effects Tobit models. Coefficients (Coeff.) and marginal effects 
(ME) are presented for each equation. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Ownership 
dummies, regional dummies, industry dummies, and year dummies are included in all estimations. Obs. 
stands for the number of observations. Log likelihood is the log likelihood of the fitted model. *, **, 
*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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CHAPTER 6 POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND FINANCIAL 
CONSTRAINTS 
 
In this chapter, we examine the extent to which political connections, intended as the 
lishu relationship, affect the financial constraints using 105,487 unlisted Chinese 
manufacturing firms over the period 2002-2007. We document that Chinese firms face 
financial constraints, which is indicated by the high sensitivity of investment to the 
availability of internal financing. We also find that compared with private firms, 
foreign firms are more likely to encounter financial constraints; therefore, the lishu 
relationship can reduce their financial constraints significantly. Furthermore, firms 
locating in the western region have the least significant sensitivity of investment to 
the availability of internal financing due to the implement of the regional development 
policies. However, the lishu relationship can help firms in the central and coastal 
regions alleviate their financial constraints.    
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
For private firms, the possession of resource and sufficient financing represents a 
crucial competitive edge. According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), a firm’s 
investment decisions are not affected by their financing decisions on perfect capital 
markets. Capital markets, however, are not perfect and the imperfections create a 
wedge between the costs of internal funds and external funds. Due to asymmetric 
information and agency problems, firms face higher costs of external financing. 
Therefore, firms are considered financially constrained when their investments are 
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sensitive to internal funds. Put another way, firms facing higher imperfections 
experience a wider difference between internal and external financing, and therefore 
are more financially constrained.   
 
There is considerable evidence that financial constraints are an impediment to the 
efficient allocation of credit for corporate investments and therefore to the growth of 
firms, and hence the economy (Stein, 2003; Hubbard, 1998; King and Levin, 1993). 
Some studies focus on a) the relationship between financial constraints and firms’ 
characteristics, such as size, age, and business group affiliation, b) the links between 
financial constraints and firms’ activities, such as acquisitions, and c) the connection 
between financial constraints and institutional environment, such as the legal and 
financial systems that affect their financial constraints (for example, Hadlock and 
Pierce, 2010; Lensinka et al., 2003; Erel et al., 2015; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
1998). Few studies examine the relationship between firms’ political connections and 
financial constraints.  
 
The impact of political connections on firm financial constraints can be categorised 
into two groups. The first group focuses on the “direct effect”, which indicates that 
governments provide more preferential treatment and assistance, such as the extended 
welfare terms to the connected firms directly. Faccio (2010) states that politically 
connected firms find it easier to access governmental support when the International 
Monetary Fund or the World Bank provides financial assistance to domestic firms. 
Bartels and Brady (2003) find that private enterprises that have political connections 
with local government are able to receive more financial subsidies.  
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The second group focuses on the “indirect effect”, which considers political 
connections as a middle power between firms and financing institutions, like banks. 
Through the indirect effect, political connections can bring favourable loan terms to 
the connected firms. According to Faccio (2006), enterprises with political 
connections can access more bank loans and more preferential interest and tax rates 
than those without political connections.1 Boubakri et al. (2008) also show that the 
costs of equity financing for firms with political connections are lower than that for 
the firms without such ties. Similar results have been found in developing countries, 
such as Malaysia and Pakistan. Johnson and Mittion (2003) and Khwaja and Mian 
(2005) assert that politically connected firms can receive more loans than unconnected 
firms.  
 
Whilst most of the literature that looked at the links between political connections and 
financial constraints focused on developed countries, some literature focused on 
developing countries. However, the definitions of political connections and the 
impacts on enterprises are different between China and other countries due to the 
different political regime. In addition, among the developing countries, financial 
market imperfections are considered to be very pronounced in China for the following 
three reasons.  
 
                                               
1 Faccio (2006) looked at 47 countries covered by the Worldscope database, which provides full 
coverage of developed markets. These 47 countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Rep., Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South 
Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, the US, the UK, Venezuela, 
and Zimbabwe.  
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First, the development of market-supporting institutions does not match the rapid 
growth of the economy. Private entrepreneurs face many barriers in running their 
businesses because the weak state, financial markets, and legal system cannot 
appropriately secure property rights and enforce contracts (Hay and Shleifer, 1998; 
McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Frye and Zhuravskaia, 2000). Second, although 
private firms are growing fast and the private sector has stimulated most of China’s 
economic growth since the 1980s (Allen et al., 2005), the state sector is favoured by 
the government in China. Crucial industries, including national security, civil aviation, 
finance, natural resources, and real estate, are still dominated by state-owned firms 
(SOEs).1 Third, by law, the state banks, which were the largest Chinese banks, were 
instructed not to lend to private enterprises until 1997, suggesting that private 
enterprises did not have high rank in terms of political status at that time. Due to the 
lingering legacy of the centrally-planned economy, capital allocation in China has 
been characterised by government intervention. The state controls the primary 
resources and the financial system, and a bias exists in favour of the state-owned firms 
(Brandt and Li, 2003; Bai et al., 2006; Li et al., 2008; Cull et al., 2009, 2014; Gordon 
and Li, 2011). Huang (2003) considers this lending bias as a “political pecking order” 
in the Chinese capital market. 
 
Moreover, insufficient financing support may set up obstacles to the development of 
firms that lack political connections. According to Johnson et al. (2000), McMillan 
                                               
1 In the fourth Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee in September 1999, it was proposed by 
The Decisions of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Regarding the Reform and 
Development of State-owned Enterprises and other Important Issues (zhong gong zhong yang guan yu 
guo you qi ye gai ge he fa zhan ruo gan zhong da wen ti de jue ding). This phenomenon is called as 
Guo Jin Min Tui in Chinese since 2002, which means that the state advances and the private sector 
recedes.  
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and Woodruff (2002), and Guriev (2004), private firms are often rejected access to 
bank loans, which are largely reserved for the state-owned firms, or suffer from heavy 
governmental regulations (red tape) and extra legal fees. Farrell and Lund (2006) 
report that the private sector had produced more than half of China’s GDP by 2006 
but the loans they received only account for 27% of total loans. Dollar and Wei (2007) 
also point out that the distorted credit allocation has led to the continued uneven 
distribution in the return to capital on the grounds of firm ownership, regions, and 
industrial sectors. 
 
Although the “political pecking order” in the allocation of resource where private 
firms were discriminated has been alleviated since 1997, credit constraints on private 
firms still exist and may hinder the growth of the Chinese economy. Therefore, this 
research contributes to the literature in the following ways.  
 
Firstly, the Chinese economy is a particularly interesting setting due to its 
heterogeneity. Firms in developing countries are more likely to face severer financial 
constraints than those in developed countries, and firm owners typically consider 
financial constraints as one of their key obstacles to invest and develop (Dethier et al., 
2011). Given the noticeable imperfections in the Chinese capital market, China is an 
ideal pilot region to test the financial constraints hypothesis and the extent to which 
political connections can alleviate these constraints.  
 
Secondly, the existing studies examining the financial constraints hypothesis for 
Chinese firms are based on the datasets containing relatively small numbers of firms, 
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which do not represent the whole population of Chinese firms, and are likely to suffer 
from sample selection bias. For example, Chow and Fung (1998, 2000) use a dataset 
from the Shanghai Economic Commission that includes 5,325 manufacturing firms in 
32 manufacturing industries of Shanghai from 1989 to 1992. Héricourt and Poncet 
(2009) use a dataset of 1,300 companies over the period 2000-2002, taken from the 
World Bank’s 2003 Investment Climate Survey. Poncet et al. (2010) use firm-level 
data originating from the Oriana dataset, which contains 14,967 firms over the period 
1998-2005. Cull et al. (2014) use a dataset from the World Bank 120 city survey 
covering 12,400 firms in 2005. By contrast, our paper uses a very large dataset, 
compiled by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics from 2002 to 2007, which 
includes 105,487 unlisted manufacturing firms, summing up to 356,053 observations. 
This dataset contains a large proportion of small and young firms that are more prone 
to suffer from liquidity constraints. It therefore provides a unique opportunity to carry 
out sharper tests of the financial constraints than those typically performed in the 
literature.  
 
Although a series of studies conducted by Guariglia apply the same dataset, they do 
not test the relationship between political connections and financial constraints. For 
example, Chen and Guariglia (2013) look at the link between internal financial 
constraints and firm-level productivity, Ding et al. (2013) analyse the relation between 
investment in fixed and working capital and financial constraints, Guariglia et al. 
(2008, 2011) investigate the extent to which the internal financial constraints affect 
firms’ asset growth, Guariglia and Liu (2014) examine the relationship between 
financial constraints and firms’ innovation activities, and Guariglia and Mateut (2013) 
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explore the linkage between political affiliation and trade credit extension by Chinese 
firms. To the best of our knowledge, the hypothesis of the linkage between political 
connections and financial constraints, measured by investment-cash flow sensitivity, 
has never been tested using such a comprehensive dataset.  
 
Thirdly, the existing studies are almost based on the data from firms quoted on the 
stock market. However, financial constraints on these listed firms tend to be weaker 
as they are typically large, financially healthy, and long-established enterprises with 
good credit ratings, compared with the unlisted firms. A sharper test of financial 
constraints should be done from unquoted firms, which are generally considered as a 
short track record, poor solvency, and low real assets compared with their counterparts. 
Although few studies have examined the financial constraints hypotheses in unlisted 
firms (for instance, Chen and Guariglia, 2013; Ding et al., 2013; Guariglia et al., 2008, 
2011; Guariglia and Liu, 2014; Guariglia and Mateut, 2013), again, these studies do 
not focus on the extent to which political connections can affect financial constraints. 
Therefore, this paper attempts to shed light on the tests of the hypothesis of political 
connections and financial constraints by using unlisted firms in China. 
  
Finally, although political connections have attracted worldwide academic interest, 
China is characterised by a type of political connection which does not exist in other 
parts of the world.1 This unique political connection is called the lishu relationship, 
                                               
1 In other parts of the world, politically connected firms are typically defined in five ways. Firstly, at 
least one of the large shareholders who controlling 10% or more of the company’s voting rights directly 
or indirectly is a politician (e.g. a national congress member, a government minister, or a head of state) 
(Faccio, 2002, 2006, 2007 and 2010). Secondly, at least one of the company’s top officers (e.g. the 
CEO, president or chairman) is a politician (Faccio et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2010). A company, which 
is closely related to a top politician or a political party leader through friendship, family members, and 
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which is an institutional variation during the economic transition in China. Lishu is a 
Chinese word which means “belonging to”, “subordinate to”, or “directly controlled 
by”. Through this relationship, the governments can maintain administrative power to 
control various aspects of the firm both directly and legally (Tan et al., 2007; Li, 2004). 
In addition to the control perspectives, the firms with the lishu relationship can get 
governmental support and subsidies (Tan et al., 2007). As the non-state ownership is 
growing in China, having the lishu relationship is an important route through which 
the firm can be connected with the government. There is hardly any research on the 
relationship between financial health and political connections intended as the lishu 
relationship. Our research will therefore focus, for the first time, on financial 
constraints for unlisted firms through the perspective of the lishu relationship. 
 
In this chapter, we document that the investments for unlisted firms are constrained 
by the accessibility of the firms’ internal funds. Firms that locate in the coastal region 
are more financially constrained. However, through the lishu relationship with the 
government, these financial constraints can be reduced for affiliated firms. Such a 
mitigating effect is more significant for firms affiliated with a high level of 
government.   
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 endeavours to provide a 
                                               
relationships with foreign politicians falls into the third type (Faccio, 2002; Gul, 2006; Faccio et al., 
2006; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). The fourth group includes firms with state ownership 
(Boardman and Vining, 1989; Belka et al., 1995; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001). The final kind of 
connection is established by campaign contribution, which refers to a relationship between a firm and 
an election candidate. That is, a firm, having supported an election candidate in the campaign, will in 
return gain favours from the politician (Claessens et al., 2008; Goldman et al., 2009; Cooper et al., 
2010).  
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comprehensive review of the related existing literature on financial constraints and 
political connections and propose our hypotheses. Baseline specification and 
methodology are described in section 6.3. Section 6.4 describes the data sample and 
summary statistics. In section 6.5, our empirical results are presented. Section 6.6 
presents further tests. Section 6.7 concludes this chapter.  
 
6.2 Literature review and hypotheses 
 
This chapter analyses the following four streams of literature: the background of 
financial constraints, the debate on indicators of financial constraints, financial 
constraints in China, and the impact of political connections on firms’ financial 
constraints.  
 
6.2.1 The background of financial constraints 
 
Financial constraints have received intensive academic interest. In the perfect world 
with frictionless capital markets proposed by Modigliani and Miller (1958), a firm’s 
value is irrelevant to its capital structure, which is the way that a firm is financed, 
because the internal financing and external financing can substitute each other 
perfectly. That is, a firm’s investment only relies on the profitability of this investment 
project and a firm can make the investment decisions independently. Although this 
theory has been the foundation of corporate investment analysis, it does not exist in 
the real world. Researchers and scholars have theoretically and empirically identified 
a variety of frictions and distortions that prevent firms from making investment 
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decisions optimally and independently.  
 
Information asymmetries and agency problems are two major types of frictions. They 
will arise when managers are better informed than outside investors or when managers 
have inside information about the firm but not about the market or the economy 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). Information asymmetries are a fact of life and difficult to 
diminish due to the following three perspectives.  
 
First of all, it is hard for a firm to only disclose proprietary information to investors 
and financiers without revealing it to competitors (Myers and Majluf, 1984). In order 
to illustrate the true value of a project, the firm has to provide sufficient verifiable 
details to the lenders, rather than only saying, for example, “we have a fantastic 
investment plan, but we cannot tell you the details for confidential reasons”. However, 
making a public investment project will in most cases let the firm’s competitors gain 
the confidential information which they have not known. The leakage of confidential 
information to the public or to the competitors can be catastrophic and disastrous as 
the competitors may act as a free rider to take unfair advantage of others’ hard work. 
The proposed investment can also be jeopardised by competitors as they may steal the 
idea.  
 
Secondly, it is costly to convey all the information to the market (Myers and Majluf, 
1984; Campbell, 1979). The investors’ and lenders’ information disadvantages are 
reflected not only through the fact that investors obtain fewer facts than the managers, 
but also through how to process and understand this information. As outsiders of a 
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firm, investors and lenders always do not have a better understanding on what the 
information means for the firm and what should (not) be done, when compared with 
the managers, who are the insiders of a firm. Therefore, the costs of providing and 
verifying the information are very high because educating investors and lenders 
always involved substantial time and labour capital inputs.  
 
Finally, under most situations, there is no need to convey proprietary information to 
investors as it is difficult to require an outside investor to have the equal understanding 
and intelligence as managers do. Therefore, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that the 
asymmetric information is created naturally because of the separation of professionals 
(managers) from others (investors, lenders, or public).  
 
Ross (1973, p.134) points out that the agency relationship is “one of the oldest and 
common codified modes of social interaction”. He defines the agency relationship as 
an interaction between two or more parties, with one assigned as agent or as 
representative, acting on behalf of another or the other part(ies), which is (are) the 
principal. Furthermore, Gjesdal (1982, p.373) shows that “the principal-agent 
relationship is arisen when corporate decisions are made by managers or individuals 
(agents) on behalf of the firm’s capital suppliers (principals) in firms, without 
considering how principals can be affected by these decisions”. For example, when 
the top managers aim at obtaining greater wages and bonuses, they may tend to make 
decisions which can improve the company’s performance in the short term, but can 
cause some problems in the long term. Obviously, these decisions will not be approved 
by shareholders. In this situation, agency costs appear as the corporate decisions are 
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made by agents on behalf of the shareholders.   
  
Moral hazard and adverse selection are the two forms of information asymmetries and 
agency problems. Adverse selection arises at the earliest stage of financing. As it is 
difficult to observe the risk of a project for the lenders in front of a group of firms that 
need external finance, they cannot distinguish a good borrower from a bad one and 
price correctly according to good and bad borrowers respectively (Hyytinen and 
Väänänen, 2006; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The lenders therefore can only grant 
financing at a higher rate that compensates them for losses if the firm turns out to be 
bad. When the interest rate increases, some good borrowers may withdraw from the 
market, increasing the probability of default of loans-making. As a consequence, the 
expected benefits of lenders will decrease. Moral hazard occurs after the lender 
provides a firm with external financing. The firm may take activities that jeopardise 
the repayment or use this financing for other purposes instead of the indicated purpose. 
From the viewpoint of the lenders, the owner of the firm may be prone to accept more 
risky investments or work less hard (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).   
 
Due to the friction, financial constraints and preference for financing exist in the 
reality. According to the Pecking Order Model and the Trade-off Theory, the first 
choice of a company is internal financing, followed by issuing debt and equity (Myers, 
1984). Financial constraints refer to the friction that makes firms unable to finance all 
investment they want to, including assets illiquidity, heavy dependence on bank loans, 
and difficulty in borrowing (Lamont et al., 2001). These capital market imperfections 
may have a significant influence on firms’ behaviour and their growth. 
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6.2.2 Controversy on measures of financial constraints 
 
A long debate on whether the sensitivity of firm’s investment to their cash flow should 
be considered as an indicator of financial constraints has initiated since Fazzari, 
Hubbard, and Petersen (FHP hereafter) published their ground-breaking work in 1988.  
 
6.2.2.1 Evidence of financial constraints  
 
FHP (1988) use annual data on 421 manufacturing firms over the period 1970-1984 
constructed from the Value Line database and examine the importance of a financing 
hierarchy caused by capital market imperfections, i.e. asymmetric information. The 
authors test whether the determinants of investments are the same for firms with 
similar costs between internal financing and external financing and firms with a 
remarkable financing hierarchy by modifying a model of firm financial and 
investment decisions taken from the public finance literature. 
 
FHP point out that the different tax treatments to capital gains and dividends generate 
the differences in the costs of internal and external financing. That is, external funds 
are more expensive than internal funds because dividends are taxed higher than capital 
gains. Hence, the authors use firms’ average retention ratios to identify firms that 
faced financial constraints. This logic can be explained as follows. Suppose that the 
cost disadvantage of external finance is small (e.g. only issue costs), the retention 
behaviour should contain little or no information about firm’s investment behaviour 
or its q value. Therefore, firms would just choose the external finance to support their 
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investment when internal finance fluctuates. On the other hand, if a prominent 
financing hierarchy exists, then the costs of external funding are higher than that of 
internal funding because of the information costs, tax treatment, or transaction. In this 
case, choosing external finance by paying considerable dividends would not be a 
valuable decision to fund investment opportunities. Therefore, if financial constraints 
exist, the constrained firms will have a different investment to cash flow sensitivity 
compared with non-constrained firms. That is, the investment of firms that reserve all 
or almost all of their earnings will prone to be more sensitive to cash flow than that of 
the high dividend payout ratio firms.  
 
Specifically, they classify firms into four categories according to the payout ratios 
from Class 1 to Class 4 in decreasing the likelihood of facing financial constraints. 
They regard Class 1 firms as those facing binding financial constraints, which retained 
95% of their income and paid an average dividend of 35%. In this group, they find 
that most firms do not pay any dividend for the first 7-10 years and a small dividend 
in the rest of the sample period. In particular, around 41% of total firms in Class 1 
never pay a dividend over the entire sample period even though these firms are 
profitable. The average retention ratio (percentage of years with positive dividend) for 
Class 2, Class 3, and Class 4 are 85%, 68%, and 34% (83%, 98%, and 99%), 
respectively.  
 
In their empirical tests, FHP estimate a model with both Q and cash flow included 
under the framework of the q-theory of investment as below: 
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where I is the investment, K represents the replacement value of the capital stock at 
the beginning of the sample period, CF is firms’ available cash flow, 𝛼 is the normal 
value of (
𝐼
𝐾
)𝑖, and 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is a white noise error term . Q is Tobin’s Q at the beginning of 
the period after being adjusted for personal and corporate tax. The authors find that 
investment is approximately three times more sensitive to cash flow in Class 1 (firms 
with low-dividend payout ratio) compared with Class 3 and 4, suggesting that cash 
flow tends to affect the investment significantly in financially constrained firms.  
 
A number of papers followed FHP’s research, supporting their main conclusion not 
only from the perspectives of investment behaviour, 1  but also from inventory 
investment,2 R&D investment,3 employment decisions, and growth.4 
 
6.2.2.2 Conflicting views 
 
An important challenge to FHP’s (1988) work came from Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
(hereafter KZ (1997)). They focus on the 49 low-dividend paying firms (i.e. Class 1) 
                                               
1 For example, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Carpenter and Guariglia (2008) point out that 
firms’ investment-cash flow sensitivity is significant for financially constrained firms.  
2 For firms without access to external finance markets, their inventory investment is significantly 
constrained by their internal funding because of the low adjustment costs of inventory investment. That 
is, those firms have to reduce their inventory investment if they do not have enough cash reserves 
(Kashyap et al., 1994; Carpenter et al., 1994, 1998; Guariglia, 2000; Benito, 2005). 
3 Bond et al. (2005), Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), and Bloch (2005) find that internal finance is 
the principal determinants of R&D investment.  
4 For example, Cantor (1990), Sharp (1994), and Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) show that the sensitivity 
of employment demand to fluctuations in internal financing is more significant in highly leveraged 
firms. While Carpenter and Petersen (2002) state that financially constrained firms with small size 
present roughly a dollar-for-dollar linkage between the growth of the assets and internal funding.  
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used in FHP (1988) for the same fifteen years, 1970 to 1984, and reclassify firms in 
this sample into five groups according to their degree of financial constraints based 
on information contained in the firms’ annual reports and management’s statements 
on liquidity.  
 
The first group in their classification contains firms without financial constraints, 
named as not financially constrained (NFC). This group includes the definitely 
financial healthy firms with low debt and high cash in the predictable future. The 
second group contains the firms that are likely not to be financially constrained 
(LNFC). Firms in this group are financially healthy and do not indicate any sign of 
being liquidity constrained. The third group includes firms that are possibly 
financially constrained (PFC). These firms cannot be classified either as financially 
constrained or as unconstrained because they do not show any clear indication of 
financial constraints, but they do not seem to hold sufficient liquidity and cash 
reserves either. The fourth group embraces the firms that have difficulties to gain 
funding. These firms are classified as likely to be financially constrained (LFC). The 
last group includes financially constrained firms (FC). These firms are either in 
shortage of debt or expressly state that they have to reduce investments due to liquidity 
problems.  
 
The authors find that sensitivities of investments to cash flow are higher, rather than 
lower in FHP (1988), for those firms classified as less financially constrained firms. 
Therefore, they conclude that higher sensitivities of investment to cash flow cannot 
be interpreted as a proper indicator showing that firms are more financially 
constrained.  
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Following the approach of KZ (1997), Cleary (1999) examines 1,317 US firms 
between 1987 and 1994 from the SEC Worldscope Disclosure database, and finds that 
although investment decisions of all firms are very sensitive to liquidity, the sensitivity 
is greater for more creditworthy firms than for less creditworthy firms. This result 
supports the conclusion of KZ (1997).  
 
Another series of studies focus on the conventional Q model of investment and 
challenge the findings in FHP (1988). The definition of average q is the ratio of the 
value of the firm to the replacement cost of its installed capital. However, share prices 
may indicate a noisy measure of the firm’s true value, which may lead to a serious 
measurement error problem. Therefore, some scholars argue that the traditional Q 
model of investment has weakness as it uses share prices to measure average q.  
 
Cummins et al. (2006) believe that market-based average q has measurement error 
because of the substantial and persistent error during the process when the stock 
market is measuring the firm’s intrinsic value. The authors study 11,431 observations 
over the period 1982-1999 from the Compustat and I/B/E/S data set, and find a strong 
relationship between investment spending and an alternative measure of average q 
obtained by earnings forecasts from securities analysts. They also find that when 
controlling for the expected future profitability by analysts’ earnings forecasts, 
internal funds are insignificant in explaining investment decisions, even for firms who 
do not pay dividends and firms without bond ratings (which were considered as 
financially constrained firms in previous studies). They conclude that there is no 
correlation between internal finance and investment. Furthermore, Erickson and 
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Whited (2000) obtain similar results to the series of studies that used earnings 
forecasts, suggesting that cash flow is uncorrelated with investment outlays in both 
liquidity-constrained firms and unconstrained firms by using 737 manufacturing firms 
from the Compustat dataset over 1992-1995.  
 
Similar results have been found by Bond and Cummins (2001), who use 1,066 firms 
from 1982 to 1999 taken from the Compustat and I/B/E/S database, and Bond et al. 
(2004), who use 703 UK quoted firms from 1987 to 2000. Their results show that 
there is a positive relationship between investment spending and cash flow when 
applying the conventional measure of average q (based on stock market valuations). 
However, such a relationship vanishes when using the alternative measure of average 
q (based on analysts’ earnings forecasts), even for the financially constrained firms. 
This suggests that in the former studies, it is simply because cash flow picks up 
investment opportunities, which is not appropriately accounted for by average q, cash 
flow becomes a significant determinant of investment.  
 
Another branch of the literature relative to this debate demonstrates theoretically that 
empirical findings on the investment-cash flow sensitivity cannot be interpreted as 
evidence for the existence of financial constraints. For example, according to Alti 
(2003), the sensitivity of investment to cash flow exists even in the benchmark case 
with no financial constraints, and such sensitivity is higher for younger, smaller, and 
low dividend payout firms that are growing fast. The author argues that the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity should be attributed to the fact that cash flow 
contains information about investment opportunities that is not captured by Tobin’s q, 
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rather than to capital market imperfections. Under this circumstance, the sensitivity 
for younger firms is higher because these firms face uncertainties of their projects’ 
quality and therefore respond more aggressively to the information reflected in cash 
flow. Gomes (2001), Abel and Eberly (2003), and Cooper and Ejarque (2001, 2003) 
also provide theoretical challenges to the hypothesis that a significant relationship 
between cash flow and investment can be regarded as a predictor of the presence of 
financial constraints, suggesting that the sensitivity is probably due to a combination 
of measurement error in q and identification problems.  
 
However, Carpenter and Guariglia (2007) point out that the I/B/E/S analysts are more 
likely to follow larger and profitable firms that face less financial constraints, which 
may explain why authors that considered securities analysts’ earnings forecasts from 
I/B/E/S database did not find significant effects of cash flow on investment.  
 
6.2.2.3 The rationale of the debate 
  
According to Cleary (1999) and Guariglia (2008), the different conclusions of the 
validity of investment–cash flow sensitivities as measures of financial constraints 
obtained by these different groups of researchers can be attributed to the fact that they 
use different ways to measure financial constraints.  
 
Studies that support the results of FHP (1988) generally classify firms, according to 
their characteristics such as dividend payout ratio, firms’ age and size, the access to 
commercial paper, and information on whether they have a bond rating. These 
260 
 
variables can be seen as proxies of the capital market imperfections and information 
asymmetries faced by these firms, which in turn make financial constraints appear. 
Information asymmetries considerably affect smaller and younger firms, as they can 
only access little public information and it is more difficult for financial institutions 
to gather this information. Hence, external finance is particularly expensive for these 
firms (Bernanke et al., 1996). In an imperfect market with asymmetric information, 
dividends can be used for firms to transmit information to shareholders and the outside 
world. Firms with a high dividend payout ratio indicate that they have good long-term 
prospects (John and Williams, 1985; Miller and Rock, 1985). By contrast, getting 
external funds will be more complicated for firms with low-dividend payout ratios as 
they are more likely to suffer from moral hazard and adverse selection problems. 
Finally, in order to make bond rating feasible (issue bond) and access the commercial 
paper market, Calomiris et al. (1995) point out that firms must achieve a minimum 
requirement on size, age, and collateral level to ensure that the additional risk related 
to information asymmetries is low enough for them.  
 
As for the study that has found results in line with KZ (1997), they categorise firms 
based on the level of available internal financing, which can be considered as a proxy 
for the degree of internal financial constraints that firms face. For example, KZ (1997) 
separate their sample according to firms’ liquidity related variables, which are 
significantly correlated with the level of available internal funds to firms. Cleary 
(1999) constructs an index of firms’ financial strength based on variables such as the 
current ratio, debt ratio, and the coverage ratio etc., which are strongly associated with 
firms’ internal financing.  
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In addition, Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) point out that the findings in KZ and 
Cleary are mainly due to the inclusion of negative cash flow observations, which can 
be considered as a proxy for identifying firms that are in financially distressed 
situations. They argue that when firms are in a considerably worse situation and cash 
shortage is severe, firms’ investments may have been reduced to their lowest possible 
levels and only extremely essential and necessary investments can be undertaken. In 
this case, even if cash flow declines, investments cannot be reduced any further. This 
situation is quite predominant among the most constrained firms. Hence, the 
sensitivity of investment-cash flows is low in these firms.  
 
6.2.2.4 The reconciliation of the debate 
 
Some studies provide evidence to reconcile the existing conflicting debate. Moyen 
(2004) uses a simulated sample of 2,000 firms between 1987 and 2001 from annual 
Compustat data and provide evidence that reconciles the conflicting empirical studies 
by identifying firms with financial constraints via various criteria.1 She finds that 
using the constrained model or Cleary’s index to identify firms with financial 
constraints leads to KZ’s result, which is that constrained firms have a lower 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow than unconstrained firm’ investment. She points 
out that in the presence of favourable opportunities, both constrained and 
                                               
1 The author builds an unconstrained model, in which firms have no financial constraints and can 
access to external financing markets. These firms maximize their equity value by choosing its policies 
of investment, dividend, and debt. Another model is called the constrained model, in which firms 
cannot obtain external funds. These firms can only choose its dividend and investment policies to 
maximise their equity value. Combining with these two models, the author defines financially 
constrained firms as those with low dividends, low cash flow, described in constrained model, 
especially those that invest less due to insufficient internal funds and no access of external funds, and 
low Cleary index values.  
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unconstrained firms invest more. For unconstrained firms, they can issue debt to 
finance their additional investment opportunities. As this debt financing effect is not 
considered in her regression specification, it amplifies the cash flow sensitivity for 
unconstrained firms. While for constrained firms, they must choose either to allocate 
their cash flow to more investment or more dividends. This weakens the sensitivity 
between constrained firms’ cash flow and their investment. Additionally, the result 
shows that firms with low index value (financially constrained firms) have a lower 
investment-cash flow sensitivity than those with high index value (0.292 vs. 1.007).  
 
She also confirms FHP’s result under the conditions that financially constrained firms 
are identified by low cash flow, by low dividends, or by both the constrained model 
and an investment policy that their internal financing has been used up. The author 
states that if the constrained firms run out of their internal funds, their investment 
depends on cash flow and asset sales. In this case, the sensitivity between investment 
and cash flow for these firms is very significant.  
 
Another study supporting the findings of both FHP and KZ/Cleary is Cleary et al. 
(2007). The authors use 88,599 observations from the annual S&P Compustat 
financial statement data between 1980 and 1999 and argue that existing models that 
present a monotonic relationship between internal financing and investment depends 
either on excessively restrictive assumptions on a firm’s investment or funding 
opportunities, or on particular assumptions on the external funding costs. Therefore, 
they provide three more plausible assumptions1 and find that the linkage between 
                                               
1 Firstly, internal financing is cheaper than external financing. Secondly, the cost of external financing 
is determined endogenously, and hence depends on the firm’s financial situation and the investment it 
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internal finance and investment is U-shaped. That is, investment increases 
monotonically with internal financing if the firm has a high level of internal funds, 
but decreases for firms with low level of internal financing. Their results indicate that 
firms with high level of internal financing only need to borrow a small amount of 
money in order to meet the almost-best investment scale. In this case, they only need 
to take the responsibility of a small repayment and face a small expected liquidation 
loss. If these firms’ internal funds decrease, they can reduce a small scale of 
investment without losing too much revenue to avoid borrowing more money. 
Therefore, an increase in internal funds will cause an increase in investment, and vice 
versa. The story is quite different among the firms with low level of internal financing. 
These firms generally invest less, but require more loans and suffer higher default and 
liquidation risks. At the same time, through enlarging investment scale, these firms 
can obtain more revenue, which would in turn increase the firm’s ability to make 
repayments and reduce the risk of default. Due to this revenue effect, firms with low 
level of internal funds will eventually invest more when a decrease happened in its 
internal funds.  
 
Furthermore, Guariglia (2008) also provides reconciliation for the conflicting findings 
in FHP and KZ by using 24,184 mainly unquoted UK companies1 over the period 
1993-2003. By dividing the sample based on the level of accessible internal funds to 
the firms, she finds a U-shaped relationship between investment and cash flow. That 
is, given the cash flow-to-capital ratio with an around 0 value, the investment-to-
                                               
plans to make. Finally, investment is scalable, which means that firms can choose between larger and 
smaller investments.  
1 Guariglia (2008) estimates 7,534 firms in the manufacturing sector and 24,184 firms in a broader 
range of industries.  
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capital ratio is at its minimum level, and then the investment to capital ratio increases 
in both situations when the cash flow becomes negative and positive. The results also 
suggest that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is likely to increase 
monotonically with the degree of external financial constraints that firms face, and the 
sensitivity is the highest for firms with external financial constraints and without 
internal financial constraints.  
 
6.2.3 Financial constraints in China 
 
6.2.3.1 Institutional environment in China  
 
According to Beck et al. (2006), firms in countries with higher levels of institutional 
development face significantly lower financial constraints than firms in countries with 
less developed institutions. When compared with the governments in developed 
countries, those in developing countries play a more crucial role in allocating financial 
resources. In addition, they tend to support state-owned firms and firms that have 
stronger ties with the government in allocating the capital (Ayyagari et al., 2012). As 
the largest developing countries in the world, capital market imperfections and the 
underdeveloped legal/institutional support are considered to be very noticeable in 
China. 
 
Since its transformation from a centrally planned economic system to a market 
economic system with socialist characteristics, the Chinese economy is characterised 
as a unique market environment where the private sector and public sector exist 
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simultaneously. Although a series of economic reforms since 1978 have been carried 
out and provided favourable support to private investments, such as granting private 
businesses preferential access to capital, technology, and markets, stated-owned 
enterprises are still powerful and dominate the major industries and resources. In 
practice, the state banks, which were the largest Chinese banks, were not allowed to 
lend loans to private firms until 1997. Not having loans from state banks indicated 
that private firms were excluded from the external financing as the credit market was 
dominated by state banks at that time. Although the situation has become better since 
1997, the financial market in China is still controlled by the state and private firms are 
still treated unfavourably. As a result, in order to start and expand firms, most private 
entrepreneurs had to depend on self-financing (Li et al., 2008). 
  
The Chinese financial system is generally regarded as inefficiency and fragmented. 
Allen et al. (2005) explore the financial system, including both the financial markets 
and the banking system, in China at the aggregate level. They compare China’s 
financial system with that in 49 countries. Their results show that the banking system 
is not an efficient system due to its higher overhead cost and the lowest profitability.  
 
In addition, according to Morck et al. (2000) and Allen et al. (2005), poor minority 
investor protection and imperfect regulation of market give rise to a phenomenon that 
stock prices are more synchronous in China than in other countries, suggesting that 
the stock markets are inefficient. For example, due to poor and uncertain protection 
of private property rights, political events and rumours may significantly affect the 
market-wide stock prices, which should be associated with economic fundamentals, 
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and may cause stock prices to diverge considerably from fundamental values. In 
addition, the relative amounts of capitalised firm-level and market-level information 
into stock prices determine the extent to which stocks move together. Among 
developing countries, less protection for public investors’ property rights against 
corporate insiders is associated with less firms-specific information being capitalised 
into stock prices. This effect would reduce firm-specific stock price variation, 
increasing stock return synchronicity. 
 
The four stated-owned banks constitute the largest financial institutions in China and 
have been dominating the financial market with low efficiency. 1  However, it is 
noteworthy that the Chinese financial system has experienced important structural 
reforms over the past decade.  
 
In order to mitigate the Asian financial crisis at the end of the 1990s, the State Council 
released the Notice Concerning Deepening Financial Reform, Rectifying Financial 
Order and Preventing Financial Risk (zhong gong zhong yang guan yu shen hua jin 
rong gai ge, zheng dun jin rong zhi xu, fang fan jin rong feng xian de tong zhi), which 
outlined the risks that were faced by the financial system and proposed a reform plan 
(Chinese Communist Party News and Documents, 1997). In a speech at 2002 National 
Financial Work Conference, Premier Zhu Rongji pointed out that overheating in the 
real estate market, unnecessary government investment projects, redundant 
government interference in bank lending decisions, misappropriation of bank funds, 
and heavily indebted SOEs led to the problems in the financial system (Zhu, 2013). 
                                               
1  They are Bank of China (BOC), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China 
Construction Bank (CCB), and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC).  
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The Premier outlined an aspiring restructuring reform of the financial system, which 
spanned around ten years and included three phases (Borst and Lardy, 2015).   
 
The first stage of the reform aimed to improve the banks’ balance sheet and efficiency 
by dismissing redundant employees and closing excessive branches, increasing the 
banks’ capital base, and establishing four asset management companies1 to deal with 
the nonperforming loans and bad assets. The second stage of the reform focused on 
adjustments of the structure of financial regulatory institutions, including establishing 
the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) to regulate the banking sector 
independently, and creating Central Huijin Investment Company Ltd. to implement 
the shareholders’ rights and obligations in the large state-owned commercial banks on 
behalf of the government. The final phase of the reform aimed to corporatise and list 
the major national banks on the stock market by introducing foreign strategic 
investments in Chinese banks, and increasing disclosure and transparency of the banks.  
 
Later, during the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party in November 2013, A Decision on Major Issues Concerning 
Comprehensive and Far-Reaching Reform (zhong gong zhong yang guan yu quan 
mian shen hua gai ge ruo gan zhong da wen ti de jue ding) has been issued (Xinhua 
News, 2013). This document states a clear outline of the far-reaching financial reform, 
including establishing private financial institutions, developing the capital markets, 
accelerating liberalisation of interest rate, moving to a market-based exchange rate, 
                                               
1  They are China Orient Asset Management Corporation, China Great Wall Asset Management 
Corporation, China Cinda Asset Management Corporation, and China Huarong Asset Management 
Corporation.  
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promoting capital account convertibility, establishing a deposit insurance scheme, 
creating a market-based exit mechanism, and experimenting with mixed ownership 
reform.  
 
These new developments have improved the financial system in China, but at the same 
time they have also brought new risks. For example, the amount of nonperforming 
loans has increased significantly. At the same time, a shadow banking system has 
played a crucial role in credit allocation with insufficient regulations, which might 
cause moral hazard and some other risks. In this case, the financial system in China is 
underdeveloped and financial constraints still exist.  
 
According to Beck et al. (2008), better protection of property rights can increase 
external financing, especially for small firms. However, the Chinese legal system is 
still evolving and is too weak to protect property rights and enforce contracts (Hay 
and Shleifer, 1998; McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Frye and Zhuravskaia, 2000). The 
Chinese legal system is characterised by a fragmentation of regulatory authorities. For 
example, as the Chinese commercial law system is an instrument aimed at enforcing 
the economic policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the central government 
chooses model areas (shi dian) and implements special regulations within those areas 
to test the effects of these rules in one area before introducing them to the whole nation. 
In this case, the central government may delegate authority and flexibility to local 
officials so that they can exercise the authority in accordance with the local 
circumstances. In this case, laws may become uncertain (Ho, 1994). Moreover, the 
legal system in China is also characterised by ambiguity in legal drafting. For example, 
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according to Law and Chen (2004), Chinese economic laws often draw a broad picture, 
without specifying the concrete and detailed rules. This situation can be explained by 
the fact that the Chinese government may not have enough time to consider every 
aspect of the legislation because of the rapid development of the legal and economic 
environment; but at the same time, some regulations may be in urgent need to be 
carried out in the market economy. The government therefore often enacts some laws 
or regulations hurriedly without containing sufficient details. 
 
Allen et al. (2005) compare the legal system in China to those of other emerging 
countries, including India, Pakistan, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. 
They show that the corruption index in China is the worst among the seven developing 
countries, while its protection for creditors and shareholders are only better than that 
of India and Mexico. This indicates that the development of China’s legal system is 
behind that of the other major emerging countries. Furthermore, one of the most 
important factors necessary to have an effective law enforcement system is that a 
country must have an independent and efficient judicial system with a sufficient 
supply of qualified legal professionals. However, according to Allen et al. (2005), 
only 20% of all lawyers in China have law degrees, and even a lower percentage of 
judges have formally studied law at universities or colleges. Moreover, only 4% of the 
five million business firms in China have regular legal advisers. Allen et al. (2005) 
also argue that the most important problem with China’s accounting system is the lack 
of independence, and the situation of professional auditors is similar to that for legal 
professionals.  
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In a word, the financial, legal, and accounting institutions in China, including investor 
protection systems, accounting standards, and quality of government are significantly 
underdeveloped. Additionally, governments also place heavy regulations (red tape) or 
extra-legal fees on private firms (Brunetti et al., 1997; Johnson et al., 2000, 2002; 
Hellman et al., 2003; Guriev, 2004). Under this circumstance, the banking lending 
decisions could be biased by the weak institutional supports and financial constraints 
would be pronounced in China.   
 
6.2.3.2 Empirical evidence on financial constraints in China  
 
Using 5,325 companies in Shanghai from 1989 to 1992 supplied by the Shanghai 
Economic Commission, Chow and Fung (1998) show that the investment of 
manufacturing firms in Shanghai is sensitive to cash flow. Cash flow plays an 
important role in determining investment behaviour, indicating the existence of 
financial constraints in China. The authors also find that non-state firms are more 
liquidity-constrained than state-owned firms in terms of the availability of cash flow. 
This can be attributed to the lending bias of favourable treatments obtained by state-
owned firms. Because of this bias, non-state firms find it hard to obtain bank loans, 
which are the major source of external funding in a transition economy, and in turn, 
the progress of economic reforms will be impeded. The difference between the cash 
flow estimates of non-state firms and SOEs supports their overinvestment hypothesis: 
private firms with more efficient and good investment opportunities have to depend 
more on internal financing, while state-owned firms with less efficient and poor 
investment opportunities do not. Chen (2008) analyses 815 Chinese listed firms over 
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the period 1998-2004 obtained from the 2005 China Stock Market Financial Database 
(Annual Report). Similar to the results obtained by Chow and Fung (1998), Chen 
(2008) shows that non-state firms exhibit a larger dependency of investment on cash 
flow, indicating that they are more significant constrained than SOEs.  
 
According to Héricourt and Poncet (2009), state-owned firms are insensitive to the 
debt-to-asset ratio and the interest coverage ratio, which are proxies for financial 
distress. By contrast, domestic private firms show credit constraints. Similar results 
have been reached by Poncet et al. (2010), who uses 14,967 Chinese firms from 1998 
to 2005, originating from the Oriana data set. The authors find that Chinese private 
firms are significantly financial-constrained, while state-owned firms and foreign-
owned firms are not. Guariglia et al. (2011) estimate the relationship between liquidity 
constraints and asset growth using 79,841 mainly unlisted Chinese firms from the 
Chinese National Bureau of Statistics between 2000 and 2007, and confirm that 
private and foreign firms are affected significantly by the available amount of cash 
flow, while SOEs are not. This result suggests that SOEs do not suffer from financial 
constraints, while private firms suffer a lot, especially those private firms that are 
located in coastal regions and with negligible foreign ownership.  
 
Furthermore, both Héricourt and Poncet (2009) and Poncet et al. (2010) point out that 
although domestic private firms in China face financial distortion and discriminations, 
which can be alleviated by FDI. One reason is that foreign investment inflows can 
bring abundant capital and inject equity for domestically owned firms to reduce their 
credit constraints (Harrison et al., 2004). Moreover, Chinese governments grant 
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foreign-financed firms elite status legally and politically compared with other private 
firms. Under this circumstance, having foreign investments can help private domestic 
firms get around legal obstacles as well.    
 
Ding et al. (2013) provide another insight for financially constrained Chinese firms to 
reduce their constraints and keep a high investment rate. Using a panel of 758,849 
firm-year observations covering 116,724 mainly unlisted firms, Ding et al. (2013) 
analyse the reasons why Chinese firms facing significant financial constraints are 
characterised as very high investment rates. Specifically, they focus on the role of 
working capital management. The author considers the working capital as a measure 
of liquidity and defines it as the difference between current assets and current 
liabilities. Their results firstly confirm that SOEs in China are not financially 
constrained, while private, foreign, and collective firms show a high sensitivity of 
fixed investment to cash flow. Moreover, the authors point out that the latter three 
types of firms also have a high sensitivity of working capital investment to cash flow, 
indicating that firms can adjust both the fixed and working capital investment to ease 
the cash flow shocks. Especially, those firms with a high working capital to fixed 
capital ratio are prone to adjust their working capital investment in the presence of 
fluctuations in cash flow. Furthermore, except for foreign firms, all other firms with 
high working capital exhibit a low sensitivity of fixed capital investment to cash flow, 
which suggests that these firms can mitigate the impact of cash flow fluctuations on 
their fixed capital investment by using their working capital. To summarise, firms can 
alleviate their financial constraints by adjusting their working capital management: 
adjusting both fixed and working capital investment for firms with internal finance 
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constraints, while adjusting working capital investment more than fixed capital for 
firms with external credit constraints.  
 
Lin and Bo (2012) find an interesting result using 1,325 non-financial listed firms on 
either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange over the period 
of 1999 and 2008. The authors confirm that the listed firms experience financial 
constraints in China by estimating two proxies for financial constraints: the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity and the KZ index.  
 
From the above analysis of Chinese institutional environment and empirical evidence 
in the existing literature, we can conclude that given such an under-developed 
financial and legal system, the government has severely got involved in resource 
allocation, in which the SOEs are provided with preferential treatment. Firms that lack 
government connections confront difficulties in development and investment, as they 
have insufficient financial support (Cull et al., 2014; Dollar and Wei, 2007; Farrell 
and Lund, 2006). In other words, these obstacles are more significant in China because 
of the hostility of the political environment to private firms, which do not rank high 
in terms of political status. Having political connections is therefore important for 
Chinese firms. The art of using connections (guan xi) to subvert or take advantages of 
the formal system, also known as “using the back door” (zou hou men), exists 
everywhere in the Chinese administration. Political connections are always 
considered as an important instrument for private enterprises, especially unlisted firms, 
to overcome these market and state failures and to develop themselves in the market 
environment with Chinese characteristics. 
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6.2.4 Political connections and financial constraints 
 
The ownership of capital can determine the enterprises’ ability to receive external 
funding. In practice, private firms are always considered to be more risky than their 
state-owned counterparts in the eyes of banks in China. Financial resources, therefore, 
are more likely to be allocated to SOEs (Havrylchyk and Poncet, 2007). In other words, 
PEs are discriminated against on credit market. Under the circumstance where they 
lack market supporting institutions, private firms either become passive victims or 
have to depend on other institutions to do business (Li et al., 2006; Johnson et al., 
1997; Friedman et al., 2000; McMillan and Woodruff, 1999). Such phenomenon is 
particularly pronounced in developing countries, especially in China. Political 
connections are found to be prevalent among firms and are considered as crucial 
resources for the connected firms.  
 
Specifically, political connections can in fact provide favourable financing for well-
connected firms both directly (providing favourable finance support to the connected 
firms) and indirectly (acting as a bridge between connected firms and the financing 
providers). The financial benefits provided by political connections have been 
documented in previous studies on different countries. Specifically, political 
connections can bring easier access to funding and more loans, lower-cost financing, 
and a preferential bailout for the connected enterprises. In turn, these benefits can 
mitigate financial constraints on the connected firms. 
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6.2.4.1 Access to funding 
 
Faccio (2002) focuses on firms in 42 countries and defines higher leverage as a proxy 
for easier access to financing. Her results illustrate that firms with political 
connections, and especially firms with stronger and closer connections, have a 
statistically significant higher leverage ratio than non-connected firms. She also 
provides some anecdotal examples to support the idea that connected firms can obtain 
easy funding from government-controlled banks, even though they are not qualified 
to get this bank credit. For example, Tommy, former President Soeharto’s son, was 
declined twice by the central bank and Sultan of Brunei in searching credit to finance 
his corporations. Finally, he asked his father to intervene and the central bank lent him 
$600 million under the president’s pressure.  
 
A few studies have demonstrated that political connections can grant easier access to 
financing and more funding in developing countries, such as Thailand, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, and Brazil. The scholars find that banks in Asia tend to allocate credit to 
friends and relatives on soft terms, instead of focusing on hard market criteria. Using 
a sample of non-financial listed companies in Stock Exchange of Thailand in 1996, 
Charumilind et al. (2006) conclude that compared to firms without connections to 
politicians, firms with such ties have easier access to long-term debt with much less 
collateral needed.  
 
According to Johnson and Mittion (2003), political connections can increase the debt-
to-asset ratio for the connected firms by 50% to 60%. The debt-to-asset ratio of the 
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unconnected firms is much smaller than the figure of the connected firms in Malaysia. 
Similarly, analysing loan-level data of 90,000 firms in Pakistan from 1996 to 2002, 
Khwaja and Mian (2005) show that compared to non-affiliated firms, politically 
associated enterprises receive 45% more loans from banks controlled by the 
government. 
 
Using a novel dataset of firm-level and candidate-level contributions during the 1998 
and 2002 elections in Brazil, Claessens et al. (2008) look at the relationship between 
political connections and preferential access to finance from the perspective of 
campaign contributions. They find that political connections affect contributing firms 
positively in terms of growth in bank financing following an election. The empirical 
evidence shows that a one-standard-deviation increase in contributions to deputies 
leads to a 9.4% increase in bank financing. Furthermore, the authors point out that 
firms making contributions to winning deputies benefit more in terms of greater 
access to funding. Their regression results suggest that a one standard deviation 
increase in contributions to the elected government leads to a 12.1% growth in bank 
credit, indicating that these firms obtain more loans from banks.  
 
In China, the ownership of capital can determine the enterprises’ ability to receive 
external funding. In practice, private firms are always considered to be more risky 
than their state-owned counterparts in the eyes of banks. Financial resources, therefore, 
are more likely to be allocated to SOEs (Havrylchyk and Poncet, 2007). In other words, 
Private Enterprises (PEs) are discriminated in the credit market, while SOEs have the 
privilege to obtain as many bank loans as they need (Ge and Qiu, 2007; Lin, 2011; 
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Dong et al., 2012). Collectively-owned enterprises (COEs) are the firms owned by all 
of the citizens of a township or village, but controlled by the local government (Park 
and Shen, 2003). These firms can benefit from preferential access to the newly 
emerged product and input markets and massive loans from state banks on rather soft 
terms (Che and Qian, 1998; Kung and Lin, 2007; Park and Shen, 2003; Chang and 
Wang, 1994; Brandt et al., 2005). 
 
Gordon and Li (2003) theoretically point out that SOEs can access a better financing 
platform because the Chinese government restricts the access to bank loans for non-
state owned firms to increase its market control power. Guariglia et al. (2011) point 
out that SOEs can absorb surplus labour and help governments to maintain social 
stability; therefore, they can access unlimited loans from the state banks.  
 
Dong et al. (2012) study 779,157 firm-year observations and 182,973 unique 
manufacturing firms in the non-listed sector over the period 1998-2007. Their data are 
taken from the National Basic Unit Census (which is developed and maintained by 
the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS)), and find that there is a significant 
difference between firms with and without state ownership in terms of financing debts. 
That is, the long-term debt ratio for state-owned firms is 3.55% higher than that for 
firms without such ownership. This effect is much stronger in the regions with less 
developed institutions, such as the less developed financial and legal systems. 
According to the descriptive statistics over the sample period, the ratio of long-term 
liabilities to total assets for both firms with and without state ownership show a 
decrease from 1999 to 2007. The decreasing pattern, however, is more significant in 
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firms without state ownership (from 7.60% to 4.03%) compared with firms with state 
ownership (from 13.59% to 11.08%). This finding indicates that firms with state 
ownership can benefit from bank loans on rather soft terms.  
 
However, Lin and Bo (2010) do not illustrate that state ownership can alleviate firms’ 
financial constraints through bringing in more bank loans for the firms in the state-
controlled banking sector. They argue that SOEs do suffer from the soft budget 
constraints; however, when these firms go through the corporatisation movement, 
these benefits have been eliminated. In this case, although these firms still have 
connections with the state, they can be considered as modern enterprises operating in 
a market environment.  
 
Private entrepreneurs can establish political connections through actively 
participating in the political organisations. According to Li et al. (2006), Chinese 
private entrepreneurs with the membership of the People’s Congress (PC) or the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPCC) can gain scarce resources 
that are not accessible from the markets, favourable tax treatment, and better access 
to credit and other resources. 
 
Using a national wide survey of 3,258 Chinese private firms in 2002, Li et al. (2008) 
find that Chinese Communist Party members assist connected private firms to obtain 
more loans from state banks and other state institutions, and Party membership is 
particularly crucial for enterprises in areas with weaker legislation. Fan et al. (2008) 
collect 23 high-level government bureaucrats (including provincial level government 
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and central level government) corruption cases that happened during the period 1995 
to 2003, and point out that private firms with connections to politicians have 
advantages in receiving more loans for a longer term and better growth opportunities. 
Moreover, Feng et al. (2011) find that the leverage ratio and long-term debt are 
significantly related to political participation in a positive way, suggesting that firms 
controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics have better access to debt 
financing, especially long-term debt. 
 
Chan et al. (2012a) analyse Chinese listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange markets from 2005 to 2007 and conclude that political connections can 
reduce financial constraints for the connected firms. The investment sensitivity to cash 
holdings is positive and statistically significant for firms without political ties (0.065), 
while the sensitivity is much smaller and not statistically significant for politically 
connected firms (0.010). This evidence suggests that non-connected firms experience 
huge financial constraints, whereas connected firms seem to be free from such 
constraints. In addition, firms without connections controlled by families face greater 
constraints than non-connected firms with state ownership. The authors attribute such 
benefits of connected firms to easier access to external credit, preferential policy 
treatment, and implicit government guarantee. Our work is different from this study 
by using a comprehensive dataset covering unlisted firms. In addition, the authors 
define political connections as the firm’s chairman or CEO is a current or previous 
governmental official, while ours depends on the lishu relationship, which has 
received the least academic attention. 
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There is only one study looking at the relationship between political affiliation and 
trade credit in China conducted by Guariglia and Mateut (2013). Using a sample of 
over 72,000 firms in the manufacturing and mining industrial sectors from the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) between 2000 and 2007, Guariglia and 
Mateut (2013) document evidence that political affiliation (lishu) has a significant 
impact on the trade credit extension. They point out that politically affiliated firms can 
access short-run external financing more easily in China. As a result, these firms, and 
especially firms with more financial constraints, can extend more trade credit than 
their non-affiliated counterparts. Their findings suggest that bank financing can be 
redistributed by trade credit and therefore, political connections can increase the 
efficiency in the allocation of resources.   
 
6.2.4.2 Cost of financing 
 
Politically connected firms can receive loans at a relatively cheap price. Using data 
for firms in 47 countries, Faccio (2007) shows that companies connected with a 
minister enjoy an average decrease of 1.14% in the interest rate on debt. Similarly, 
Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) point out that establishing political connections is a 
way to obtain low-cost financing. 
 
By analysing 2,537 firms from 25 countries between 1997 and 2001, Boubakri et al. 
(2008) show that the cost of equity financing for firms with political connections is 
lower than that for firms without such ties. More specifically, connected firms in 16 
out of 25 countries face a lower cost of equity capital than that for the non-connected 
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firms from the same countries. In other words, connected firms have an approximately 
50 basis-point lower equity financing cost, especially when political ties are strong. 
Chaney et al. (2011) support the idea above by conducting an analysis of accounting 
data for more than 4,500 corporations in 19 countries, suggesting that firms without 
connections are more likely to pay more when issuing debt.  
 
Similar results are observed in China. Li et al. (2011) consider all listed private 
enterprises on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange market from 2005 to 2009 
and conclude that political connections can reduce the cost of financing among private 
firms in China, as political officials contribute to allocate financial resources to target 
enterprises through rent-seeking.  
 
Xu et al. (2013) use the 489 listed family firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share 
stock markets in China between 2000 and 2007, corresponding to 2,094 observations, 
and estimate whether the political connections of family firms can help these firms to 
ease the financial constraints. The authors demonstrate that family firms with political 
connections can overcome the underinvestment problem by reducing information 
asymmetry, and by reducing the investment sensitivity to their internal funds. The 
authors point out that through the good relationship with the government that controls 
privileged resources, the costs of external financing can be reduced for the connected 
firms. They also prove that this effect is more remarkable for firms with significant 
financial constraints.   
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6.2.4.3 Bailout benefits 
 
Some research illustrates that politically connected firms tend to get government aid 
in economic distress. By analysing 450 politically connected firms in 35 countries 
over the period 1997-2002, Faccio et al. (2006) document that 11.3% of firms with 
political connections receive financial assistance from the governments, while only 
4.4% of their non-connected peers receive such a package, indicating that connected 
firms are particularly more likely to be bailed out than other firms. They also find that 
51 firms (out of 71 firms), which received a bailout more than once during the sample 
period were politically connected. Additionally, they find that in countries that receive 
financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, 
politically associated firms are disproportionately more likely to receive a financial 
aid package than non-connected firms (21.1% and 7.4% respectively).  
 
Blau et al. (2013) use data on lobbying expenditures for 237 US financial firms that 
received the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)1 support from the Centre 
for Responsive Politics (CRP), and confirm that political engagement significantly 
affects the distribution, timing, and magnitude of the TARP bailout, and firms that 
obtained bailout dollars spent four times or more on lobbying than firms that did not 
obtain bailout dollars. The authors measure political engagement from two proxies, 
                                               
1 The TARP program is proposed by Hank Paulson, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, on 19th September 
2008 to address the mortgage crisis. “The TARP bill was passed by Congress on October 3rd. It 
authorized the Treasury department to purchase up to $700 billion worth of troubled assets (especially 
mortgage-backed securities) from financial institutions to stabilize financial markets and prevent the 
crisis from escalating further. On October 14th, 2008, secretary Paulson and President Bush announced 
revisions to the program, which authorized the Treasury department to use up to $250 billion of the 
available $700 billion to purchase preferred stock from US financial institutions under the Capital 
Purchase Program (CPP).”(Blau et al., 2013, p.3009).  
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i.e. lobbying expenditures and political connections.1 
 
The authors also find that firms with political engagement during the 5 years prior to 
TARP had a better chance (37%-51% for the firms that lobbied and 23.5%-39.3% for 
the firms with political connections) to receive such bailout supports. The timing of 
bailout decisions is also related to political engagement of firms. 62% of firms that 
lobbied and 70% of politically connected firms during the 5 years prior to TARP 
obtained the TARP funds in the first two payouts, while 95% of firms that lobbied and 
100% of firms with political connections received funding during the first nine 
payouts. Specifically, all eight firms that received bailouts on the first payout date 
(28th October 2008) had both lobbied and connected with politicians during the 5 years 
before the TARP. 15 firms received support on the second payout date (17th November 
2008), of which five had lobbied and four firms had political connections.  
 
The authors also find that firms that lobbied/firms that had political connections 
obtained bailouts 21.34%/35.37% sooner than firms that did not lobby/firms that were 
not politically connected. Furthermore, their results show that politically engaged 
firms obtained more support than other firms. Specifically, firms that did not lobby 
accepted between $2.02 billion and $5.14 billion less than firms that had lobbied, 
while unconnected firms received between $3.08 billion and $6.47 billion less than 
connected firms.  
 
                                               
1 Blau et al. (2013) consider a firm to be politically connected if at least one of the following three 
conditions holds: 1) the firm previously employed a current federal government officer; 2) the firm 
currently employs a previous federal government officer; 3) the firm currently employs a current federal 
government officer.  
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6.2.5 Hypotheses  
 
Based on the analysis above, we hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Because of the underdeveloped and imperfect Chinese financial 
market, Chinese firms’ investment intensities are likely to be constrained by the 
availability of internal financing.  
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The effect of financial constraints on investment intensities is 
likely to be mitigated by the lishu relationship.  
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The effect of the lishu relationship on financial constraints is more 
significant for firms with high and medium levels of the lishu relationship compared 
with firms with lower and without such relationships.  
 
6.3 Specifications and estimation methodology 
 
6.3.1 Baseline specification 
 
We initially estimate the following simple dynamic investment model similar to that 
used by Chan et al. (2012a): 
 
𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
𝐼𝑖(𝑡−1)
𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛼2
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼3
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑣𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                       (1)      
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where I is the firm’s investment, K is the tangible fixed assets, which indicates the 
replacement value of its capital stock, CF is the firm’s cash flow, and Sale is defined 
as the firm’s real sales. These variables are scaled by capital stock K. The subscript i 
indexes firms, while t refers to time, where t = 2000-2007. We include the lagged 
dependent variable in the model specification in order to control for the past level of 
investment by the firm.  
 
The error term in Eq. (1) consists of four elements. 𝑣𝑖 is a firm-specific component, 
which we control for by estimating the equations in first-difference. 𝑣𝑡 represents a 
time-specific component and is accounted for by including time dummies in the 
regressions. 𝑣𝑗𝑡  denotes a time-specific component which varies across industries, 
which accounts for industry-specific time effects. We take 𝑣𝑗𝑡  into account by 
including interactions between industry dummies and time dummies in the regressions. 
And 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is an idiosyncratic component.  
 
To the extent that the FHP conclusion is valid in the Chinese context, an increase in 
cash flow should increase the investment spending. Therefore, we expected that the 
coefficient of cash flow is positive and statistically significant in this regression if 
firms’ internal funds can affect their investments.  
 
In order to control for possible bias due to omitting relevant variables, we augment 
Eq. (1) with following additional variables. Firstly, in order to control for the effects 
of external financing, we include the leverage ratio in Eq. (1). As a high leverage ratio 
indicates that the firm faces soft budget constraints, we expect the coefficient on the 
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leverage ratio to be positive. Moreover, if expected future profit is high, then firms 
may hold more cash because they anticipate greater capital investment. In this case, 
the coefficient of cash flow may not reflect financial constraints. We therefore 
incorporate an accelerator term, defined as sales growth (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ) into Eq. (1) 
to account for the effects of future opportunities of investment (Chan et al., 2012b; 
Cull et al., 2014).  
 
𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
𝐼𝑖(𝑡−1)
𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛼2
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼3
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑣𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                                 (2) 
                                                                                                                      
In order to test the influences of the lishu relationship on the sensitivity of cash flow 
to investments for Chinese firms, rather than estimating all the equations on separate 
sub-samples of firms as in Cull et al. (2014), Chen et al. (2011), and Chan et al. 
(2012a), we estimate a single equation and interact the cash flow variables with 
political affiliation variable, which is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm has 
a lishu relationship and 0 otherwise following Chen et al. (2011) and Mclean et al. 
(2012). Specifically, we estimate the following reduced and augmented equations: 
 
𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
𝐼𝑖(𝑡−1)
𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛼21
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼22
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
× 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑣𝑗𝑡
+ 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                                                            (3) 
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𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
𝐼𝑖(𝑡−1)
𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛼21
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼22
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
× 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑣𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                           (4) 
 
Using interactions rather than separate regressions for each group allows us to avoid 
the endogenous sample selection problems, obtain degrees of freedom, and take 
account of the fact that firms can transit between groups (Guariglia, 2008). For all the 
sample firms, we expect that the coefficient on the interaction term to be significantly 
less than zero. 
 
We further divide the lishu relationship into four degrees by generating an ordinal 
dummy variable, named PAV, which takes the value of 1 if firms have no lishu 
relationship, takes the value of 2 for firms affiliated with the low level of government, 
takes the value of 3 for firms affiliated with the medium level of government, and 
takes the value of 4 for firms affiliated with the high level of government.1 We interact 
cash flow with this dummy indicating various degrees of political connections held 
by firms and expect that the firms affiliated with higher level of governments in China 
face less financial constraints. Specifically, we estimate the following reduced and 
augmented equations: 
 
𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
𝐼𝑖(𝑡−1)
𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛼21
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼22
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
× 𝑃𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑣𝑗𝑡
+ 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                                                                (5)    
 
                                               
1 See Appendix for detailed definitions.  
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𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
𝐼𝑖(𝑡−1)
𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛼21
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼22
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
× 𝑃𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑣𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                            (6) 
 
6.3.2 Estimation methodology 
 
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates are likely to suffer from biases caused 
by unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity and possible endogeneity of the regressors, 
while the Fixed Effects estimator only controls for the former bias. For the purpose of 
controlling both biases, we estimate all equations by adopting the first-difference 
generalised method of moments (GMM),1 proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
This methodology has been widely employed in recent research (for example, 
Guariglia et al., 2011; Firth et al., 2012; Greenaway et al., 2014; Guariglia and Mateut, 
2013; Männasoo and Maripuu, 2015). This method controls for the unobserved firm-
specific heterogeneity by estimating regressions in first-difference, and controls for 
the problem of possible endogeneity of regressors by using the regressors lagged two 
or more periods as instruments.  
 
If the model is appropriately specified, the variables in the instrument set should not 
be correlated with the error term. In order to evaluate whether the instruments are 
valid and whether the model is specified appropriately, we consider two tests 
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). The first test is the serial correlation in the 
differenced residuals. Generally, we assess the correlation of order l+1 in differences  
to check for serial correlation of order l in levels (Brown and Petersen, 2009; 
                                               
1 The GMM estimation in this chapter is performed in Stata using the command –xtabond2- developed 
by Roodman (2009).  
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Roodman, 2009). The instrument set needs to be restricted to lag 3 and deeper if the 
serial correlation of order 2 in the differenced residuals exists. Therefore, we use the 
m(l) test to evaluate the presence of lth-order serial correlation in the differenced 
residuals. This test is under the null of no lth-order serial correlation of the differenced 
residuals and asymptotically distributed as a standard normal.   
 
The second test is the Sargan test (also known as J-test). This test is used for assessing 
over-identifying restrictions. The null hypothesis being evaluated by the Sargan test 
is the instrument validity. That is, the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the 
set of residuals, and therefore, they are acceptable, healthy, and valid instruments. It 
is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square variable with (n-k) degrees of freedom, 
where n is the number of instruments and k is the number of parameters. However, 
according to Blundell and Bond (1998) and Benito (2005), when the estimation is 
used for samples with a very large cross-sectional dimension, it is likely to over-reject 
the null hypothesis of valid instrument. Therefore, given the size of our panel, we tend 
to pay little attention to the J-test.  
 
We select our instruments starting with lagged twice regressors. If m2 test is rejected, 
we delete the regressors lagged twice from the instrument set and use regressors 
lagged three times as instruments.1  We only include the deeper lags if they can 
improve the specification estimations.  
                                               
1 The m1 test for first-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals is reported in all the tables. 
As our regressions are tested in first-differences, we observe negative first-order autocorrelation in the 
differenced residuals. If the regressions use instruments both lagged twice (t-2) and three times (t-3), 
both the m2 and the m3 tests for second- and third- autocorrelation in the differenced residuals are 
reported in the tables. If the most recent instruments are lagged twice (t-2) or three times (t-3), only the 
m2 or m3 test will be reported in the tables. Note that the differences between bad instruments and 
model specification cannot be diagnosed neither by the Sargan test nor by the lth-order serial correlation 
in the differenced residuals.   
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6.4 Data and summary statistics 
 
6.4.1 Data 
 
We use firm-level dataset for this study as it can avoid aggregation problems in 
estimation, and make it possible to take firm heterogeneity into account (Bond and 
Van Reenen, 2007). This dataset is from the annual accounting reports, maintained 
and complied by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), and provides 
comprehensive economic information of all types of firms in China with annual sales 
of more than five million Yuan.1  
 
In order to improve the reliability of our analysis, we first drop observations which 
make little sense, such as those with negative sales, negative age, and negative 
leverage ratio. Second, we eliminate firms without complete records on our main 
regression variables. Finally, in order to control for the potential effect of extreme 
values, we drop outliers, which are the observations beyond the 1st and 99th percent 
tails for each continuous main regression variables.2 After the above adjustments, our 
final panel dataset includes 356,053 firm-level observations, covering 105,487 mainly 
unlisted firms over the period 2002-2007.3 The sample has an unbalanced structure,4 
with the number of observations ranging from a minimum of 32,358 in 2002 to a 
                                               
1 The official RMB exchange rate per US dollar during the sample period was 8.2785 in 2000, 8.2771 
in 2001, 8.2770 in 2002 and 2003, 8.2768 in 2004, 8.1943 in 2005, 7.9734 in 2006, and 7.6075 in 2007 
(World Development Indicators, World Bank). Therefore, the threshold for including in the dataset is 
equivalent to between USD 604,098 and USD 657,246 over the sample period.  
2 It is quite common in the literature (see Greenaway et al., 2007; Guariglia, 2008; Carpenter and 
Guariglia, 2008; Yan, 2012) to eliminate extreme values in this way.  
3 It should be noted that our dataset include a very small proportion of listed firms for two reasons. 
Frist of all, according to Liu and Xiao (2004), when firms become listed, their legal identification 
numbers are changed; it is therefore hard to track these firms. The second reason is that there is no 
separate identification of Chinese publicly listed firms in the NBS dataset. However, they only 
comprise a very small portion of the whole sample. Over the whole considered period, only 
approximately 1000 listed firms in the manufacturing and mining sectors, accounting for less than 0.3% 
of the total number of firms in the sample.  
4 See Appendix for details about the structure of the panel. 
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maximum of 79,185 in 2006. 
 
6.4.2 Summary statistics  
 
Table 6.1 reports the summary statistics for the full sample, firms with the lishu 
relationship and those without such relationship.1 The statistics presented include the 
number of observations in each category, mean, median, and standard deviation (S.D.). 
And we also report the p-values from an independent mean-equality test between the 
firms with a lishu and those without a lishu in the last column in Table 6.1. 
 
Relative to those without a lishu relationship, firms with a lishu relationship have 
lower average investment intensities (7.61% vs. 10.90%), are much older (17 vs. 10 
years old), and much larger in terms of assets (908.05 vs. 636.53 thousands of yuan). 
Compare with the leverage ratio of non-affiliated firms (55.20%), the higher leverage 
ratio of the affiliated firms (58.92%) suggests that the latter firms suffer from the soft 
budget constraints. The politically affiliated firms prefer to locate in the centre and 
west of China, while firms without a lishu relationship are more likely to locate 
themselves in the coastal area. Table 6.1 also shows that firms with a lishu relationship 
have lower cash flow/capital ratio (29.66% vs. 36.68%), lower sales/capital ratio (5.88% 
vs. 7.69%), and lower sales growth (8.32% vs. 10.89%), compared with firms without 
a lishu relationship. The politically affiliated firms are therefore growing more slowly. 
This may indicate that they respond to social and political needs, as well as to 
economic objectives (Bai et al., 2006). All the variables in the two groups are 
significantly different from each other.  
                                               
1 See Appendix for the complete definitions and the correlation matrix of variables used.  
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Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics (sample mean, median, and S.D.) 
 
Variables 
Full sample Firms with a lishu relationship 
Firms without a lishu 
relationship Diff 
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. 
Investment/Capital 9.580 6.082 31.151 7.612 4.210 29.859 10.904 7.546 31.923 0.000*** 
PA 0.402 0.000 0.490 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
PAV 1.704 1.000 0.964 2.751 3.000 0.690 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000*** 
Cash flow/Capital 33.857 20.836 43.605 29.663 17.058 42.328 36.679 23.209 44.220 0.000*** 
Sales/Capital 6.964 4.274 7.891 5.877 3.339 7.287 7.694 4.950 8.192 0.000*** 
Leverage 56.694 58.170 24.990 58.918 60.092 25.285 55.197 56.822 24.677 0.000*** 
Sales Growth 9.859 9.572 33.549 8.324 8.162 32.958 10.892 10.608 33.901 0.000*** 
Real Assets 745.733 249.868 1494.509 908.045 293.936 1742.523 636.526 225.902 1289.867 0.000*** 
Age 12.814 10.000 10.184 17.144 12.000 13.127 10.044 9.000 6.337 0.000*** 
Region 1.350 1.000 0.663 1.512 1.000 0.757 1.240 1.000 0.566 0.000*** 
Observations 356,053 143,207 212,846  
Notes: PA is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm has a lishu relationship and 0 otherwise. PAV is an ordinal dummy which takes the value of 1 if firms have no lishu 
relationship, takes the value of 2 for firms affiliated with the low level of government, takes the value of 3 for firms affiliated with the medium level of government, and takes 
the value of 4 for firms affiliated with the high level of government. Real Assets are expressed in thousands of yuan. All the other variables except for age and region are 
expressed in percentage terms. S.D. stands for standard deviations. The last column (Diff) presents p-values from an independent samples mean-equality test between affiliated 
group and non-affiliated group. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. See Appendix for complete definitions of all variables.  
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Focusing on the three different levels of lishu relationship in Table 6.2, we observe 
that while the level of lishu relationship is upgrading, the investment/capital ratio is 
decreasing (from 9.62% to 6.46% and 5.81% for firms affiliated with the 
low/medium/high level of government, respectively), while the firm size (measured 
by the real assets), as well as firm age are increasing. In addition, the sales-to-capital 
ratio and sales growth are decreasing when the level of political affiliation is 
increasing. As for the financial factors, we find that firms affiliated with the medium 
level of government have the highest leverage ratio (62.02%) and the lowest cash flow 
to capital ratio (22.79%). Furthermore, we observe that the firms affiliated with 
medium level of government are more likely to locate themselves in the inner regions.  
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Table 6.2 Descriptive statistics for three levels of the lishu relationship (sample mean, median, and S.D.) 
 
Variables 
LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Diff1 Diff2 Diff3 
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. 
Investment/Capital 9.624 6.249 31.311 6.462 3.074 29.417 5.811 3.161 26.746 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 
PA 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
PAV 2.000 2.000 0.000 3.000 3.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Cash flow/Capital 39.656 24.408 47.341 22.786 12.815 36.345 24.432 13.319 40.267 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Sales/Capital 7.870 5.007 8.408 4.697 2.621 6.236 4.226 2.273 5.719 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Leverage 55.893 57.338 24.662 62.024 63.277 25.201 57.244 57.578 26.057 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Sales Growth 10.619 10.517 33.420 6.890 6.641 33.275 6.661 7.180 30.213 0.000*** 0.000***  0.378 
Real Assets 489.051 194.224 1034.712 976.108 351.838 1752.263 1828.692 741.653 2631.622 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Age 12.907 11.000 7.597 18.996 12.000 14.693 21.476 14.000 15.469 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Region 1.273 1.000 0.569 1.681 1.000 0.815 1.623 1.000 0.837 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Observations 56,354 66,092 20,761    
Notes: PA is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm has a lishu relationship and 0 otherwise. PAV is an ordinal dummy which takes the value of 1 if firms have no lishu 
relationship, takes the value of 2 for firms affiliated with the low level of government, takes the value of 3 for firms affiliated with the medium level of government, and takes 
the value of 4 for firms affiliated with the high level of government. Real Assets are expressed in thousands of yuan. All the other variables except for age and region are 
expressed in percentage terms. S.D. stands for standard deviations. The last three columns present p-values from an independent samples mean-equality test between the low 
level of lishu group and the medium level of lishu group (Diff1), between the low level of lishu group and the high level of lishu group (Diff2), and between the medium level 
of lishu group and the high level of lishu group (Diff3). *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and1% level, respectively. See Appendix for complete definitions of 
all variables. 
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Table 6.3 presents a comparison of the main variables by the types of firms’ ownership. 
In terms of investment-to-capital ratio, PEs and FEs invest more (10.88% and 9.28%, 
respectively), followed by COEs (7.72%), while SOEs have the lowest ratio (3.15%). 
SOEs and FEs are generally large in real assets (1220.30 thousands of yuan and 
1118.85 thousands of yuan, respectively), compared with PEs and COEs (608.10 
thousands of yuan and 407.01 thousands of yuan, respectively). SOEs have the highest 
political affiliation level (level 3) and are the longest-established firms in terms of 
firms age (28 years), followed by COEs with 18 years old and the second highest 
political affiliation level (level 2), while the FEs are the youngest one (10 years old). 
This is due to the fact that most foreign firms entered China after the 1990s. SOEs also 
suffer from soft budget constraints indicated by their highest leverage ratio (65.35%), 
while FEs enjoy the highest cash flow-to-capital ratio (37.88%). Table 6.3 also shows 
that sales/capital ratio is the highest for COEs (7.48%) and the sales growth is the 
highest for private firms (11.29%). Finally, we observe that the FEs prefer to locate 
their firms in the coastal region, while SOEs are more likely to locate their firms in 
the inner area of China.  
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Table 6.3 Descriptive statistics for ownership (sample mean, median, and S.D.) 
 
Variables 
SOEs PEs          FEs            COEs                    
Diff2 Diff3 Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Diff1 
Investment/Capital 3.154 1.057 27.636 10.883 7.472 32.126 9.283 5.896 28.561 7.719 4.438 31.458 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
PA 0.944 1.000 0.229 0.317 0.000 0.465 0.234 0.000 0.423 0.814 1.000 0.389 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
PAV 3.212 3.000 0.719 1.533 1.000 0.864 1.398 1.000 0.799 2.101 2.000 0.718 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Cash flow/Capital 14.314 7.586 29.830 34.248 21.358 42.357 37.883 24.399 46.346 37.813 21.904 49.349 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Sales/Capital 2.998 1.607 4.511 7.450 4.744 8.076 6.756 4.123 7.649 7.475 4.535 8.364 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Leverage 65.352 66.059 26.584 58.875 60.849 23.853 46.000 45.756 24.282 58.378 59.665 25.850 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Sales Growth 4.768 4.789 33.609 11.288 10.878 33.971 8.543 8.703 31.817 7.880 7.548 33.999 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Real Assets 1220.297 386.136 2177.360 608.104 207.952 1299.233 1118.852 444.634 1820.282 407.006 183.795 785.862 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Age 27.920 30.000 15.476 11.401 8.000 9.272 9.799 10.000 3.413 18.029 15.000 11.150 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Region 1.810 2.000 0.827 1.370 1.000 0.677 1.079 1.000 0.348 1.418 1.000 0.680 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
    Observations 25,582           215,269                        69,781                        30,087    
Notes: PA is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm has a lishu relationship and 0 otherwise. PAV is an ordinal dummy which takes the value of 1 if firms have no lishu relationship, 
takes the value of 2 for firms affiliated with the low level of government, takes the value of 3 for firms affiliated with the medium level of government, and takes the value of 4 for 
firms affiliated with the high level of government. Real Assets are expressed in thousands of yuan. All the other variables except for age and region are expressed in percentage terms. 
S.D. stands for standard deviations. The ownership classification is based on the majority average ownership shares (at least 50%). SOEs, PEs, FEs, and COEs refers to state-owned 
enterprises, private enterprises, foreign enterprises, and collectively-owned enterprises. The last three columns present p-values from an independent samples mean-equality test between 
the SOEs group and the PEs group (Diff1), between SOEs group and the FEs group (Diff2), and between PEs group and FEs group (Diff3). *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 
5%, and1% level, respectively. See Appendix for complete definitions of all variables.  
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The descriptive statistics for three different regions of China are provided in Table 6.4. 
We observe that firms located in the central region have the highest investment to 
capital ratio (10.01%), followed by firms in the central area (9.21%), and firms in the 
west of China have the lowest investment/capital ratio (7.03%) and the highest political 
affiliation level. In addition, firms in the west of China are generally larger, in terms of 
real assets (835.87 thousands of yuan) and older (around 17 years) than firms in the east 
and central of China. Interestingly, firms located in the coastal region have the highest 
sales/capital ratio and cash flow/capital ratio (7.55% and 36.12%, respectively), while 
those located in the west of China enjoy the highest leverage ratio (60.01%). However, 
firms in the central area have the largest sales growth (11.06%). This may be attributed 
to their location advantage, which is close to the heart of China, Beijing, which is one 
of the biggest cities with rapid growth rate, providing extensive markets to the firms.  
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Table 6.4 Descriptive statistics for region (sample mean, median, and S.D.) 
 
Variables 
            Costal            Central            Western 
Diff1 Diff2 
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. 
Investment/Capital 10.006 6.617 30.936 9.205 5.326 33.253 7.030 3.301 29.710 0.000*** 0.000*** 
PA 0.345 0.000 0.475 0.554 1.000 0.497 0.612 1.000 0.487 0.000*** 0.000*** 
PAV 1.572 1.000 0.890 2.004 2.000 1.015 2.259 3.000 1.106 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Cash flow/Capital 36.122 22.938 44.173 29.887 15.078 44.272 22.852 13.286 35.950 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Sales/Capital 7.550 4.778 8.187 5.494 3.144 6.749 4.680 2.532 6.288 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Leverage 56.098 57.814 24.672 57.412 58.095 26.632 60.014 60.505 24.765 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Sales Growth 9.781 9.666 32.999 11.059 10.156 35.522 8.869 8.289 34.749 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Real Assets 742.927 253.649 1475.306 691.417 210.000 1487.587 835.868 277.434 1629.327 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Age 11.971 10.000 8.953 15.079 10.000 12.859 16.680 11.000 13.695 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Region 1.000 1.000 0.000 2.000 2.000 0.000 3.000 3.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Observations 269,414 48,828 37,811   
Notes: PA is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm has a lishu relationship and 0 otherwise. PAV is an ordinal dummy which takes the value of 1 if firms have no lishu 
relationship, takes the value of 2 for firms affiliated with the low level of government, takes the value of 3 for firms affiliated with the medium level of government, and takes the 
value of 4 for firms affiliated with the high level of government. Real Assets are expressed in thousands of yuan. All the other variables except for age and region are expressed 
in percentage terms. S.D. stands for standard deviations. The last two columns present p-values from an independent samples mean-equality test between the coastal region group 
and the central region group (Diff1), and between the coastal region group and the western region group (Diff2). *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and1% level, 
respectively. See Appendix for complete definitions of all variables.  
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6.5 Empirical results 
 
6.5.1 Financial constraints in China 
 
Table 6.5 presents the estimation of Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) for the full sample of firms. 
Column (1) reports the estimation for Eq. (1), while column (2) reports the estimation 
for Eq. (2). Both equations are estimated by the first-difference GMM technique.  
 
Focusing on the coefficient of cash flow variable in column (1). Under the assumption 
of perfect capital markets without financial constraints, we should find a negative and 
insignificant relationship between investment and the availability of cash flow. 
However, if the cash flow is positively and significantly associated with the investment, 
this suggests that the firm’s investment activities are subject to credit constraints. Our 
result shows a positive and precisely determined coefficient on cash flow in Eq. (1), 
which is consistent with our first hypothesis that Chinese firms’ investments have a 
significant sensitivity to its internal funds. The coefficient of cash flow in first column 
estimator is 0.202 and the standard deviation for cash flow in Table 6.1 is 43.605. 
Therefore, a one-standard-deviation increase in cash flows yields an 8.808 increase in 
investment. The mean value of the investment is 9.580, hence a one-standard-deviation 
increase in cash flows creates a 91.94% increase of investment. This result indicates 
that the effect of cash flow on investment is economically significant.  
 
Column (2) in Table 6.5 presents the results by controlling for the sales growth and 
leverage ratio. We find that the coefficient on cash flows decreases to 0.141, but remain 
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significant at a 5% level, indicating that the investment is sensitive to the availability 
of internal funds in China. Specifically, one-standard-deviation increase in cash flows 
yields a 6.148 increase in investment. Evaluated at the sample mean for investment, a 
one-standard-deviation increase in cash flow creates a 64.18% increase in investment. 
This result also consistent with most of the existing studies (FHP, 1988; Chow and 
Fung, 1998; Cull et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2011; Hubbard, 1998; Stein, 2003; Dethier 
et al., 2011).  
 
When focusing on the coefficients of the other regressors, we find a positive and 
significant relationship between sales-to-capital ratio and investment in both columns. 
More specifically, in the reduced equation, a 10% increase in sales-to-capital ratio 
causes a 3.427 increase in investment. Considering the mean value for investment, a 
10% increase in sales-to-capital ratio enhances the investment by 35.75%. As for the 
augment equation, a 10% increase in sales-to-capital ratio causes a 3.299 increase in 
investment. Evaluated at the mean value of investment, a 10% increase in sales to 
capital ratio enhances the investment by 34.44%. 
 
The insignificant but positive coefficient on the leverage ratio indicates that debt may 
not be the first preference for Chinese firms to finance their investment activities. This 
can be explained by the fact that private firms, which takes up almost 60% of our 
sample, are not favoured in the capital market, which is dominated by the government. 
Therefore, it might be difficult for them to obtain sufficient external financing when 
there is an investment opportunity. We also find a negative and significant (at 1% level) 
relationship between sales growth and investment intensity. One possible explanation 
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for the negative relationship between sales growth and investment/capital ratio is that 
firms with less expected future profits generally invest less, but require more loans and 
face higher default risks. Meanwhile, via expanding investments, these firms can gain 
more revenue, which in turn can reduce the risk of default and increase these firms’ 
liquidity. According to Cleary et al. (2007), these firms will ultimately invest more.  
  
Although the Sargan test indicates some problems with the specification of the model 
and/or the validity of the instruments, the m3 test in both columns shows that the null 
of no 3rd-order autocorrelation of the differenced residuals cannot be rejected. As we 
have discussed in section 6.3.2, the J-test tends to over-reject given the large size of 
our panel, we incline not to consider too much about this statistic. We therefore 
conclude that the instruments and specifications are generally acceptable.  
 
To summarise, the results suggest that Chinese firms suffer from financial constraints 
as their investment intensity is sensitive to the access to cash flow.  
302 
 
Table 6.5 Financial constraints in China 
 
Variables  (1)  (2) 
𝑰𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 𝑲𝒊(𝒕−𝟏)⁄  -0.026 -0.119*** 
 (0.038) (0.042) 
𝑪𝑭𝒊𝒕 𝑲𝒊𝒕⁄  0.202*** 0.141** 
 (0.057) (0.057) 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊𝒕 𝑲𝒊𝒕⁄  4.340*** 4.181*** 
 (0.690) (0.672) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊𝒕  0.023 
  (0.078) 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒕  -0.616*** 
  (0.115) 
   
m1 -18.64 -19.090 
m3 0.299 0.167 
J (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
Observations 356,053 356,053 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the results for the reduced equation and augmented equation, 
respectively. We estimate all equations using the first-difference GMM estimator. The robust standard 
errors are presented in the parentheses. Time dummies and interactions between industries dummies 
and time dummies are included in all regressions. Instruments in all columns are three lags of all right-
hand-side variables, time dummies and interactions between industries dummies and time dummies. 
m1/m2/m3 are tests for first-order/second-order/third-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The J 
statistics is a test for the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null hypothesis 
of instrument validity. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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6.5.2 The lishu relationship and financial constraints in China  
 
Test results of estimating the second hypothesis, which predicts that firms with a lishu 
relationship face less financial constraints than their counterpart, are reported in Table 
6.6. Column (1) reports the results for Eq. (3), while column (2) presents the results 
for Eq. (4). The interaction terms are based on the cash flow-to-capital ratio and the 
lishu dummy variable.  
 
The negative coefficient of the interaction term between cash flow and lishu 
relationship in column (1) indicates investment/capital ratio is less sensitive to the level 
of cash flow for the firms with a lishu relationship. This insignificant level is due to 
omitting the relevant control variables. Focusing on the results in column (2), we find 
that the coefficient of the interaction term is significantly negative, suggesting that the 
lishu relationship reduces the sensitivity of investment to cash flow.  
 
In the regressions including interactions, the overall cash flow coefficient equals the 
cash flow coefficient plus the interaction coefficient multiplied by the mean value of 
the interactive variable (Mclean et al., 2012). In this case, in column (1) the total cash 
flow coefficient is the sum of the cash flow coefficient plus the cash flow-PA 
interaction coefficient multiplied by the mean value of PA. The cash flow coefficient 
in this regression is 0.215, whereas the interaction term is -0.055, the mean value of 
PA for firms with a lishu relationship is 1.00 and for those without a lishu relationship 
is 0.00. Therefore, the overall cash flow ratio for firms with a lishu relationship is 0.16 
and for non-affiliated firms is 0.215, which is more than one time larger than that for 
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affiliated firms. Looking at column (2), the cash flow coefficient in this regression is 
0.174, while the interaction term is -0.075. Hence, the overall cash flow ratio in Eq. 
(4) for firms with a lishu relationship is 0.099 and for firms without a lishu relationship 
is 0.174. These results support our Hypothesis 2, which indicates that the lishu 
relationship can mitigate the financial constraints faced by affiliated firms.  
 
As for the other variables, sales-to-capital ratio still has a positive and significant 
influence on investment activities. The coefficient of sales growth remains negative 
and significant. We do not find a significant relationship between leverage ratio and 
firms’ investment activities. As the m3 test in both columns is not rejected, we 
therefore conclude that our instruments and specification are generally acceptable.  
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 Table 6.6 The lishu relationship and financial constraints in China 
Variables (1) (2) 
𝑰𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 𝑲𝒊(𝒕−𝟏)⁄  -0.012 -0.077* 
 (0.038) (0.040) 
𝑪𝑭𝒊𝒕 𝑲𝒊𝒕⁄  0.215*** 0.174*** 
 (0.067) (0.065) 
𝑪𝑭𝒊𝒕 𝑲𝒊𝒕⁄ × 𝑷𝑨 -0.055 -0.075* 
 (0.045) (0.043) 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊𝒕 𝑲𝒊𝒕⁄  4.344*** 4.263*** 
 (0.692) (0.667) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊𝒕  0.002 
  (0.076) 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒕  -0.447*** 
  (0.105) 
   
m1 -18.990 
 
-18.73 
 
m3 0.194 
 
-0.103 
 
J (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
Observations 356,053 356,053 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the results for the reduced equation and augmented euqtion, 
respectively. We estimate all equations using the first-difference GMM estimator. The robust 
standard errors are presented in the parentheses. Time dummies and interactions between industries 
dummies and time dummies are included in all regressions. Instruments in all columns are three lags 
of all right-hand-side variables, time dummies and interactions between industries dummies and time 
dummies. m1/m2/m3 are tests for first-order/second-order/third-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation. The J statistics is a test for the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null hypothesis of instrument validity. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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6.5.3 Different levels of the lishu relationship and financial constraints in China 
 
Table 6.7 presents the test results for our third hypothesis, which expects that the higher 
level of government the firms affiliated with, the lower cash flow-investment 
sensitivity they face. To this end, we estimate the Eqs. (5) and (6) and report the results 
in columns (1) and (2), respectively.  
 
Looking at the results in column (1), the negative coefficient of the interaction term 
indicates that firms with a high level of lishu relationship face less investment-cash 
flow sensitivity. By controlling for relevant variables, this effect becomes significant. 
Specifically, the cash flow coefficient in column (1) is 0.248, while the interaction term 
is -0.033. The mean value of PAV for firms without a lishu relationship, and firms 
affiliated with a low/medium/high level of government are 1.00/2.00/3.00/4.00, 
respectively. Therefore, the overall cash flow coefficient of the firms without a lishu 
relationship is 0.215, the figure is 0.182 for the firms with a low level of lishu 
relationship, it is 0.149 for the firms with a medium level of lishu relationship, and for 
the firms with a high level of lishu relationship the number is 0.116. Focusing on the 
results of the augmented equation, we calculate the overall cash flow coefficient for 
non-affiliated firms is 0.187, while that for firms affiliated with a low/medium/high 
level of government is 0.125/0.063/0.001, respectively. In line with our Hypothesis 3, 
these results suggest that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow decreases when the 
level of the affiliated government increases. This may be attributed to the higher level 
of governmental control of the abundant resources, which is likely to support their 
affiliated firms. In this regard, the dependence of investment on cash flow can be 
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alleviated consequently.  
 
The results for the other variables are similar to the previous findings. Leverage ratio 
does not have a significant influence on investments. Increases in sales-to-capital ratio 
will increase the investment, while the relationship between sales growth and 
investment is negative and significant due to the revenue effect. Moreover, due to the 
large panel, we focus on the m3 tests, which do not indicate significant problems of 
the model specification.  
Table 6.7 Different levels of the lishu relationship and financial constraints  
 
Variables (1) (2) 
𝑰𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 𝑲𝒊(𝒕−𝟏)⁄  -0.012 -0.093** 
 (0.038) (0.041) 
𝑪𝑭𝒊𝒕 𝑲𝒊𝒕⁄  0.248*** 0.249*** 
 (0.086) (0.083) 
𝑪𝑭𝒊𝒕 𝑲𝒊𝒕⁄ × 𝑷𝑨𝑽 -0.033 -0.062** 
 (0.027) (0.027) 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊𝒕 𝑲𝒊𝒕⁄  4.265*** 4.244*** 
 (0.677) (0.665) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊𝒕  0.007 
  (0.078) 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒕  -0.547*** 
  (0.112) 
   
m1 -19.10 
 
-19.27 
0 
m3 0.204 
 
-0.029 
 
J (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
Observations 356,053 356,053 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the results for the reduced equation and augmented equation, 
respectively. We estimate all equations using the first-difference GMM estimator. The robust standard 
errors are presented in the parentheses. Time dummies and interactions between industries dummies 
and time dummies are included in all regressions. Instruments in all columns are three lags of all right-
hand-side variables, time dummies and interactions between industries dummies and time dummies. 
m1/m2/m3 are tests for first-order/second-order/third-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The J 
statistics is a test for the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null hypothesis 
of instrument validity. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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6.6 Further tests 
 
6.6.1 The lishu relationship and financial constraints by firm ownership 
 
We firstly estimate the financial constraints and the extent to which a lishu relationship 
affects financial constraints by different types of firms’ ownership. As we find that 
around 94% of state-owned firms and 84% of collectively-owned firms are politically 
affiliated, in Table 6.8, we only report the results for private firms (in column (1)), 
which account for more than 60% of our full sample, and foreign firms (in column (2)), 
which are generally the youngest and active firms in China. 
 
Focusing on sub-columns (a) and (b) of private firms, and (I) and (II) of foreign firms, 
we find that the coefficients on cash flow in all regressions are significant and positive, 
indicating that financial constraints exist in private and foreign firms in China. 
Interestingly, we observe that financial constraints are more severe in foreign firms 
than in private firms. Looking at the augmented equation results for both firms (sub-
columns (b) and (II), respectively), we find that the coefficient on cash flow is 
significant at the 10% level for private firms, while it is at the 1% level for foreign 
firms. In particular, a one-standard-deviation increase in cash flow leads to a 7.918 
increase in investment of foreign firms and a 6.404 increase in private firms. Evaluated 
at the mean value of investment in each group, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
cash flow creates an 85.29% increase for foreign firms and a 58.85% increase in 
private firms.  
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Sub-columns (c) and (d) in column (1), and (III) and (IV) in column (2) report the 
linkage between the lishu relationship and financial constraints of private and foreign 
firms, respectively. Focusing on the coefficient on the interaction term between cash 
flow and the lishu relationship, we find that it is negatively related to the 
investment/capital ratio in all four regressions, suggesting that the lishu relationship 
can alleviate financial constraints for both private and foreign firms. Especially, such 
effect is more pronounced for foreign firms (significant at the 1% level) when 
compared with private firms (significant at the 10% level). Particularly in the 
augmented regressions for foreign firms, the overall cash flow coefficient for affiliated 
firms is 0.159, while it is 0.281 for non-affiliated firms. Similar results are found for 
other independent variables.  
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Table 6.8 The lishu relationship and financial constraints in China by ownership 
 
Variables 
Private Firms  
(1) 
Foreign Firms 
(2) 
 (a)  (b) (c) (d) (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
𝑰𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 𝑲𝒊(𝒕−𝟏)⁄  -0.085*** -0.191*** -0.085*** -0.114** -0.032 -0.069 -0.022 -0.042 
 (0.005) (0.060) (0.005) (0.054) (0.062) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) 
𝑪𝑭𝒊𝒕 𝑲𝒊𝒕⁄  0.286*** 0.187* 0.290*** 0.123* 0.238*** 0.209*** 0.298*** 0.281*** 
 (0.045) (0.096) (0.050) (0.095) (0.078) (0.078) (0.086) (0.085) 
𝑪𝑭𝒊𝒕 𝑲𝒊𝒕⁄ × 𝑷𝑨   -0.031 -0.024*   -0.125** -0.122*** 
   (0.041) (0.061)   (0.049) (0.046) 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊𝒕 𝑲𝒊𝒕⁄  4.727*** 4.590*** 4.759*** 4.133*** 2.016 1.686 2.158 1.769 
 (0.407) (0.754) (0.410) (0.694) (1.805) (1.320) (1.849) (1.357) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊𝒕  0.063  0.042  0.120  0.120 
  (0.118)  (0.106)  (0.119)  (0.122) 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒕  -0.882***  -0.632***  -0.205  -0.130 
  (0.171)  (0.146)  (0.135)  (0.125) 
         
m1 -68.16 
 
-15.10 
 
-67.36 
 
-15.64 
 
-10.56 
 
-9.706 
 
-10.57 
 
-9.602 
 
m2 
1.539 
 
 
1.550 
 
     
m3  -0.022 
 
 -0.032 
 
-0.011 
 
0.285 
 
-0.087 
 
0.0460 
 J (p-value) 0.0000 0.417 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 215,269 215,269 215,269 215,269 69,781 69,781 69,781 69,781 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the results for private firms and foreign firms, respectively. Sub-columns (a) and (I) present the results for estimating Eq. (1) in each 
group. Sub-columns (b) and (II) report the results for estimating Eq. (2) in each group. Sub-columns (c) and (III) present the results for estimating Eq. (3) in each group. 
Sub-columns (d) and (IV) report the results for estimating Eq. (4) in each group. We estimate all equations using the first-difference GMM estimator. The robust standard 
errors are presented in the parentheses. Time dummies and interactions between industries dummies and time dummies are included in all regressions. Instruments in all 
columns are two and deeper lags of all right-hand-side variables, time dummies and interactions between industries dummies and time dummies. m1/m2/m3 are tests for 
first-order/second-order/third-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. 
The J statistics is a test for the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null hypothesis of instrument validity. * indicates significance at the 10% 
level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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6.6.2 The lishu relationship and financial constraints by region 
 
Given China’s huge size and various geographic distributions, the regions have played 
a vital role in the development and growth of the Chinese economy. In fact, most 
regional development policies in China are based on three zones, i.e. the east, the 
central, and the west.  
 
Because of the reform and opening-up policy, firms locating in the east of China have 
experienced fast development since the 1970s, which causes development divergences 
between the coastal and inner regions. In order to reduce the regional inequalities and 
balance the development across different regions, the Chinese government has 
changed its development policies with a focus on the central and western regions. The 
government implemented the “Development of the Western Region in China” (xi bu 
da kai fa) in the late 1990s, and the “Rise of Central China Strategy” (zhong bu jue qi 
zhan lve) in 2004. Supported by these national strategies, substantial financing has 
been invested in environment, infrastructure, and energy and resource extraction in 
those regions.  
 
As the coastal region in China is the most developed and competitive market for firms, 
they have to get involved in the severe competition for financial resources and other 
benefits. In this case, firms in the eastern provinces are more prone to rely on their own 
internal financing than firms in the central and western provinces. Therefore, firms in 
the eastern region are more likely to be financially constrained (Chen, 2008; Guariglia 
et al., 2011).  
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We test the Hypotheses 1 and 2 in the three regional groups and report our results in 
Table 6.9.1 Column (1) presents the results of the coastal region, column (2) reports 
the results of the central region, and the results of the western region are presented in 
column (3). We find that the sensitivity of investment to the internal funds is significant 
for firms in the eastern and central regions than those in the western region. This can 
be attributed to the fact that the central development policy has been carried out by the 
Chinese government only since 2004. Given our sample period, which is from 2002 to 
2007, it may not have enough time for us to observe the significant effect of this policy. 
Furthermore, focusing on the interaction term, we find that, for those firms with 
financial constraints in the coastal and central regions, the lishu relationship can reduce 
the cash flow-investment sensitivity.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1  We only report the results by estimating the augmented equations, and present the results by 
estimating the reduced equations in the Appendix.  
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Table 6.9 The lishu relationship and financial constraints in China by region (augmented equation) 
 
Variables 
Coastal Region 
(1) 
Central Region 
(2) 
Western Region 
(3) 
(a) (b) (A) (B) (I) (II) 
𝑰𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 𝑲𝒊(𝒕−𝟏)⁄  -0.156*** -0.118** -0.093*** -0.095*** 0.026 0.077 
 (0.050) (0.048) (0.008) (0.008) (0.106) (0.096) 
𝑪𝑭𝒊𝒕 𝑲𝒊𝒕⁄  0.122** 0.162*** 0.256*** 0.320** 0.341 0.287* 
 (0.058) (0.064) (0.075) (0.102) (0.258) (0.128) 
𝑪𝑭𝒊𝒕 𝑲𝒊𝒕⁄ × 𝑷𝑨  -0.084*  -0.074*  -0.036 
  (0.046)  (0.070)  (0.113) 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊𝒕 𝑲𝒊𝒕⁄  4.372*** 4.631*** 0.493 0.818 0.130 -0.287 
 (0.747) (0.735) (0.486) (0.513) (1.926) (1.751) 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊𝒕 0.078 0.048 0.495*** 0.448*** -0.277 -0.213 
 (0.092) (0.089) (0.094) (0.096) (0.211) (0.195) 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒕 -0.705*** -0.502*** -0.285*** -0.225*** -0.367** -0.221 
 (0.140) (0.126) (0.084) (0.082) (0.185) (0.153) 
       
m1 -16.67 
 
-15.95 
 
-28.39 
 
-15.64 
 
-7.027 
 
-7.219 
 m2   -0.190 
 
   
m3 0.147 
 
-0.214 
 
 -0.032 
 
-1.590 
 
-1.998 
 J (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
Observations 269,414 269,414 48,828 215,269 37,811 37,811 
Notes: Columns (1) , (2), and (3) report the results for coastal region, central region, and western region, respectively. Sub-columns (a), (A) and (I) present the results for 
estimating Eq. (2) in each region. Sub-columns (b), (B) and (II) report the results for estimating Eq. (4) in each region. We estimate all equations using the first-difference 
GMM estimator. The robust standard errors are presented in the parentheses. Time dummies and interactions between industries dummies and time dummies are included 
in all regressions. Instruments in all columns are two and deeper lags of all right-hand-side variables, time dummies and interactions between industries dummies and 
time dummies. m1/m2/m3 are tests for first-order/second-order/third-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under 
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The J statistics is a test for the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null hypothesis of instrument 
validity. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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6.7 Conclusion  
 
The impacts of financial constraints on firms’ investment activities have been 
substantially explored since FHP (1988), which for the first time that it was pointed 
out that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow can be regarded as an indicator of 
financial constraints. The existing studies on financial constraints have been extended 
to inventory investment, R&D investment, employment demand, and the growth of 
firms. Most literature estimating the links between political connections and financial 
constraints focuses on the developed countries. Some literature explores the 
developing countries, but with a focus on Thailand, Pakistan, and Malaysia. However, 
these studies define political connections either as state ownership or the linkage 
established by entrepreneurs’ political participation. Our study fills the gap in the 
literature testing the effects of political connections, in the context of the lishu 
relationship, on the cash flow-investment sensitivity for Chinese unlisted firms.  
 
We use a comprehensive firm-level dataset from 2002 to 2007 provided by the NBS, 
which includes 105,487 mainly unlisted firms from 31 provinces or province-
equivalent municipal cities all across China. We demonstrate that Chinese firms 
confront financial constraints and can mitigate their cash flow-investment sensitivity 
through the lishu relationship. Moreover, this effect is more significant to the firms 
affiliated with a high level of government. We also find that compared with private 
firms, foreign firms are more likely to encounter financial constraints; therefore, the 
lishu relationship can reduce their financial constraints significantly. Furthermore, 
firms locating in the western region have the least sensitivity of investment to the 
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availability of internal financing due to the implement of the regional development 
policies. However, the lishu relationship can help firms in the central and coastal 
regions alleviate financial constraints.    
 
Our findings confirm the “lending bias” and “political pecking order” existing in the 
Chinese capital market. One of the implications for Chinese firms is that they can 
diminish financial constraints by the lishu relationship with the governments. In 
addition, the higher level of government they can affiliate with, the more investment-
cash flow sensitivity they can reduce. In addition, the Chinese governments should 
also develop policies to mitigate financing obstacles for the financially constrained 
firms and the firms with a lower level of political affiliation. Non-banking financial 
institutions, such as trust, security, insurance, financial leasing, rural credit 
cooperatives, and financial companies, should be established to improve the financial 
system and reduce financial constraints for Chinese unlisted firms.   
 
Further research can be undertaken from the following directions. Firstly, it would be 
interesting to test other models, such as the error-correction model and Euler equation 
model. Secondly, it would be interesting to investigate the links between the lishu 
relationship and other types of investment activities. Thirdly, it also would be worthy 
of incorporating investments in net working capital (NWC), particularly in the context 
of China.  
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Appendix 6A 
Table 6A.1 Definition of the variables used 
 
Variable Definition 
Investment/capital 
ratio 
ratio of firms investment to tangible fixed assets 
PA 
a dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm has a lishu 
relationship and 0 otherwise 
PAV 
an ordinal dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm has no lishu 
relationship, 2 if firm has a lishu relationship with the low level 
of government, 3 if firm affiliated with the medium level of 
government, 4 if firm has a lishu relationship with the high 
level of government 
Leverage ratio ratio of total debt to total assets 
CFK ratio of cash flow to tangible fixed assets 
Sales/capital ratio ratio of firms real sales to tangible fixed assets 
Sales growth growth of total real sales  
Region coastal region=1; central region=2; western region=3 
Deflators 
all variables (except tangible fixed assets) are deflated using 
provincial ex-factory producer price indices (pdsales) taken 
from various issues of the china statistical yearbook. tangible 
fixed assets are deflated using a deflator for fixed capital 
formation (pdgoods)  
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Table 6A.2 The correlation matrix of the main variables 
 
 
Table 6A.3 Structure of the unbalanced panel 
 
Year 
No. of 
Observations 
Percent Cumulative 
2002 32,358 9.09 9.09 
2003 44,586 12.52 21.61 
2004 56,942 15.99 37.60 
2005 66,033 18.55 56.15 
2006 79,185 22.24 78.39 
2007 76,949 21.61 100.00 
Total 356,053 100.00  
 
No. of 
Observations per 
firm 
No. of Firms Percent Cumulative 
5 26,834 25.44 25.44 
6 20,739 19.66 45.10 
7 23,598 22.37 67.47 
8 34,316 32.53 100.00 
Total 105,487 100.00  
 
No. of 
Observations per 
firm 
No. of 
observations 
Percent Cumulative 
5 49,797 13.99 13.99 
6 53,540 15.04 29.02 
7 78,906 22.16 51.18 
8 173,810 48.82 100.00 
Total 356,053 100.00  
 
 
 
Investment
/Capital 
PA PAV 
Cash 
flow/Capital 
Sales/Capital Leverage 
Sales 
Growth 
Investment/Capital 1.000              
PA 0.030  1.000       
PAV -0.049  -0.075  1.000      
Cash flow/Capital -0.058  -0.100  0.884  1.000     
Sales/Capital -0.029  0.481  -0.116  -0.149  1.000    
Leverage 0.005  -0.194  0.066  0.068  0.060  1.000   
Sales Growth 0.139  0.134  -0.043  -0.049  0.132  0.003  1.000  
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Table 6A.4 The lishu relationship and financial constraints by region (reduced 
equation) 
 
Variables 
Coastal Region 
(1) 
Central Region 
(2) 
Western Region 
(3) 
(a) (b) (A) (B) (I) (II) 
𝑰𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) 𝑲𝒊(𝒕−𝟏)⁄  -0.041 -0.039 -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.072*** -0.073*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
𝑪𝑭𝒊𝒕 𝑲𝒊𝒕⁄  0.180*** 0.208*** 0.299*** 0.370*** 0.156 0.137 
 (0.057) (0.066) (0.083) (0.118) (0.122) (0.147) 
𝑪𝑭𝒊𝒕 𝑲𝒊𝒕⁄ × 𝑷𝑨  -0.065  -0.077  -0.035 
  (0.047)  (0.081)  (0.125) 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊𝒕 𝑲𝒊𝒕⁄  4.494*** 4.641*** 1.468*** 1.644*** 4.681** 4.452** 
 (0.769) (0.769) (0.500) (0.540) (1.937) (1.835) 
       
m1 -16.45 
 
-16.44 
 
-35.88 
 
-33.83 
 
-30.05 -30.54 
 m2   -0.006 
 
-0.079 
 
1.078 1.104 
 m3 0.207 
 
0.160 
 
    
J (p-value) 0.000 0.417 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
Observations 269,414 269,414 48,828 48,828 37,811 37,811 
Notes: Columns (1) , (2), and (3) report the results for coastal region, central region, and western region, 
respectively. Sub-columns (a), (A) and (I) present the results for estimating Eq. (1) in each region. Sub-
columns (b), (B) and (II) report the results for estimating Eq. (3) in each region. We estimate all equations 
using the first-difference GMM estimator. The robust standard errors are presented in the parentheses. 
Time dummies and interactions between industries dummies and time dummies are included in all 
regressions. Instruments in all columns are two and deeper lags of all right-hand-side variables, time 
dummies and interactions between industries dummies and time dummies. m1/m2/m3 are tests for first-
order/second-order/third-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The J statistics is a test for the over-
identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null hypothesis of instrument validity. * 
indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
319 
 
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter concludes the thesis. A summary of the findings is presented in section 
7.1. Section 7.2 raises the implications of this research. Limitations of this study and 
recommendations for future research are discussed in section 7.3.  
 
7.1 Summary of findings 
 
The lishu relationship is a unique kind of political connections, which only exists in 
China. Through this relationship, the government can control the firms legally and 
directly, while the affiliated firms can obtain favourable support from the government 
and develop smoothly under the market economy with Chinese characteristics. 
However, as a unique institutional variation of importance, the lishu relationship has 
received the least attention in previous research. For the first time in literature, Chapter 
2 provides the political and economic background of this relationship, explores its 
different meanings under the different economic development stages in China, 
introduces the procedures of establishing, changing, and terminating this relationship, 
and explores the difference between the lishu relationship and ownership structure. 
 
The dataset we use in this thesis is presented in Chapter 3. The dataset is drawn from 
the NBS (National Bureau of Statistics of China) from 2000 to 2007, which covers 
more than 100,000 mainly unlisted manufacturing firms from 31 provinces or 
province-equivalent municipal cities. This thesis investigates the determinants and 
effects of the lishu relationship between Chinese manufacturing enterprises and 
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central, provincial, or local governments. This thesis comprises three main empirical 
studies. In particular, we examine the determinants of the lishu relationship, the links 
between the lishu relationship and firms’ exporting, and the effects of the lishu 
relationship on firms’ financial constraints.  
 
Chapter 4, being the first empirical part, explores what types of firms are more likely 
to have political affiliation. This is an important question, but has been overlooked in 
the existing literature. We find that the older and larger firms are prone to have a lishu 
relationship, while the firms with foreign ownership and locating in the east of China 
are less likely to affiliate with the governments. Financially healthy firms are more 
likely to have the lishu relationship. However, firms with high profitability and sales 
growth do not show such preference. Furthermore, we find that firms are more 
inclined to have connections with the medium level of governments. We attribute this 
finding to the fact that the governments can provide the affiliated firms with the 
important resources and high flexibilities at the same time. Similar results are found 
by looking at the types of ownership and the locations of firms. Particularly, the 
magnitude of marginal effects is larger for private firms than that for foreign firms. 
Moreover, we do not find that cash flow is a precise determinant to the firms in the 
central and western regions. This can be explained by the fact that firms in these 
regions have received preferential financial supports due to the Chinese regional 
development policies. Therefore, these firms have less dependence on their internal 
funding.  
 
In Chapter 5, we estimate dynamic models for both the propensity and intensity of 
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exports of Chinese manufacturing firms. We employ the pooled Probit and Tobit 
models, clustering observations by firms ID, as well as random-effects Probit and 
Tobit models, respectively. Furthermore, we take into account of the sunk entry costs, 
unobserved firm heterogeneity, and the initial conditions problem. It is supposed to be 
the first study that estimates both firms’ exporting probability and intensity for the 
unlisted Chinese firms from the perspective of the lishu relationship. We reveal that 
sunk entry costs exist in firms’ exporting behaviour. Moreover, the overestimation of 
the size of the sunk entry costs can be alleviated by controlling the initial conditions 
problem appropriately. In addition, we find that the politically affiliated firms are less 
likely to participate in the export markets and export less once they enter these markets. 
This can be attributed to the political and social goals the affiliated firms have 
responsibilities to achieve, which in turn restricts the firms’ capability to 
internationalise. Interestingly, this negative effect is only significant to the firms 
affiliated with low or medium level of governments. We also find that firm size, total 
factor productivity, financial factors, ownership structure, and location are the 
significant determinants of firms’ exporting activities.   
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the relations between the lishu relationship and firms’ financial 
constraints, proxied by the sensitivity of investment to internal funds. We document 
that the investments of Chinese firms significantly depend on the availability of cash 
flow, suggesting that financial constraints exist in the context of China. We further 
find that by the lishu relationship, firms can alleviate such constraints. This effect is 
more significant for the firms affiliated with a higher level of government. We also 
find that, when compared with the private firms, the lishu relationship can reduce the 
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financial constraints of foreign firms more significantly because they are more likely 
to encounter the constraints. Furthermore, firms locating in the western region have 
the least sensitivity of investment to the availability of internal financing due to the 
regional policies. However, the lishu relationship can help firms in the central and 
coastal regions alleviate financial constraints.    
 
7.2 Implications of this research   
 
Given a relatively underdeveloped legal and market environment, having the lishu 
relationship may be an effective and active way for entrepreneurs to operate their 
business in the transitional economy. Our findings in Chapter 4 demonstrate that not 
all the firms are the good candidates to have the lishu relationship. In addition, China 
is geographically large and has different levels of governments. For the firms without 
the lishu relationship, they should be prepared to face the regulations from not only 
one government, but at least five layers of governments in the vertical hierarchy. 
Second, China has a system of economic decentralisation and political centralisation, 
in which the local governments have the authority to make economic policies. Since 
firms are more willing to be affiliated with the medium level of governments, the 
policy makers should establish the policies to support the firms’ development. At the 
same time, they should be cautious not to arouse further regional imbalance and 
inequity.  
 
The findings in Chapter 5 illustrate that entering into the foreign markets is always 
related to huge sunk costs. Therefore, the policies aiming to help firms overcome the 
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obstacles of exporting should be more effective and helpful in promoting more 
exporting entrant. The governments are advised to provide information about the 
potential foreign markets to reduce the sunk costs for the potential exporters. Secondly, 
we find that state ownership has a negative and significant impact on firms’ exporting 
activities. Therefore, firms with an exporting plan should avoid collaborating with 
SOEs or holding large state stakes in the firms. Last but not least, we find that 
affiliation with low or medium level of government is negatively associated with firms’ 
exporting activities, while this negative effect diminish for firms affiliated with high 
level of government. Therefore, firms with an international agenda should try to 
affiliate with higher level of governments, while avoiding the affiliation with the low 
or medium level of government. 
 
In Chapter 6, we confirm that the “lending bias” and “political pecking order” exist in 
the Chinese financial market. One of the implications for Chinese firms is that they 
can diminish financial constraints by the lishu relationship with the governments. In 
addition, the higher governments they can affiliate with, the more investment-cash 
flow sensitivity they can reduce. In addition, the Chinese governments should also 
develop policies to mitigate financing obstacles for the financially constrained firms 
and the firms with a lower level of political affiliation. Non-banking financial 
institutions, such as trust, security, insurance, financial leasing, rural credit 
cooperatives, and financial companies, should be established to improve the financial 
system and reduce financial constraints for Chinese unlisted firms.   
 
Following the deepening of the economic and political reforms in China, state-
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ownership has witnessed a decrease in recent years. Private enterprises are expected 
to play a more important and active role in every aspect of the country’s development. 
Under the current socialism political regime with the Chinese characteristics, the 
economic system in China is neither centrally planned nor market-based. According 
to the main findings in our three empirical chapters, as a part of an administrative 
strategy, the lishu relationship should be assessed carefully before deciding how to 
establish an efficient lishu relationship. To achieve the harmonious development 
national widely, the Chinese governments should establish new policies and 
regulations to alleviate the financial constraints, reduce large sunk entry costs for 
exporters, and balance the development across different political affiliation groups, 
ownership types, and regions.  
 
7.3 Limitations of the study and the proposed future research 
 
One of the limitations of this study results from the period covered in this dataset. 
Although the original panel data covers a relatively long period from 2000 to 2007, it 
does not include the data since 2008. As the global financial crisis swept all over the 
world during 2008 and 2009, Chinese firms have also experienced a decline in firm 
performance and exporting. Therefore, it would be of interest to examine whether the 
politically affiliated firms performed differently compared with the unaffiliated 
counterparts during the crisis.  
 
Secondly, we do not employ the IV Probit or Tobit estimator in Chapters 4 and 5, 
because it requires that the endogenous regressors are continuous and cannot be 
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applied when the categorical variables are included as regressors. Therefore, it would 
be prudent to test whether these results are robust by using other methods, for example, 
the special regressor estimator proposed by Lewbel (2000). Compared with the IV 
Porbit or Tobit model, the special regressor allows discrete or limited endogenous 
regressor. Baum (2012) develops the –sspecialreg- command in Stata. In this case, 
future research can be done by employing new estimation methods.  
 
Thirdly, in Chapter 6, it would be interesting to test whether the results remain robust 
if other models are applied, such as the error-correction model and Euler equation 
model (Bond et al., 2003; Guariglia, 2008). It also would be worthy of incorporating 
investments in net working capital (NWC), particularly in the context of China.  
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